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Abstract 
Recent research demonstrates that believing that an event occurred and recollecting 
an event are distinct components of remembering the past. The over-arching aim of 
this thesis was to examine whether omission errors in memory reports can be 
explained by the attenuation of belief in those memories. Specifically, we examined 
whether omission errors are characterised by lower belief ratings. Previous research 
suggests that omission errors can be elicited using suggestive and misleading post-
event information. Factors such as social feedback, contradictory evidence and event 
implausibility are also commonly reported reasons for people attenuating their belief 
that events in their past actually occurred. In Experiments 1 and 2, we sought to 
elicit omission errors using a procedure adapted from Wright et al. (2001). 
Participants saw a number of scenes, each showing a collection of household items. 
After a free recall test where participants had to recall as many items as they could 
from each scene, participants were either re-presented with the scenes (Expt. 1) or 
the experimenter read aloud to the participants the items they had recalled (Expt. 2). 
In these re-presented scenes, some of the items which were originally presented to 
the participants were withheld. The results showed that re-presenting participants 
with either the original stimuli (Expt. 1) or repeating back to participants the items 
they had recalled (Expt. 2) with some items withheld, did not result in participants 
attenuating their belief that they had previously seen these items. Furthermore, we 
did not find substantial evidence that these items were even omitted (at a higher rate) 
as predicted from previous research (Wright et al., 2001). In Experiments 3 and 4, 
participants’ memories of items (Expt. 3) or actions (Expt. 4) were challenged by a 
confederate (Expt. 3 & 4), or by the experimenter (Expt. 4) providing social 
feedback. The results showed that social feedback resulted in omission errors and the 
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attenuation of belief. However, we also found that memory ratings for omitted 
memories were lower than reported memories. In the discussion of our results, we 
highlight the important link between social feedback, omission errors and the 
attenuation of belief.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction to the Thesis 
 
Introduction 
Human memory is as remarkable as it is complex. In an attempt to understand 
how our memory works, memory is often described as being comprised of three 
stages. The first of these three stages is encoding, where we acquire the information 
which is to be remembered. The second stage is concerned with the storage of this 
information in our memory system. The final stage of remembering is retrieval, 
concerned with retrieving the information from the memory system. We must first 
acquire the information, retain it, and we must be able to gain access to this 
information when it is required. These different stages represent the basic processes 
involved in remembering. 
Psychologists are predominantly concerned with encoding and retrieval 
mechanisms when examining human memory. Researchers have examined a number 
of factors, occurring at encoding and retrieval, which can impact the way people 
remember pieces of information. For example, in the eyewitness memory literature, 
research has demonstrated that participants’ memories for details of an event are 
often impaired when there is a weapon present at encoding, known as the weapon 
focus effect (see Fawcett, Russell, Peace, & Christie, 2013). Research has also found 
that participants who are induced into a state of stress at retrieval show poorer 
memory performance compared with participants who are not in a stress state 
(Smeets, Otgaar, Candel, & Wolf, 2008). These findings demonstrate that memory 
performance can be impaired by factors at encoding and retrieval. 
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Endel Tulving once described retrieval as the most important of the three 
memory stages of remembering (Gazzaniga, 1991). Of course, encoding and storing 
information into memory seems rather pointless without a way of gaining access to 
this information when it is required. Retrieval is perhaps the most common process 
people associate with memory. We have all experienced being unable to remember 
something (e.g., where did I leave my keys?) and the frustration that comes with 
being unable to retrieve a memory. Attempting to retrieve information from memory 
can have four possible outcomes. This can be viewed as a 2 (encoded vs. not 
encoded) x 2 (retrieved vs. not retrieved) matrix. Encoded information can either be 
retrieved, what might be called perfect remembering; or fail to be retrieved, most 
often attributed to forgetting, but as will be discussed later, can also occur as a result 
of misleading and erroneous information. When people do not report information 
that was encoded, then people “suffer” from so-called omission errors. Misleading 
information can also cause people to report erroneous or false memories of the past. 
That is, in these cases, people retrieve a memory which is not part of the originally 
encoded information. 
Besides the critical distinction between the stages of encoding, storing, and 
retrieving information, recent research has made a distinction between recollecting 
the past and believing that an event occurred in the past (e.g., Mazzoni & Kirsch, 
2002; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004; Scoboria et al., 2014). A growing 
body of literature has demonstrated that people can have a strong belief that an event 
occurred in the past, accompanied by only a weak recollection of the event (Mazzoni 
& Kirsch, 2002), or indeed that people can have a strong recollection of an event 
which is accompanied by a weak belief that the event occurred (Mazzoni, Scoboria 
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& Harvey, 2010). This research highlights that what we often call ‘remembering’ is 
actually a combination of processes that includes recollection and belief.  
The focus of this thesis is on the consequences of having a strong recollection 
accompanied by a weak belief. Previously, researchers have speculated that the same 
manipulation used to cause the attenuation of belief has also resulted in omission 
errors (Mazzoni, Clark & Nash, 2014). However, the experiments presented in this 
thesis are the first to examine whether a relationship exists between attenuated belief 
and omission errors. Specifically, in this thesis, we report four experiments 
examining whether undermining peoples’ beliefs about the past but not their 
recollections of the past, would result in omission errors. 
The review of the literature to follow has three purposes. First, it will look at 
the ways our memories can become erroneous, with a specific focus on omission 
errors. Second, we then review the literature demonstrating that recollecting the past 
and beliefs about the past can co-occur or each independently occur when trying to 
remember events from out past. Finally, we outline the aims of this thesis. 
The Reconstructive Nature of Memory 
 A commonly held belief is that memory operates like a video camera. A 
recent survey has shown that 63% of a lay sample endorsed the proposition that 
memory ‘works like a video camera’ (Simons & Chabris, 2011). This view of 
memory suggests that when we experience an event, a literal recording of the event is 
stored in our mind, and that to remember the event, we simply need to retrieve the 
relevant recording and mentally replay the event. However, decades of memory 
research has demonstrated that this idea of memory is flawed. Instead, research has 
shown that each time we recollect the past, we are, in fact, reconstructing the past. It 
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is through this process of reconstructing our memories that our memory becomes 
susceptible to errors, such as reporting details incorrectly, reporting entirely new 
details or even omitting pieces of information.  
 One of the first demonstrations of this reconstructive character of memory 
was reported by Bartlett (1932). Bartlett used a method called repeated reproductions 
to reveal the reconstructive nature of remembering. Bartlett asked participants to read 
a story called ‘The War of the Ghosts’. Participants read the story twice and were 
then asked, at different time intervals, to recall the story. Initially, participants first 
recalled the story 15 minutes after reading it. Subsequently, participants were then 
asked to recall the story at different intervals, with some participants being asked to 
recall the story several years later. Bartlett was interested in how much of the story 
people were able to recall and how much of the recalled information had changed 
over the course of time. The findings from Bartlett’s research showed that 
participants often provided a shorter account of the story, recalling the gist (i.e., the 
general theme) of the story rather than reproducing the entire story verbatim (i.e., a 
word by word reproduction). Bartlett also found that participants reported what 
Bartlett termed ‘transformations’, replacing details such as ‘canoes’ from the original 
story into ‘boats’ in their recollection of the story. Perhaps the most interesting 
finding from this research was that participants either omitted information or 
provided explanations for elements of the story that were ambiguous to them (see 
Bergman & Roediger, 1999 for a replication). This research demonstrates that 
remembering the past is not a case of simply re-playing a video recording of the past 
in one’s mind, but instead, remembering involves reconstruction of the past.  
 Bartlett’s research of people mis-telling an innocent story is an example of 
how peoples’ memory for the past can become erroneous. Whereas making an error 
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while repeating a folk-tale is a benign memory error, researchers have demonstrated 
that errors, such as those described by Bartlett, can occur in situations where there 
are real consequences. The domain where these severe consequences frequently take 
centre-stage is the courtroom. One of those notable situations is when people witness 
a crime. Psychologists interested in false memories have used a variety of techniques 
to demonstrate that eyewitnesses can come to make memory errors when recalling 
details of a crime.  
 Over the past half a century, memory researchers have demonstrated that 
exposing people to erroneous and suggestive information can impact the accuracy 
(i.e., how accurate the memory report is) and completeness (i.e., how complete the 
memory report is) of their memory reports for past information (Loftus, 2005). In 
general, researchers have demonstrated three effects that such techniques can have 
on memory reports. The first is that people can report erroneous details about the past 
(e.g., reporting a stop sign which was actually a yield sign, Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 
1978). Second, people can report entirely false events that they never actually 
experienced (e.g., remembering becoming lost in a shopping mall, Loftus & Pickrell, 
1995). Finally, research has also shown that people can omit details from their 
memory reports (e.g., not mentioning the waitress who took the couple's order, 
Wright, Loftus, & Hall, 2001). Researchers have devised a number of paradigms to 
elicit these memory errors. Below we discuss these memory errors and the paradigms 
used to elicit them.  
Changing Details Within Memory 
One of the most frequently used procedures used to demonstrate how 
memories can be changed is the misinformation paradigm (see Loftus, 2005 for a 
review). Experiments using the misinformation paradigm often start by exposing 
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participants to a stimulus, such as a series of slides or a video of an armed robbery. 
Participants are then exposed to misleading post-event information (e.g., a narrative 
containing misleading information). After encountering the misleading post-event, 
participants are then given a memory test. One of the first misinformation 
experiments was performed by Loftus et al. (1978; Expt. 1) who presented 
participants with a series of slides showing a car accident. One of the slides showed 
the car at a junction. In this slide, half of the participants saw the car at a junction 
with a stop sign, while the remaining participants saw the car at a junction with a 
yield sign (give-way sign). Participants then answered a series of questions which 
included one asking about the sign. Half of the participants saw a question with 
consistent information (e.g., asking about a stop sign when the participant had seen a 
stop sign), while the other half saw a question with misleading information (e.g., 
asking about a stop sign when the participant had originally seen a yield sign). The 
results showed that in a subsequent recognition memory test, participants who had 
been questioned with consistent information – the sign which was present in the 
original scene - 75% of participants recognised the correct sign. When questioned 
with misleading information (e.g., asking about a stop sign when the participant had 
originally seen a yield sign), only 41% of participants recognised the sign from the 
original slide. These results showed that presenting witnesses with misleading post-
event information can result in the witnesses reporting details differently from what 
they originally saw. 
Over almost four decades, research using the misinformation paradigm has 
demonstrated that details within people’s memory reports can be changed when 
people encounter misleading post-event information (see Loftus, 2005 for a review). 
For example, participants have been misled about whether a victim had an arm or 
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neck injury (Okado & Stark, 2005), about seeing bugs bunny at Disney World 
(Braun, Ellis & Loftus, 2002) and whether a thief was accompanied by an 
accomplice (Wright, Self & Justice 2000). These experiments demonstrate that 
misleading post-event information can contaminate people’s memory reports about 
past experiences. 
Another paradigm demonstrating how people can come to report erroneous 
details is the social contagion paradigm. Roediger, Meade, and Bergman (2001) 
paired each participant (N = 24) with ‘another participant’ who was actually a 
confederate. Each pair saw six scenes of rooms from around a house (e.g., a 
bedroom, a kitchen, and a garage). Half the pairs saw the scenes for 15 seconds while 
the remaining half saw the scenes for 60 seconds. The participant and the confederate 
then took turns to recall items from each of the scenes (collaborative recall). During 
the collaborative recall, for half of the scenes, the confederate reported one highly 
consistent and one low consistent false item. That is, these items were not present in 
the original scenes. An example of a highly consistent item for the kitchen scene 
would be a toaster or a knife. A low consistency item for the kitchen would be oven 
mitts or napkins. Participants then completed an individual recall test where they had 
to recall as many items as they could for each of the scenes. The results showed that 
22% of the false items reported by the confederate were reported by participants in 
the individual recall test, compared with only 6% of control items (high and low 
consistency items for the scenes not reported by the confederate). Participants were 
more likely to report the erroneous details when they had seen the original scenes for 
a shorter amount of time (15 seconds) compared with a longer amount of time (60 
seconds). Also, participants made more errors by reporting high consistency items 
than low consistency items. The key finding from this experiment is that other people 
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can influence the way we remember the past. However, it is also noteworthy that this 
effect was larger when participants were given less time to study the material and 
when the false item was highly consistent. 
Implanting False Memories for Events 
 The research reviewed above demonstrates that misleading post-event 
information can cause people to report erroneous details within their memory reports. 
However, research has shown that people can come to report that they remember 
entire events that they, in fact, did not experience, known as implanted false 
memories. One of the first experiments to demonstrate that people can come to report 
implanted false memories as ‘remembered’ events was conducted by Loftus and 
Pickrell (1995). In this experiment, information provided by the experimenter 
suggested that the participant had become lost in a shopping mall when aged between 
four and six years old. Before testing the participants, the researchers contacted the 
participants’ parents to (a) collect details of three events the participant had 
experienced between the ages of four and six-years-old, (b) to find out details about 
the shopping centre where the participant might have visited around age five and 
who they might have been with, and crucially, (c) to ensure that the participant had 
not had a genuine experience of being lost in a shopping mall. Participants were then 
presented with narratives describing each of the four events, including the three 
genuine events (provided by the parents) and the false event of being lost in the 
shopping mall (including accurate details about the experience obtained from the 
parents). The narrative describing the participant being lost in the shopping mall 
included details about the participant getting lost and starting to cry before being 
helped by an elderly person and eventually being reunited with their family. 
Participants were asked to read each narrative and provide details about their 
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memory for the event. Participants returned 1-2 weeks later for an interview where 
they were again asked to provide details about each of the four events. The 
interviewer used the information from the narratives to encourage the participant to 
provide information about each of the events. After the interview, participants were 
encouraged to think about the event before returning for an interview 1-2 weeks 
later. Recall that for each participant (N = 24) there were three true memories. The 
results showed that 68% (n = 49) of the true events were remembered, with 
participants providing more details about the event than had been provided in the 
narrative. This figure was consistent across all interviews. For the 24 false events, in 
interview 1, seven participants reported that they could remember details about the 
event, which decreased to six participants (25%) in the second interview. This 
research showed that a small, but significant number of participants came to report 
remembering details of an event which had not occurred. The striking finding from 
this research is that participants came to remember this non-occurring event based 
simply on the small amount of information provided in the narrative.  
 Another way to elicit false memories is to present people with doctored 
evidence. In one experiment, participants were shown doctored photo evidence 
suggested that they had taken part in an event which they never actually experienced. 
Wade, Garry, Read, and Lindsay (2002) presented participants with doctored 
photographs showing the participant and some of their family members experiencing 
a hot-air balloon ride when aged between 4 and 8 years old. Participants were 
subsequently interviewed three times. In the first interview, participants were 
presented with four photographs. Three of these were genuine photographs and one 
was the doctored hot-air balloon photo. After presenting each photo, participants 
were asked to tell the researcher everything they could about the event. Next, 
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participants rated how confident they were that the event in the photo had actually 
occurred (1 = 0% confident to 7 = 100% confident). Participants did this for each of 
the three true events and the false event. If participants were unable to remember the 
event in the photo, participants were given a little more time to think about the event 
and then the researcher used context reinstatement and guided imagery to aid their 
remembering of the event. In the second interview, participants were only asked 
about the events which they had not remembered in the first interview. Participants 
were asked whether they could now remember the event, and context reinstatement 
and mental imagery techniques were used. Interview 3 was identical to interview 1 in 
that participants were presented with each of the photos and asked to tell the 
researcher about the event, before rating their confidence that the event had occurred. 
The results showed that 10 (50%) of the participants, at the end of interview 3, had 
developed a false belief or memory for the hot-air balloon event. Participants were 
classified as having a clear false memory if their recalling of the event included 
elaboration of details not present in the photo. Participants were classified as having 
a partial false memory if their recalling of the event included elaboration of details of 
the false photograph (e.g., feelings, who was present) but did not indicate explicitly 
remembering the event. Confidence ratings for true events that participants had 
recalled was 90.8%, and 41.7% for non-recalled true events. For the false hot-air 
balloon event, participants who recalled the event provided confidence ratings of 
44.5%, compared with 10% for participants who did not recall the event. This 
research shows that presenting people with misleading information in the form of 
doctored photographic evidence can result in people being easily mislead into 
remembering an event which did not occur (see Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009b for 
similar results using doctored video evidence).  
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 Similar to the research reported above, using a variety of techniques, 
researchers have demonstrated that people can come to report remembering entire 
events which never actually occurred. For example, participants have come to 
remember being attacked by a dog (Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999), and spilling 
punch over the parents of the bride at a wedding (Hyman & Billing, 1998). Such 
experiments raise interesting questions about the reliability of our memories for past 
events.  
 To summarise, research has shown that misleading post-event information 
can result in people reporting erroneous details of a past experience, or even entire 
events which did not occur can be injected into peoples’ memories. These findings 
demonstrate how people can falsely remember the past which has consequences in 
settings such as the courtroom (e.g., false accusations). We now turn our attention to 
omission errors. Omission errors are details of a past experience that are not reported. 
While this is similar to forgetting, research has shown that using similar procedures 
as those described above to elicit changes and additions to memory can also increase 
the occurrence of omission errors. 
Omission Errors 
 The first experiment to specifically examine omission errors was conducted 
by Pezdek and Roe (1997). Pezdek and Roe asked four-year-old (n = 80) and ten-
year-old (n = 80) children to view a series of slides with an experimenter. During the 
presentation of the slides, the experimenter either touched the children on the hand or 
shoulder for 15 seconds or did not touch them. After 15 minutes, participants were 
exposed to misleading post-event information presented in the form of a review of 
the earlier session. In this review, the researcher suggested that either the touch had 
not occurred (omission condition), the touch had been on the hand when in fact it 
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was on the shoulder, or vice versa (change condition) or that there had been a touch 
when in fact there had not (addition condition). There were also two control 
conditions where children who either were touched or were not touched during the 
presentation of the slides were not exposed to any misleading post-event information 
during the review. The children were then asked to provide yes/no answers to a series 
of questions about the slide presentation, including one question about the touch. The 
results showed that participants in the change condition most frequently reported 
being touched in the suggested location more frequently than the original location 
compared with the control condition. However, participants in both the addition and 
omission conditions did not perform differently to their respective control conditions. 
This finding led Pezdek and Roe to conclude that it was easier to change the contents 
of a memory than it was to induce omission errors or additions to memory reports. 
However, the results obtained in this research are limited given the small sample size 
for the number of conditions (n = 16 per condition). Wright et al. (2001) argued that 
although the findings from Pezdek and Roe did not reach significant levels, the effect 
sizes indicate that for all conditions accuracy was impaired. Therefore, with a larger 
sample size, Pezdek and Roe might have obtained enough power to detect an effect 
of misleading post-event information in all of the experimental conditions.  
 Building on the research reported by Pezdek and Roe (1997), there have been 
a number of experiments examining omission errors in children. Over three 
experiments, Roos af Hjelmsäter and colleagues found mixed results. The general 
methodology in these experiments was as follows. Children participants had a brief 
interaction with a stranger (actually a confederate of the experimenter). The children 
were then interviewed about this encounter with the stranger. In each of the 
experiments, the participants received socially administered misleading post-event 
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information from either the stranger or someone else who claimed to have witnessed 
the child’s interaction with the stranger. For example, Roos af Hjelmsäter, Granhag, 
Strömwall, and Memon (2008) recruited children aged 7 (n = 82) and 12 (n = 92) 
years old. During their encounter with the stranger, he asked the participant to help 
him choose a present for another child, a 5-year old boy. First, the stranger opened 
the rear passenger door, but there were no toys there. Then stranger then opened the 
driver’s door and there were three toys. The participant was asked to help the 
stranger choose a toy to give as a gift and the encounter ended. There were two 
critical details. Half of the participants saw a suitcase when the stranger opened the 
rear passenger door, while the remaining half of the participants saw a passenger 
sitting in the front of the car. Prior to the interview, the participants had a brief 
conversation with the stranger. During this conversation, the stranger summarised the 
details of their original encounter and provided misleading post-event information. 
Half of the participants who had seen the suitcase on the back seat were told by the 
stranger that the back seat was empty (n = 44). Half of the participants who had seen 
the passenger in the car were told that the stranger had been alone (n = 44). For half 
of the participants who had not seen the suitcase, the stranger told them that his 
suitcase had been on the back seat (n = 43). Finally, for half the participants who had 
seen not seen a passenger on the front seat, the stranger told the participant that his 
friend Eric was in the car (n = 43). In the interview, the children were asked to 
provide a free recall account of the original encounter with the stranger. Next, 
participants were asked open-ended questions about specific parts of the event (e.g., 
what did the man look like). Finally, participants were asked specific questions, 
including one about any item on the back seat and one asking whether anyone else 
was with the stranger. In summary, participants saw either a suitcase or a passenger 
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in the car. Half of the participants seeing either a passenger or the suitcase received 
misleading information from the stranger suggesting there was no suitcase or 
passenger. The remaining participants received misleading information that the 
passenger or suitcase was present. The results showed that both 7-year old and 12-
year old participants did not differ on any of the measures. With regard to memory 
errors, participants in the commission condition made significantly more commission 
errors for the misleading information (59.52%) compared with the control item 
(3.45%). For participants in the omit condition, 31.40% of participants omitted the 
item compared with 29.27% omitting the control item, a non-significant difference. 
When examining the centrality of the item manipulated, children in the experimental 
conditions made more errors for the peripheral detail (suitcase) 61.45% compared 
with the central detail (passenger; 29.89%). The results of this research showed that 
omission errors occurred less frequently than commission errors.  
In a similar experiment, Roos af Hjelmsäter, Granhag, and Strömwall (2009) 
found that additions to memory and omission errors occurred at a similar rate. 
Participants (n = 176) were children aged 11- and 12-years old. In this experiment, 
when the children encountered the stranger, he was either accompanied by a 
passenger or alone. Immediately prior to the interview, two weeks after the encounter 
with the stranger, participants received misleading information by watching a video 
interview of a person who claimed to have witnessed the participant’s interaction 
with the stranger. The witness in the interview was either a 10-year old girl or a 
woman. Half of the participants saw the woman while the other half saw the child 
witness. For participants in the commission condition, the witness mentioned seeing 
a passenger, although the participant had not seen a passenger. For participants in the 
omit condition, the witness stated that the stranger had been alone whereas there had 
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actually been a passenger in the car. In the control condition, no misleading 
information was provided. As in the previous experiment, participants were 
interviewed initially using a free recall test, then open questions and finally specific 
questions including one about the presence of a passenger. The results showed that 
participants who had received misleading information were 83.50% less likely to 
correctly report the presence or absence of a passenger. There was also not a 
significant effect of misleading post-event information on commission or omission 
errors, suggesting that the misleading information had a similar effect on both errors 
of commission and errors of omission. These finding demonstrated that misleading 
information from a video of a witness had a similar influence on the frequency of 
both omission errors and commission errors. 
Finally, Roos af Hjelmsäter, Granhag, and Strömwall (2012) found omission 
occurred more frequently than additions to memory. Participants (N = 115) were 
children aged 10-13- years old. The procedure was as described in the two previous 
experiments. However, half of the participants (omit condition) saw five additional 
items compared with the other half of the participants (commission condition). These 
items were a suitcase on the back seat, a female passenger in the front, the stranger 
was wearing a hat, the stranger talked on the phone briefly and the stranger shook the 
child’s hand at the end of the interaction. As in the previous experiments, the 
interview took place two weeks after the participant had encountered the stranger. 
Half of the participants were interviewed with a confederate who was an adult 
claiming to have witnessed the participant’s encounter with the stranger. In the omit 
condition, the confederate denied seeing the five target items, while in the 
commission condition the confederate claimed to have seen the five target items. The 
results showed that participants in the omit condition omitted two items more often 
28 
than participants who had been interviewed alone. The items were for the handshake 
and the phone call. All other items were not significant. Similarly in the commission 
condition, participants exposed to the influence performed similarly to participants in 
the control condition. These findings demonstrated that omission errors occurred 
more frequently than commission errors.  
Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, and Merckelbach (2010) found that younger and 
older children were equally susceptible to making omission errors, whereas younger 
children were more likely to add details to memory than older children. Participants 
were children aged 4 (n = 59) and 10 (n = 59) years old who were instructed to 
remove a hat, a skirt and the shoes from a puppet. Immediately after, the children 
went into another room and were asked by the researcher to describe what they had 
done earlier in the experiment (i.e., which items they had removed). Participants in 
the omission condition were told that they had not removed one of the items of 
clothing (e.g., the skirt). Participants in the addition condition were told that they had 
removed another item (e.g., a jacket). Immediately after receiving this misleading 
information, the participant was taken back to see the puppet who was either wearing 
the omitted item or was not wearing the added item. Participants were immediately 
interviewed about which items they had removed. Participants were again 
interviewed one-week later. Finally, participants were also asked by their parents to 
name the items of clothing that they had removed from the puppet. Before receiving 
the misleading information, 95% (n = 112) of participants correctly reported the three 
items of clothing which they had actually removed from the puppet. Analyses were 
only conducted on participants who had reported removing the two other items 
(omission condition) or the three items (addition condition). Only 80 parents 
completed the interview conducted with the parents. The result showed that children 
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in the omission condition were more likely to omit the item suggested by the 
researcher than participants in a control condition. Across the three interviews, the 
rate of omission errors decreased. At interview 1, 45% (n = 27) of the children 
omitted the item which decreased to 20% (n = 12) at interview 2 and 13% (n = 6) at 
interview 3. Commission errors also decreased across the interviews. At interview 1, 
66% (n = 38) of the children reported the erroneous items, compared with 55% (n = 
29) at interview 2 and 42% (n = 14) at interview 3. When examining age-related 
differences, the authors found no age difference for omission errors. However, for 
commission errors, younger children were twice as likely to report the erroneous 
item at interview 1. Younger adults also made more errors than older children at 
interviews 2 and 3. The findings of this experiment showed that both younger and 
older children were equally likely to make an omission errors, whereas commission 
errors were more common for younger than older children. This research also 
suggests that omission errors are not stable over time and decrease over longer 
periods of time. 
In summary, researchers examining omission errors in children have found 
mixed findings. These mixed findings could perhaps be attributed to the mixed 
methodologies used in these experiments. For example, in each of the three 
experiments by Roos af Hjelmsäter and colleagues (reported above) there were 
varying sources of misinformation as well as differences in the target items 
manipulated. In the current research, we are interested in omission errors in adults. 
While there have been fewer experiments conducted using adult participants, the 
findings are also more consistent, showing that adults are susceptible to errors of 
omission following the use of misleading and suggestive techniques.  
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One example of omission errors in adults was reported by Wright et al. 
(2001; Expt. 1). Participants (N = 115) attended a first session where they were 
instructed to copy a series of 12 drawings depicting a man and a woman going on a 
date. These drawings showed, for example, the man wearing a suit, the woman 
wearing a dress, the man knocking on the woman’s door with a bunch of flowers, the 
man and woman entering a restaurant, and so on. One week later, participants were 
re-presented with what they were told was someone else’s copy of the drawings. In 
this version of the drawings, participants were either presented with a new drawing 
(e.g., a new picture showing the waitress taking the couple’s order) which was not 
present in the original drawings (add condition), or one of the drawings they had 
originally seen was omitted (omit condition). There were also two control conditions 
where participants were not re-presented with the drawings. Participants in all 
conditions then completed two memory tests. In the first test, participants were asked 
to recall all of the original drawings, and the second test was a recognition test. The 
results showed that 56% of participants in the omit condition omitted the drawing 
which had not been re-presented in the second phase of the experiment, (cf. 33% in 
the control condition). Also, 34% of participants in the omit condition did not 
recognise the drawing which had not been re-presented in the second phase (cf. 16% 
in the control condition). In the add condition, 20% of participants recalled the new 
drawing, (cf. 6%, in the control condition) and 46% recognised the additional 
drawing (cf. 36% in the control condition). This research demonstrated that people 
make omission errors at a similar rate to commission errors. Furthermore, this 
research shows that omission errors can occur not only in recall memory tests but 
also in recognition memory tests.  
31 
Omission errors have also been found to occur using the social contagion 
paradigm reported by Roediger et al. (2001). Merckelbach, Van Roermund, and 
Candel (2007) showed participants, together with a confederate, six scenes from 
around a house (e.g., a bedroom, a garage, a kitchen). After a brief filler task, both 
the participant and confederate engaged in a collaborative recall task. For each scene, 
the participant and confederate took turns to recall individual items from the scene 
until they had each recalled six items for that scene. This was done for each of the six 
scenes. In the add condition (n = 30), for two of the scenes, the confederate reported 
an item that had not been present in the original scene. In the omit condition, for two 
of the scenes, the confederate denied seeing one of the items reported by the 
participant by saying “the detail that you mention was certainly not present in this 
picture; otherwise I would have noticed that”. In the control condition, the 
confederate did not deny seeing any items or report any additional items. 
Participants’ memory for the scenes was tested in the form of a recall task completed 
individually. The results showed that in the add condition, 52% (n = 16) of 
participants reported at least one of the additional item reported by the confederate, 
compared with 0% in the control condition. In the omit condition, 72% (n = 21) of 
participants omitted at least one of the items denied by the confederate compared 
with 33% (n = 10) in the control condition. These results showed that a specific 
social challenge to a participant’s memory can result in omission errors occurring at 
a similar rate to additions to memory.  
Interim Summary 
 In the literature explored above, it is clear that human memory is prone to 
errors, resulting in people reporting different details to which they originally saw, 
report experiencing entire events which never occurred or even failing to report 
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previously encountered information. Since the focus of this thesis is on omission 
errors, below we explore some of the explanations proposed to account for the 
occurrence of omission errors.  
Why Do Omission Errors Occur? 
 At least three explanations for how omission errors occur have been 
postulated. These explanations differ in important ways. For example, some 
researchers have speculated that omission errors could occur as a result of the 
original detail becoming erased from memory following the presentation of 
conflicting post-even information (Merckelbach et al., 2007; Pezdek & Roe, 1997). 
Others have proposed that omission errors occur as a result of social influence (e.g., 
Merckelbach et al., 2007). Another explanation, proposed by Wright and colleagues 
is that omission errors occur as a result of inhibition. Each of these explanations is 
examined further below. 
The term ‘memory erasure’ has been used by both Pezdek and Roe (1997) 
and Merckelbach et al. (2007) to describe omission errors. An early account for 
misinformation effects was that the new information overwrites the original 
information (Loftus et al., 1978). More recent accounts posit that both traces co-exist 
in memory and that it is the stronger of the traces which is volunteered as a memory 
(see Ayers & Reder, 1998 for a review). Other researchers have argued that using the 
term ‘erasure’ in relation to memory errors should be used cautiously since it is 
impossible to demonstrate that information has actually been erased from memory 
(Wright et al., 2001). Otgaar, Meijer, Giesbrecht, Smeets, Candel, and Merckelbach, 
(2010) demonstrated that, in children, omission errors might not occur as a result of 
memory erasure. Otgaar and colleagues asked 75 children, aged around seven years 
old, to remove three items of clothing from a puppet. Participants were then taken 
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into another room and asked to tell the researcher the name of the three items of 
clothing they had removed from the puppet. Participants then received misleading 
information from the experimenter who told the participant that they had not 
removed one of the three items they had claimed to have removed. Participants were 
then taken back into the room and shown the puppet which was wearing the item of 
clothing that the researcher had told the participant they had not removed. 
Participants were then interviewed about which items of clothing they had removed 
both immediately after and one week later. The results showed that after the second 
interview, 32% (n = 24) of the participants failed to mention that they had removed 
the item of clothing of which the experimenter had provided misleading information. 
These children were then given a choice reaction time task whereby they were 
presented with an image of a piece of clothing and had to indicate whether they had 
removed the item or not. Participants were asked to be both quick and accurate in the 
choice reaction time task. The results showed that the children selected the item of 
clothing which the researcher had told them they had not removed as an item they 
had removed. This finding suggests that participants were able to remember which 
items of clothing they had removed from the puppet, and that the omission errors 
observed in this experiment are more likely to be explained by social factors such as 
memory conformity. The results of this research are the only available evidence 
suggesting that omission errors are not caused by memory erasure.  
Wright et al. (2001) explained their results in relation to retrieval-induced 
forgetting (e.g., Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994). Retrieval-induced forgetting occurs 
when participants are asked to recall only part of a to-be-remembered stimuli. For 
example, Anderson et al. (Expt. 1) demonstrated retrieval-induced forgetting by 
having participants recall some items from a category of previously studied words 
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(e.g., FRUITS: orange, banana, lemon). In a subsequent category-cued recall test, 
participants recalled fewer of the items which had not been practised from the 
practised category. Retrieval-induced forgetting effects are explained in terms of 
retrieval inhibition. When some items of a category are practised, there is also 
competition from the related but non-practiced items from within the category. To 
reduce the risk of erroneously reporting the non-practiced items during the retrieval 
practice, inhibitory control processes inhibit the non-practiced items, making them 
harder to recall in a subsequent memory test. In Wright and colleagues’ experiment, 
participants in the omit condition would have to inhibit interference from the omitted 
drawing during the second phase of the experiment, making this item more difficult 
to recall and recognise in the subsequent memory tests.  
Omission errors have also been explained as a function of social influence. 
Here, the argument is that people make omission errors because the rememberer is 
affected by other people. In a classical experiment, Asch (1955) demonstrated how 
peoples’ decisions can be influenced by other people. Individual participants (n = 
123) took part in the experiment alongside a group of six to eight confederates. 
Participants saw a single line on a card, and then a second card showing three lines of 
varying sizes. Their task was to identify the line from the first card, on the second. In 
total, there were 18 trials and on 12 of these trails, all of the confederates 
intentionally identified an incorrect line on the second card. Asch reports that on 
average, participants had been found to make erroneous matches in 1% of trials 
without influence from other people. Asch was interested in whether participants 
would be influenced by the majority decision of the confederates even when the 
confederates were choosing incorrect responses. The results showed that participants 
yielded to the erroneous majority decision on 36.8% of trials. However, there were 
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also striking individual differences between participants’ susceptibility to the social 
influence. Around 25% of participants did not conform to the majority decision and 
instead reported the correct answer on all trials. Likewise, some participants yielded 
to the majority decision on all of the trials. This research demonstrates the significant 
influence other people have on our responses.  
Researchers have identified two forms of social influence; informational and 
normative social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Informational social influence 
occurs when people are motivated to be accurate and they report or omit information 
which they believe someone else is accurate about. Thus, informational social 
influence results in omission errors because people believe that the other 
person/people are correct while they are incorrect. Normative social influence occurs 
when people conform to the ‘group opinion’ to be in agreement with other members 
of a group. That is, their internal belief is correct, but they report an incorrect 
response to conform to the group. In relation to omission errors, people could omit 
information because they want to be in agreement with other people. The effect 
social influence can have on memory was demonstrated by Gabbert, Memon, and 
Wright (2006, Expt. 2) who asked pairs of participants to individually watch a mock 
crime video. While the sequence of events in each of the videos was the same, each 
participant saw different details within the video. For example, in the 
addition/omission condition, one participant saw the thief steal £20, while the other 
participant did not see the thief steal anything. In the change condition, one 
participant saw the thief steal £20 while the other participant saw the thief steal a 
credit card. These participants were then allowed to discuss the events of the video 
for ten minutes. Because each participant had witnessed different details, there were 
some disagreements between the participants. This allowed for the possibility that 
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participants would report new items, report different items or even omit items based 
on the disagreement with the other participant. The results showed that participants 
were most influenced when encountering new items (45% influenced), followed by 
different items (29%) and then by seen but omitted items (10%).  
 To summarise, three explanations for the occurrence of omission errors have 
been proposed. Omission errors occurring as a result of memory erasure is difficult 
to find evidence for (Wright et al., 2001), but evidence suggesting that omission 
errors are not caused by erasure is compelling (Otgaar et al., 2010). Therefore, two 
opposing explanations remain; retrieval-induced forgetting and social 
contagion/social influence. In the research described in the current thesis, we propose 
an alternative explanation for how omission errors occur. Researchers have 
speculated that omission errors could be caused by the elicitation of nonbelieved 
memories (Mazzoni, Clark & Nash, 2014; Otgaar, Scoboria & Mazzoni, 2014). 
Nonbelieved memories (Mazzoni et al., 2010; see also Scoboria, Nash & Mazzoni, in 
press) are memories for which people have a stronger recollection of the event than 
their belief that the event occurred. We argue that omission errors could occur as a 
result of people attenuating their belief for the omitted items. That is, when 
participants receive misleading post-event information suggesting that an event did 
not occur, termed negative misinformation (Mazzoni et al., 2014), it is their belief 
about the occurrence of the event which is attenuated while they maintain strong 
recollections for the omitted item. Research has shown that belief is more influential 
than recollection on peoples’ attitudes and intentions (Bernstein, Scoboria, & Arnold, 
2015). 
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Dissociation Between Recollection and Belief 
 It has been noted that most memory research has focused on believed 
memories (Scoboria et al., 2014). That is, the events remembered are both 
recollected and believed to have occurred. Brewer (1996) claimed that recollective 
memories are, “accompanied by a belief that the remembered episode was personally 
experienced by the individual in that individual’s past” (p. 61). This view of 
remembering suggests that both belief and recollection are present when 
remembering the past. Here, we review the emerging literature which has 
demonstrated that recollecting an event and believing that an event occurred are 
distinct processes involved in remembering the past. 
Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) were among the first to suggest that past events 
could be believed to have occurred even in the absence of a recollection of the event. 
In their model, Mazzoni and Kirsch argue that a question, such as ‘what were you 
doing last Tuesday?’ prompts a memory search. The rememberer must then search 
their memory for details of their activities from last Tuesday. The memory retrieved 
is then assessed for its ‘goodness of memory’, i.e., how vivid it is. The goodness of 
the memory is then compared with a memory criterion. The memory criterion is a 
pre-set internal level at which the memory will be accepted as such (i.e. is it vivid 
enough to be a memory?). If the goodness of memory meets the criterion, the event is 
considered to be remembered.  
However, when the goodness of memory is not sufficient to meet the memory 
criteria, Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) propose that people can still conclude that an 
event occurred if they have enough information available which allows them to 
believe that the event occurred. For example, you might not have a specific memory 
for last Tuesday, but you might know that you have been at work each weekday for 
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the last three weeks, which means on Tuesday you must have been at work. You 
might also know that each Tuesday evening you go to the gym, and while you cannot 
recollect specifically going to the gym last Tuesday, you know you have not missed a 
gym session for many weeks. Thus, using this information, you can conclude that on 
Tuesday you were at work, and then you went to the gym. However, knowing what 
you did on Tuesday is not based on a specific recollection for Tuesday’s events. 
Instead, it is based on the knowledge that you have about your recent activities, you 
have enough information to believe that this is what happened on Tuesday. 
To summarise, Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) argue that when faced with 
remembering the past, retrieving a strong memory is enough to conclude that the 
event occurred. However, the absence of a strong memory is not necessarily 
diagnostic that the event did not occur. Instead, they propose that people can believe 
that the event occurred if there is sufficient information available. 
Empirical support for Mazzoni and Kirsch’s (2002) model was provided by 
Scoboria et al. (2004). In this experiment 684 undergraduate student participants 
rated ten autobiographical events (e.g., Getting lost in a shopping mall) for general 
and personal plausibility (i.e., the event could happen to someone, the event could 
happen to me), belief and memory. The results showed that participants rated, on 
average, general plausibility (M = 4.63, SD = 1.64) higher than personal plausibility 
(M = 3.77, SD = 1.86). Personal plausibility was also rated higher than belief (M = 
3.19, SD = 1.80). Finally, belief ratings also exceeded memory ratings (M = 2.34, SD 
= 2.00). These data suggest that for an event to be remembered, it must be believed 
to have occurred, and for it to be believed, it must be considered personally plausible 
and generally plausible. Interestingly, for 50.3% of events rated, belief and memory 
ratings were equal. In 45.4% of cases, the belief ratings were higher than memory 
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ratings, while in 4.3% of cases belief ratings were lower than memory ratings. 
Overall, the nested relationship between belief and memory was found for 95.7% of 
events rated suggesting that most memories are believed to have occurred more 
strongly than they are recollected.  
In summary, while research once confounded recollection with belief, 
research has clearly shown that recollection and belief both contribute to the process 
of remembering the past. Subsequent research has refined this distinction further, 
making a distinction between different types of belief.  
Believing and Recollecting Events 
Recollection has been defined as “conscious awareness of remembering, re-
experiencing of perceptual details of the event, recognising the spatial and temporal 
characteristics of the event, and novel appraisal of the event as it influences current 
emotion” (Scoboria, Talarico & Pascal, 2015, p. 338). This view of recollection is 
shared by other theories of remembering. For example, Brewer (1996) describes 
recollective memory as a memory for a specific episode which is experienced as a 
reliving of the episode. Rubin (2006) describes reliving an episode as a defining 
feature of episodic memory. Thus, the term recollection appears to be consistently 
reported as the ability to relive or re-perceive the past.  
Besides recollecting events, it is also possible for people to believe that an 
event occurred. For example, we can believe that we were born (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 
2002). While it is unlikely that we can recollect our birth, we have enough 
information available (i.e., being alive today) for us to conclude that our birth must 
have occurred. The term belief has been used in a number of theories of 
remembering. For example, Rubin (2006) uses the term belief as “the belief that a 
memory is accurate” (p. 294), while Scoboria et al. (2014) use the term belief as “the 
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truth value attributed to the occurrence of an event” (p. 1243). Scoboria and 
colleagues (Scoboria et al., 2015; Scoboria & Pascal, 2016) have demonstrated both 
forms of belief discussed by Rubin (2006) and Scoboria et al. (2014) are accurate and 
reflect two distinct forms of belief. Scoboria et al. (2015) argue that Rubin’s use of 
belief is belief in accuracy, and is an assessment that recollected details are believed 
to be accurate. However, the belief discussed by Scoboria et al. (2014) is belief in 
occurrence and is different to belief in accuracy in that it is an appraisal of the entire 
event.  
The distinction between belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence is 
described best by Scoboria et al. (2014) using the lyrics from Lerner and Lowe’s 
(1958) song “I remember it well”. In the lyrics, Honoré is recalling a previous 
encounter between himself and Marnita. The lyrics are: “We met at nine. We met at 
eight. I was on time. No, you were late. Ah yes, I remember it well. We dined with 
friends. We dined alone. A tenor sang. A baritone. . .” In this example, it is not 
Honoré’s belief in the occurrence of the event that is being challenged, but his belief 
in the accuracy of specific details about the recollected event. Thus, belief in 
accuracy is a truth value relating to the accuracy of a specific item or piece of 
information, whereas belief in occurrence is a truth value relating to the occurrence 
of an entire event/episode. However, Blank (In press) argues that making such a 
distinction might not be so easy.  
The distinction between recollection and belief has been likened to the 
distinction between remembering and knowing (Tulving, 1985). There is a clear 
relationship between ‘recollection’ and ‘remembering’. However, we agree with 
Scoboria and Pascal (2016) that ‘belief’ and ‘knowing’ are not the same. One of the 
key differences between remember/know judgements and judgements of belief and 
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recollection is that remember/know are either/or choice. For example, participants 
are asked to recall or recognise an item and then decided whether they remember the 
item, or just know the item is ‘old’. In experiments which have employed belief and 
recollection, both are measured. That is, participants rate both their appraisal of the 
strength of the recollection and the strength of their belief. Tulving (1985) does state 
that when remembering the past, people could be remembering, knowing or “a 
mixture of the two” (p. 6), however, in research, this is not how these measures have 
been applied. So while there may be some similarities between the measures of 
remember/know and recollection/belief, the approach to measuring each construct is 
very different.  
It also could be that many instances of knowing could result in believing. 
That is, if you know a number of details about a given date in the past, you could 
from this knowing come to believe that a certain event occurred on that date. For 
example in the earlier example of remembering what you were doing last Tuesday, 
you might know a number of facts (e.g., I work weekdays, I haven’t had a weekday 
off in three weeks, I know I go to the gym on Tuesdays). Thus, knowing could be 
considered a contributor to belief. 
To summarise, research has demonstrated that recollection and belief are 
distinct components of remembering, with recollection reflecting the ability to 
mentally re-live or re-perceive the event, and belief referring to the truth value of the 
events occurrence. However, belief can be divided further into the belief that an 
event occurred and the belief that a detail is remembered accurately.  
Making a distinction between recollection and belief allows for the past to be 
represented by varying degrees of both belief and recollection. Scoboria et al. (2014) 
argue that belief and recollection are continuous variables. Figure 1 shows four 
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possible event representations which can occur given differing strengths of both 
belief and recollection. Using Figure 1, below we explore three of the event 
representations including the evidence available to support the existence of each.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Event representations based on belief and recollection strength (Scoboria 
et al., 2014). 
Believed Memories 
In the top right corner of Figure 1, where both belief and recollection are 
high, believed memories are proposed. As previously mentioned, much of the 
research conducted on memory has focused on events which are both recollected and 
believed to have occurred. Theories of remembering, such as that proposed by 
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Brewer (1996) have suggested that remembering includes both the ability to re-
perceive an event, accompanied with a belief that the re-perceived event is a genuine. 
This view suggests that both belief and memory are strongly associated. While few 
experiments have mentioned specifically that their research examined believed 
memories, researchers (e.g., Scoboria et al., 2014) have argued that believed 
memories are the most commonly studied type of memory.  
One experiment found that when participants were asked to provide a 
memory of the past, the most common type of event reported was a believed 
memory. Scoboria and Talarico (2013, Expt. 1) asked 171 participants to recall five 
autobiographical events from when they were six years old or younger. For each of 
the events, participants provided a brief three or four-word description of the event. 
Participants were then presented with these brief descriptions and asked to rate the 
strength of their belief that the event had occurred, the strength of their recollection 
of the event, how plausible the event was and finally 15 memory characteristics (e.g., 
how vivid the memory was). The results showed that most of the recollections (N = 
855) were believed memories (58.6%, n = 501). Interestingly, 38.3% (n = 328) of the 
recollections were classified as believed-not-remembered events. Nonbelieved 
memories were least frequently reported (3.0%, n = 26). These results showed that 
when people are asked to freely report recollections of the past, most recollections 
are believed to have occurred, with only a few recollections being nonbelieved 
memories.  
Believed, Not Remembered Events 
Believed, not remembered events (see Figure 1, top-left corner) are events 
people believe to have occurred, but for which they have little or no recollection of. 
That is, for these events, belief strength is high, and recollection strength is lower 
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than that of belief. Having a belief in the absence of a recollection was suggested as 
an event representation in the theoretical model proposed by Mazzoni and Kirsch 
(2002). Mazzoni and Kirsch argued that in the absence of a specific recollection of 
an event, people can still believe that the event occurred if there is sufficient 
information available.  
Research has shown that it is possible to increase a peoples’ belief that an 
event occurred without them developing a specific memory. Mazzoni, Loftus and 
Kirsch (2001) asked 57 Italian participants rate 40 events for plausibility (1 = highly 
implausible, 8 = highly plausible) and 36 events for likelihood (1 = certain the event 
had not happened to them, 8 = certain that the event had happened to them). One of 
the events rated was the target event, witnessing a demonic possession. Three months 
later, participants were asked to read 12 mini-articles on various topics, including 
three about witnessing a demonic possession. The mini-articles provided information 
such as how common it is to witness a demonic possession and what happens when 
someone is possessed by a demon. For some participants, these mini-articles referred 
specifically to Italian culture (own-culture), whereas for other participants the mini-
articles talked about other cultures (other-culture). Participants in a control condition 
did not read any mini-articles on witnessing a demonic possession. After a one-week 
delay, participants returned and again rated the plausibility and likelihood that the 
same 40 events had occurred. The results showed that reading the mini-articles 
referring to both own-culture and other-culture possessions resulted in increased 
plausibility and likelihood ratings for the target event compared with the control 
condition. Specifically, mean event plausibility ratings increased from 0.11 to 2.37 
for participants in the own-culture condition, and 0.30 to 1.90 in the other–culture 
condition. In the control condition, plausibility increased from 0.61 to 1.06. For 
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likelihood ratings, participants in the own-culture condition increased from 1.21 to 
2.05, while likelihood ratings provided by participants in the other-culture condition 
changed from 1.15 to 1.30. In the control condition, likelihood ratings changed from 
1.39 to 1.33. These results demonstrate that providing participants with information 
about an event, suggesting it is plausible to have experienced the event, can increase 
participant’s ratings about whether they experienced the event. The likelihood 
questionnaire used in this research has been associated with belief (Mazzoni & 
Kirsch, 2002) and uses the same style of question as used for belief in the 
Autobiographical Belief and Memory Questionnaire (Scoboria et al., 2004). These 
findings suggest that it is possible to increase people's belief that an event occurred 
when people are provided with information which suggests the event could plausibly 
have occurred. 
Coming to believe that an event occurred, but not necessarily recollecting the 
event has also been associated with other phenomena. Believed memories could 
explain false confessions. For instance, research has shown the internalised beliefs 
can result in confessions, without the confessor actually remembering the event 
(Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Nash & Wade, 2009). That is, innocent suspects who 
falsely confess do not come to recollect committing the crime, but simply believe 
that they could have committed the crime. 
Nonbelieved Memories. 
In this section, we review the literature on nonbelieved memories. This thesis 
is focused on the consequences of having a nonbelieved memory, and therefore we 
provide a more extensive review of this literature. We begin by reviewing the 
literature that prompted researchers to begin examining nonbelieved memories 
before moving to the experimental work which sought to elicit such memories in the 
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laboratory. More recent research has examined nonbelieved memories across the 
adult lifespan and examined the reasons people report for developing a nonbelieved 
memory. Nonbelieved memories (see bottom right of Fig. 1) are event 
representations characterised by high recollection and low belief1. Nonbelieved 
memories were first identified by Scoboria et al. (2004) who found that for 95.7% of 
events rated, the nested model held true. That is, for these events, belief ratings were 
higher than recollection ratings. However, for a small number of events (4.3%) 
participants rated their belief that the event occurred lower than their recollection for 
the event. These findings suggested that people are able to recollect events even 
when their belief that the event occurred is lower than recollection strength. 
There is anecdotal evidence to support the idea that people can have stronger 
recollections than beliefs about their personal past. A famous example of a 
nonbelieved memory was reported by the developmental psychologists Jean Piaget. 
Piaget (1951) recalled a memory from around the age of two years old in which he 
was the victim of an attempted kidnapping. While his nurse pushed him in his pram, 
a man approached and attempted to take Piaget. His nurse prevented the kidnapping. 
However, when Piaget was about 15-years old, he learned that this event had not 
occurred and that his nurse had made up the story. He, therefore, assumed that he 
must have learnt about this event from his parents. However, despite learning that 
this event had not occurred, he stated that he could still vividly recollect details such 
                                                          
1 Mazzoni, Scoboria and Harvey (2010) coined the term ‘nonbelieved memory’. 
While the term ‘nonbelieved’ suggests that belief has been removed entirely, it is 
more commonly accepted that nonbelieved memories are events for which belief is 
significantly lower than recollection (for example, see Scoboria, Nash & Mazzoni, in 
press ). 
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as scratches on his nurse’s face, details of the police officer who arrived on the scene, 
and a gathering crowd. Specifically, Piaget stated “I can see, most clearly, the 
following scene, in which I believed until I was about fifteen” (p. 188). Piaget’s 
account is a striking example of how people can continue to recollect events once 
believed to have occurred, but for which the rememberer has now attenuated their 
belief.  
In an attempt to understand nonbelieved memories further, Mazzoni et al. 
(2010) asked 207 British and 1386 Canadian undergraduate students whether they 
had a memory of an event which they no longer believed to have occurred. Around 
22% (n = 349) of the sample reported having such a memory. A subset of those 
participants claiming to have a nonbelieved (n = 58) memory were asked to provide 
additional details about their memory. These participants were asked to provide 
details of a believed memory and a believed but not remembered event. These three 
recollections were then rated for phenomenological characteristics examining 
recollective qualities, the ability to relive or mentally travel back in time, perceptual 
qualities, spatial characteristics and emotional valence and intensity triggered by the 
recollection. Self-reported details of why people had come to stop believing the event 
to have occurred were also collected. The results reveal three main reasons for why 
people come to stop believing in their memories. The most commonly reported 
reason for people having a nonbelieved memory was social feedback (56%). That is, 
for these participants, someone told them that the event never happened, or that it 
happened differently to the way it was remembered. The second reason was event 
implausibility (36% of participants). These participants attenuated their belief 
because the event they recollected was now considered implausible. The third reason 
people attenuated their belief was because of contradictory evidence (7% of 
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participants). These participants had either found evidence refuting their memory, or 
had been unable to find evidence to support their memory. For the memory 
characteristics, the researchers found that nonbelieved memories continue to have the 
same phenomenological characteristics as memories for which people believed to 
have occurred. There are several interesting findings in this research. The first is that 
nonbelieved memories were found more commonly than might be expected from 
previous research (e.g., Scoboria et al., 2004). Also, nonbelieved memories appear to 
occur when believed memories are challenged in some way (e.g., social feedback, 
plausibility). Finally, nonbelieved memories are similar to memories which are still 
believed to have occurred. 
It is worth noting at this point that when Mazzoni et al. (2010) introduced the 
term nonbelieved memories, it was unclear whether people had actually stopped 
believing that the event had occurred altogether or whether they had attenuated their 
belief below the strength of recollection. Subsequent research has shown that when 
nonbelieved memories are elicited in the laboratory, belief is rarely completely 
withdrawn. Instead, researchers have found that people attenuate their belief to the 
point that it is significantly lower than recollection ratings. Recent research has 
identified three subtypes of nonbelieved memories, based on varying belief and 
recollection strengths. Scoboria et al. (in press), using cluster analysis, found three 
distinct patterns of nonbelieved memories; classic, weak and grain of doubt. Classic 
nonbelieved memories are characterised by high recollection ratings and low belief 
ratings. Weak nonbelieved memories are characterised by belief and recollection 
ratings which are below the scale midpoint, with belief being significantly lower than 
recollection. Grain of doubt nonbelieved memories are characterised by recollection 
ratings which are high, but belief ratings are also high (above the scale midpoint). 
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While each of these types of nonbelieved memories have different characteristics, in 
all cases, belief ratings were significantly lower than recollection ratings. 
Interestingly, Scoboria and colleagues also examined whether different reasons for 
attenuating belief resulted in different sub-types of nonbelieved memories. The 
results showed that both classic and weak nonbelieved memories were most 
commonly associated with events which had been considered implausible or where 
the rememberer had received social feedback from someone else telling them that the 
recollected event had not occurred. Classic nonbelieved memories also occurred 
when people were unable to obtain evidence to support the occurrence of an event. 
Finally, weak nonbelieved memories were often found when people found the 
memory to be inconsistent with their view of another person. These findings showed 
that there are different sub-types of nonbelieved memories and that continued 
research is needed to examine the factors which influence belief and how different 
factors could influence belief in different ways. 
Researchers have sought to demonstrate that nonbelieved memories can be 
elicited in the laboratory. Clark, Nash, Fincham and Mazzoni (20122) set out to 
induce nonbelieved memories in 20 participants. Using a doctored video evidence 
paradigm (see Nash et al. 2009), participants were induced with a false memory of 
performing an action they had not performed. The participant and experimenter were 
video recorded as they sat facing each other across a table. The experimenter 
performed an action for 15 seconds, and then the participant performed the same 
action also for 15 seconds. This procedure was continued until a total of 26 actions 
                                                          
2 The research conducted by Clark, Nash, Fincham & Mazzoni (2012) is presented in 
Chapter 2 in full to give the reader a clearer understanding of the underpinnings for 
the research presented in this thesis.  
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had been performed. In a second session, two days later, participants returned to the 
lab where they saw a video. In this video, participants saw themselves seated at the 
table opposite the researcher. The researcher then performed 10 of the actions which 
had been performed in the first session, as well as two new actions not performed in 
the original session. These false actions had been performed by the researcher after 
the first session, but using video editing software they had been made to look as 
though the participant had watched the researcher perform the fake action, thus they 
must have performed it. Then, in a third session occurring approximately four hours 
after the second session, participants were debriefed. The researcher told participants 
about the presence of fake actions in the video. In both sessions 2 and 3, for the two 
genuinely performed actions, the two false actions and two control items (neither 
performed nor present in the video) participants rated the strength of their belief (1 = 
Definitely did not do this; 8 = Definitely did do this) and memory (1 = No memory at 
all; 8 = Clear and detailed memory) for performing these actions in the first session. 
The results revealed that the debriefing had a significant effect on participants’ belief 
for performing the fake actions, but left them with a strong memory for performing 
the fake actions. Also, supporting the findings of Mazzoni et al. (2010), the 
phenomenological characteristics of these induced nonbelieved memories shared 
many of the phenomenological characteristics of believed memories. This finding 
suggests that laboratory elicited nonbelieved memories are experienced in a similar 
way to naturally occurring nonbelieved memories.  
Researchers have also elicited nonbelieved memories for childhood memories 
in both adults and children. Using a false memory implantation procedure, Otgaar, 
Scoboria, and Smeets (2013) experimentally evoked nonbelieved memories for a 
false childhood event in both 10-year old children and adults. After implanting a 
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false memory for a hot-air balloon ride using suggestive interview techniques, 
participants were debriefed and told that the event was fabricated. In 40% of cases 
(adults: n = 12; children: n = 29), participants indicated that they remembered the 
false event but now did not believe it had occurred, and this pattern remained stable 
at a one-month follow-up. Thus, nonbelieved memories can be experimentally 
induced for recent events as well as for false memories from childhood and can 
endure over time. 
Mazzoni et al. (2014) examined whether true memories could also be 
challenged, resulting in nonbelieved memories. Using the same procedure as Clark et 
al. (2012), instead of ‘debriefing’ participants about false memories, Mazzoni and 
colleagues told participants that they had not performed actions which they had in 
fact performed. Again the results revealed that this manipulation had a greater effect 
on belief than on memory and that the resulting nonbelieved memories shared many 
of the phenomenological characteristics of believed memories (see also Otgaar, 
Scoboria, Howe, Moldoveanu, & Smeets, 2016). 
Previous research on nonbelieved memories has examined this phenomenon 
in undergraduate populations, often with participants aged around 18 - 20 years old 
(e.g., Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014; Otgaar et al., 2013). Scoboria, Memon, 
Gawryłowicz and Clark (2015) examined nonbelieved memories across the adult 
lifespan. To collect a sample of adults ageing from 18 – 72 years old, Scoboria and 
colleagues posted a survey on Amazons Mechanical Turk asking people whether 
they had a nonbelieved memory. In total, they received 786 valid responses. 
Participants from this sample of 786 respondents were then invited to take part in the 
main experiment. Participants were recruited using age ranges. Participants aged 18-
29 (n = 22), 30-39 (n = 25), 40-49 (n = 32), 50-59 (n = 37) and 60-72 (n = 22) took 
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part in the main experiment. The procedure for the main experiment was a 
replication of Mazzoni et al. (2010) in that participants were asked to describe their 
nonbelieved memory, provide belief and recollection strength ratings, and also rate 
phenomenological characteristics (e.g., how clear are the visual details of the 
memory?). Participants provided the same ratings also for a believed-not-
remembered event and a believed memory from when they were the same age as the 
event for the nonbelieved memory. The results showed that nonbelieved memories 
were reported for events that had occurred a different ages. However, the vast 
majority were for events occurring at ages 4 – 12. The age at which these memories 
became nonbelieved was around the age of 23 years old. The results from Scoboria et 
al. (2015) suggest that childhood memories are subject to re-appraisal later in life, 
especially in the period of early adulthood. However, there was also an interesting 
sub-group of older adults aged 60 years who had a nonbelieved memory for an event 
that had occurred around the age of 56 which had become a nonbelieved memory on 
average around the age of 59. Therefore, while 23 years old appears to be an 
important time for appraising and revising our memories, revision of memories in 
later life can still occur (see Brédart & Bouffier, 2016 for a replications of Scoboria 
et al., 2015).  
As reported above, nonbelieved memories have been found to occur either 
following a challenge (i.e., from an experimenter; Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 
2014; Otgaar et al., 2013), or, in some rare cases, nonbelieved memories have been 
found to spontaneously occur (see Clark et al., 2013; Mazzoni et al., 2014). More 
recent research has focused on examining the reasons people report for attenuating 
their belief for recollected events. In their research, Mazzoni et al. (2010) found that 
the most common reason people reported for revising their belief that an event 
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occurred was receiving social feedback. That is, these participants had revised their 
belief that the recollected event had occurred following someone telling them that the 
recollected event had not occurred. Mazzoni et al. also found that people attenuated 
their belief for recollections when they had come to believe that the recollected event 
was implausible and when there was contradictory evidence. Scoboria, Boucher and 
Mazzoni (2014) specifically examined the reasons people provided for attenuating 
their belief in recollected events. Scoboria et al. examined 374 samples of 
nonbelieved memories where participants had provided a reason for attenuating their 
belief. In line with Mazzoni et al. (2010), Scoboria et al. also found that the most 
commonly reported reason for people to attenuate their belief that an event occurred 
was social feedback. In 42.2% (n = 158) of cases, social feedback was the primary 
reason for people attenuating their belief, with participants specifically stating that 
someone had told them that the event had not occurred at all, or had not occurred as 
recollected. The remaining reasons, in decreasing order of frequency were: event 
plausibility (i.e., the recollected event was now considered implausible; 19.5%, n = 
73), source re-attribution (8.8%, n = 33), internal features (7.2%, n = 27), external 
evidence (i.e., seeing a photograph or video; 7.2%, n = 27), general beliefs about 
memory (e.g., meta-memory beliefs; 6.4%, n = 24), discrepant with view of self or 
others (6.4%, n = 24), and personal motivation (1.1%, n = 4). These results showed 
that there are many factors which can contribute to the appraisal of belief that an 
event occurred, but the most commonly reported reason was social feedback.  
To summarise, nonbelieved memories are event representations characterised 
by stronger recollection ratings than belief ratings. One of the most compelling 
findings from this literature is the link between nonbelieved memories and social 
feedback. Research seeking to elicit nonbelieved memories have used social 
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feedback resulting in participants attenuating their belief for recent true and false 
memories and event for recent and distant childhood memories. When people with 
naturally occurring nonbelieved memories are asked to report reasons for attenuating 
their belief, the most commonly reported reason is social feedback. These findings 
suggest that belief is most susceptible to revision following social feedback. In our 
research we draw parallels between the social feedback used to elicit nonbelieved 
memories, and the use of social feedback to elicit omission errors.  
Belief, Attitudes and Behaviour 
Recent research has shown that it is important to make a distinction between 
belief and recollection. Researchers have suggested that it is important to examine 
whether belief or recollection drives behaviour (Nash & Takarangi, 2011, Smeets, 
Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 2005). Autobiographical memories are often 
assumed to affect our behaviour (Nelson, 1993), but recent research has shown that 
coming to believe an event occurred in the past is more influential than recollection 
(Bernstein et al., 2015). 
The focus of the current research is on the consequence of having a 
recollection when belief has been attenuated. Researchers have shown that 
suggestion can influence peoples’ behaviours and attitudes. Scoboria, Mazzoni and 
Jarry (2008) suggested to 21 participants that as children that they had become ill 
after eating peach yoghurt which had been contaminated with bacteria. Participants 
in the experimental condition were told that they were 96% likely to have become ill 
after eating peach yoghurt, while participants in the control condition were told that 
they were only 53% likely to have become ill after eating peach yoghurt. One week 
later, participants returned to the lab for what they believed was an unrelated 
marketing experiment. Participants were asked to taste-test an unrelated food 
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(crackers) and three different flavours of yoghurt, including peach yoghurt. After 
tasting each yoghurt, participants were asked to rate the appearance, odour, taste, 
texture of each yoghurt, and also state how much of each yoghurt they would like to 
eat, and how much they liked the food. The experimenter then told participants that 
the remaining yoghurt would be thrown away at the end of the session, so they could 
consume as much of the yoghurt as they wanted. The results showed that the 
participants who had received the suggestion that they had likely become sick after 
eating peach yoghurt, ate less peach yoghurt in the taste-test than participants who 
had received the 53% likely information.  
Other related research in this area by Laney, Morris, Bernstein, Wakefield, 
and Loftus (2008) found that participants who came to falsely believe that, as a child, 
they had a positive experience with asparagus, were willing to pay more for 
asparagus when shopping than participants who did not come to believe the positive 
experience had occurred. Likewise, coming to believe that you became ill after 
eating boiled eggs or dill pickles can reduce your willingness to eat these foods 
(Bernstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005). These two experiments are an example 
of how coming to believe an event occurred in the absence of a specific recollection 
can influence subsequent behaviour (see also Ost, in press). 
Researchers have demonstrated that findings, such as those found by 
Scoboria et al. (2008) are driven by belief, and not recollection. Using a similar 
procedure to Scoboria et al., Bernstein et al. (2005) suggested to 180 participants that 
they had become ill after eating hard-boiled eggs (n = 91) or dill pickle (n = 89). One 
key difference in this experiment was that participants were also asked to state 
whether they actually remembered becoming ill, whether they believed they had 
become ill, or whether they did not believe they had experienced the illness. In 
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coding this data, participants were categorised as a believer when they reported 
having a memory or a belief that they had become ill, and only if their confidence 
that the illness occurred had increased. This resulted in 25% of participants in the egg 
condition being classified as believers, and 31% in the dill pickle condition. The 
results showed that those categorised at ‘believers’ showed the greatest avoidance 
towards the foods which had been suggested to have caused their illness. This 
research demonstrates that developing a false belief that you had a negative 
experience with a food, results in behavioural consequences. 
More recently, Bernstein et al. (2015) have conducted a mega-analysis which 
pooled together the data from eight experiments (N = 1369) examining the effect of 
false belief on attitudes and behaviour. The results showed that suggesting that 
participants had a positive or negative experience with a particular food influences 
the participant’s preference ratings for that food. The suggestion also influenced 
participant’s belief that the event had occurred, which in turn influenced participants’ 
future intention to consume the food. Finally, believing that the experience occurred, 
irrespective of whether participants recollected the experience, had a similar effect. 
This research demonstrated the significant influence that belief could have on 
subsequent attitudes and behaviour. 
 Taken together, this research shows that belief is influential on our behaviour. 
However, to date, this research has only focused on the consequence of having a 
belief. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether recollection in the absence of a belief 
can have a consequence, such as omission errors (Mazzoni et al., 2014; Otgaar et al., 
2014). Given that recollection is assumed to be accompanied by belief (e.g., Brewer 
1996; Mazzoni & Kirsch 2002; Scoboria et al., 2004), it is not surprising that 
recollection is assumed to drive behaviour (Nelson, 1993). However, it seems 
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plausible to argue that there could be consequences to not-believing. For example, 
would someone with a nonbelieved memory report such a memory freely? That is the 
central question in this thesis. 
People Strategically Regulate Their Memory Output 
We often assume that when people are not able to provide a memory, it is 
because they either never had the information to begin with, or we think they have 
forgotten. However, research has shown that even when people do recollect 
information, they can still decide whether or not to report this information. Koriat 
and Goldsmith (1996) have proposed a model of the strategic regulation of memory 
accuracy in which they argue that people have direct control of their memory output. 
The model they propose consists of two mechanisms: a monitoring mechanism that 
is used to assess a response for correctness, and a control mechanism which is used 
to make a decision to provide or withhold an answer. More specifically, Koriat and 
Goldsmith’s model proposes that when embarking upon a memory search, there is a 
parallel process of monitoring all possible responses for the probability that it is the 
correct one (the ‘best candidate’). This probability, that the best candidate is correct, 
is then compared with an internally derived response criterion which determines 
whether the best candidate is an answer which should be volunteered. However, 
before volunteering an answer, the rememberer also considers the potential cost of 
reporting a correct or incorrect response. Koriat and Goldsmith demonstrated this by 
showing that when participants were incentivised to be accurate and told that an 
incorrect response would be penalised, participants were more likely to withhold 
responses which they held with low confidence. However, when participants were 
confident in a response they were more likely to provide the response. Koriat and 
Goldsmith assumed that confidence was the criterion measure. However, researchers 
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have proposed that confidence and belief in accuracy are “conceptual relatives” 
(Scoboria et al., 2015, p. 339). This relation comes in how belief in accuracy is 
defined as an assessment that recollected details are believed to be accurate. 
Confidence is also an assessment that a recollection is accurate. This suggests that 
we could expect belief in accuracy to be used in a similar way to confidence. When 
belief is attenuated, we would, therefore, expect participants to withhold information, 
resulting in omission errors.  
Outline of the Experiments Reported in this Thesis 
The aim of the current research is to examine whether omission errors are 
freely reported. While research has shown that, when specifically asked to recall a 
nonbelieved memory, 20% of people reported having a nonbelieved memory 
(Mazzoni et al., 2010). However, other research (Scoboria & Talarico, 2013) showed 
that only 3% of personal memories reported were nonbelieved memories. These 
findings suggest that people might be more likely to omit nonbelieved memories. 
In this thesis, we report four experiments in which we sought to examine 
whether nonbelieved memories resulted in the occurrence of omission errors. While 
previous research has examined either omission errors (Merckelbach et al., 2007; 
Wright et al., 2001) or nonbelieved memories (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 
2014; Otgaar et al., 2013), the general aim of our experiments was to elicit omission 
errors and simultaneously also measure belief and recollection. 
Based on the literature reviewed above, the elicitation of omission errors and 
nonbelieved memories share some common factors, yet an examination of both 
omission errors and belief and recollection remains unexplored. Throughout this 
research, we propose that omission errors could occur when people have attenuated 
their belief, but not their recollection of a past experience. Over four experiments, we 
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adopted and adapted previously reported procedures for eliciting omission errors, but 
also included measures of belief and recollection.  
In Experiments 1 and 2, we adapted the procedure used by Wright et al., 
(2001) to elicit omission errors. However, we expand upon the procedure used by 
Wright et al. in that we also asked participants to rate the strength of their belief and 
recollection. As in Wright et al. we examined omission errors occurring in both a test 
of free recall and recognition. These experiments are presented in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis.  
Experiment 3 and 4 use the social contagion paradigm used by Merckelbach 
et al. (2007) to elicit omission errors. Again, unlike previous research using the 
social contagion paradigm, we again asked participants to provide belief and 
recollection rations. These experiments are presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
  
60 
Chapter 2 – Eliciting Nonbelieved Memories  
 
Creating Nonbelieved Memories for Recent Autobiographical Events 
 
Overview 
 
Research suggests that many people spontaneously report vivid memories of 
events that they do not believe to have occurred. In the present experiment we tested 
for the first time whether, after powerful false memories have been created, 
debriefing might leave behind nonbelieved memories for the fake events. In Session 
1 participants imitated simple actions, and in Session 2 they saw doctored video-
recordings containing clips that falsely suggested they had performed additional 
(fake) actions. As in earlier experiments, this procedure created powerful false 
memories. In Session 3, participants were debriefed and told that specific actions in 
the video were not truly performed. Beliefs and memories for all critical actions were 
tested before and after the debriefing. Results showed that debriefing undermined 
participants’ beliefs in fake actions, but left behind residual memory-like content. 
These results indicate that debriefing can leave behind vivid false memories which 
are no longer believed, and thus we demonstrate for the first time that memory of an 
event can be experimentally dissociated from the belief that the event occurred. 
These results also confirm that belief in and memory for an event can be 
independently-occurring constructs. 
 
61 
The research presented in Chapter 2 was published prior to commencing the work 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The rationale for including this research as a chapter 
in the current thesis is to highlight the previous research conducted by the current 
author (and collaborators) that has demonstrated that belief in the occurrence of 
events can be attenuated while leaving recollection relatively intact.  
 
This research is published in the journal PLoS One: 
Clark, A., Nash, R. A., Fincham, G., & Mazzoni, G. (2012). Creating non-believed 
memories for recent autobiographical events. PLoS ONE, e32998 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0032998. 
  
62 
Introduction 
 
Counter-intuitive as it might sound, people do not always believe that the 
events they remember really occurred. Many people report having a memory that 
they know to be false (Mazzoni et al., 2010), and in some cases, these memories can 
concern extremely significant experiences. For instance, there are documented cases 
of people with memories of severe childhood abuse having encountered 
incontestable proof that the events they recall could not possibly have happened 
(Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). Here we report on an attempt to experimentally create 
nonbelieved memories in the lab by systematically stripping people’s memories of 
their underlying beliefs. 
Theoretical accounts of autobiographical memory and constructive memory 
processes have increasingly focused on believing as a foundation and precursor to 
remembering (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Mazzoni et al., 2001; Smeets et al., 2005). 
Scoboria et al. (2004), for example, proposed a nested structure for autobiographical 
reasoning, whereby if an event is remembered then it will also be believed to have 
occurred, and if it is believed to have occurred, it will also be seen as plausible. 
Conversely, an event can be judged as plausible in the absence of belief, and can be 
believed to have occurred in the absence of a memory. This experiment (Scoboria et 
al., 2004) offered empirical support for this nested model: specifically, their 
participants gave ratings of plausibility, belief and memory for ten specific events 
that they might have experienced in childhood. The results showed that ratings were 
almost always higher for plausibility than for belief, which in turn was rated higher 
than memory. Indeed, participants gave belief ratings that were equal to or greater 
than their memory ratings on 95.7% of occasions. 
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It seems clear that the nested model provides a good account of the 
relationship between belief and memory. But what about the remaining 4.3% of 
events rated by participants in Scoboria et al.’s experiment where participants gave 
memory ratings that were higher than their belief ratings? Is this small percentage 
attributable merely to random error? It would appear not. In fact, there is both 
anecdotal and empirical evidence that nonbelieved memories do occur. 
Perhaps the best-known anecdotal report of a nonbelieved memory was 
reported by Piaget (1951), who vividly recalled being the victim of an attempted 
kidnapping in infancy. Thirteen years after this purported crime, Piaget learned that 
the whole event was a fiction fabricated by his nanny; yet Piaget maintained that he 
could still ‘remember’ it occurring. To explore incidences like Piaget’s, Mazzoni et 
al. (2010) recently reported the first empirical experiment of nonbelieved memories. 
The authors asked 1,593 undergraduates whether they could remember an event that 
they did not believe happened. Nearly a quarter of the sample reported having a 
memory of this type, thus establishing the status of nonbelieved memories as more 
than exceptional anecdotal oddities.  
Mazzoni et al. (2010) asked their participants about the characteristics of their 
nonbelieved memories and found that these memories, in fact, had many 
phenomenological similarities with ‘regular’ believed memories. For example, both 
types of memory were rated similarly in terms of visual characteristics, emotional 
richness, and the feeling of ‘reliving’ and mental time-travel. Contrastingly, 
nonbelieved memories differed from believed memories on several other 
characteristics such as auditory quality and the sense of significance. These results 
led the authors to conclude that nonbelieved memories are experienced as genuine 
memories in many respects. 
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Mazzoni et al.’s (2010) data are intriguing and informative, but to understand 
nonbelieved memories better, and thus to gain a stronger insight into the role of 
beliefs in memory construction, it would be beneficial to be able to create these 
memories experimentally. To consider how we might create nonbelieved memories, 
one should consider why people stop believing in their memories. Respondents gave 
numerous reasons, but the most commonly reported reason was that someone else 
informed them that the event did not occur (Mazzoni et al., 2010). Similarly, in 
experiments examining the effect of co-witness influences upon memory, 
participants who remember particular details are often far less likely to privately 
report those memories after they receive feedback from a confederate denying the 
presence of those details (Merckelbach et al., 2007). An analogous process to this 
occurs after the experimental phases of false-memory research when the 
experimenter debriefs participants at the end of the experiment. Debriefing after a 
suggestive procedure might thus be one method for experimentally creating and 
exploring nonbelieved memories, and was thus the focus of the present experiment. 
Testing the effects of debriefing on beliefs and memories is important for two 
reasons. First, as we have outlined, debriefing could provide a way to create and thus 
to systematically investigate nonbelieved memories. Second, and more broadly, it 
raises the practical question of whether participants in false memory experiments 
tend to leave those experiments with the effects of the induction fully reversed by the 
experimenter’s debriefing. In other words, does debriefing successfully ‘undo’ 
participants’ false memories, or does it simply ‘undo’ their beliefs, leaving 
nonbelieved memories intact? 
In the present experiment, we used Nash and colleagues’ doctored-video 
procedure to induce false memories in participants (Nash, Wade & Brewer, 2009a; 
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Nash et al., 2009b): participants saw doctored video clips that purported to ‘prove’ 
they had performed actions that they did not truly perform. A few hours later they 
were fully debriefed, after which we re-assessed their beliefs and memories to see 
whether their false memories were ‘still there’. At this point, we also assessed the 
characteristics of participants’ beliefs and memories. Using this doctored-video 
procedure has at least two benefits for our purposes: First, the procedure has been 
shown to induce high rates of strongly held false beliefs and memories, as compared 
with other false-memory paradigms such as the imagination inflation procedure that 
tend to induce significant but small confidence increases (Garry, manning, Loftus & 
Sherman, 1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). Second, in Nash et al.’s experiment, 
many participants made informal remarks after debriefing that they could ‘still 
remember’ performing the false actions that were suggested. This observation gives 
credence to the hypothesis that debriefing after the doctored-video induction could 
leave nonbelieved memories behind.  
The results of the experiment confirm the prediction that the debriefing in a 
false memory experiment leaves behind memory-like experiences for recent events. 
These are probably mental images that to a large extent feel like genuine memories, 
even though the belief in those mental images is substantially reduced by the 
debriefing. It also revealed that Nash et al.’s paradigm produces a smaller number of 
nonbelieved memories before the debriefing, thus creating clear memories for actions 
that participants are not very certain to have performed. These data confirm that 
memories and beliefs are independently-occurring constructs and as such can be 
manipulated independently.  
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Materials and Method 
Participants and Design 
Twenty participants (18 female) completed all sessions of the experiment; 
their ages ranged from 18-54, (M = 24.15, SD = 9.13). Participants who studied 
psychology were compensated with course credits; non-psychology students 
participated voluntarily without compensation. The experiment had a within-subjects 
design, with critical action type (performed, fake, new) and session (Session 2 pre-
debriefing, Session 3 post-debriefing) as the manipulated variables. 
Materials and procedure 
We selected 42 of the simple actions from Nash et al. (2009b), for use in the 
various stages of this experiment. From these, we selected six actions to be critical 
actions (clap your hands, click your fingers, rub the table, salute, cover your face 
with your hands, and flex your arm). The critical actions were selected on the basis 
that they were neither highly memorable nor unmemorable, based on the ratings 
collected in the Nash et al. experiment. These six actions were randomly divided into 
three pairs that were assigned—counterbalanced across participants—as the 
performed, fake and new critical actions. Performed critical actions were genuinely 
performed by participants in Session 1; fake actions were not performed, but 
doctored evidence presented in Session 2 suggested that they were indeed performed; 
new critical actions were neither performed nor suggested, but appeared only in the 
belief and memory questionnaires in Sessions 2 and 3, and were used as a control. 
Session 1 
The procedure used here was modelled after the procedure used by Nash et 
al. (2009a) and Nash et al. (2009b). Participants were greeted by a researcher and 
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informed that the experiment was investigating people’s ability to mimic others’ 
actions. They were told that their task would involve observing the researcher 
performing a series of actions, and then copying the actions themselves. They were 
also informed that they would be video-recorded as they completed this task. After 
gaining consent, the researcher and participant sat at a table facing each other, and 
with the video camera directed toward them both. The researcher started filming the 
session and began by performing a simple action for 12 seconds After this period, the 
participant was then required to copy the action they had seen for a further 12 
seconds. Next, the researcher performed a second action, and this ‘observe—copy’ 
process continued until both the researcher and the participant had performed 26 
actions, including the 2 critical actions that had been assigned as ‘performed actions’. 
The 24 non-critical actions were performed in a single randomised order in all 
participants’ sessions, as these were essentially fillers. The critical performed actions 
were always performed in the 9th and 17th position of the sequence.  
After completing all 26 actions, the participant was thanked and reminded to 
return for Session 2. Once the participant had left the room, the researcher returned 
to the table and filmed himself performing the two critical actions that had been 
assigned as fake actions. The researcher performed each of these for 12 seconds 
while seated in the same position as he had sat while the participant was present.  
Preparing the video-sequences 
Following Session 1, we used Adobe After Effects software to doctor two 
clips from the video-recording. As in Nash et al. (2009a, b) , and as depicted in 
Figure 2, each doctored clip was created by digitally combining two genuine clips: 
one that showed the researcher performing a critical action after the participant had 
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left the room, and one that showed the participant passively observing a different 
action. The images from these clips were combined to produce composites that 
seemed to prove that the participant had in fact observed the two fake actions. 
Because participants also performed all of the actions they observed, these clips were 
therefore designed to persuade participants that they had also performed these two 
actions. Next, we used Adobe Premier Pro to embed these doctored clips into a 
longer sequence of clips taken from the genuine recording. The full sequence 
comprised clips of the two fake actions, the two performed critical actions and eight 
other non-critical performed actions as fillers; all participants saw the same eight 
filler actions. All 12 clips were 10-seconds in length, and separated by 5-second 
pauses during which the screen was blank; thus the full video sequence lasted just 
under 3 min. We did not want the critical actions to be highly salient in the video 
sequence; the performed critical actions were thus placed in positions 3 and 7 and 
fake actions in positions 5 and 10 of the video sequence.  
 
Figure 2. Video manipulation; (A) Real clip, (B) Fake action, (C) Doctored 
composite of (A) and (B). 
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Session 2 
Participants returned for Session 2 two days after Session 1. In this session 
participants were shown their 3-min video-sequence twice through. To ensure 
participants paid attention to the actions in the video, on the first viewing they were 
asked to note down how many times they thought they performed each action in a 
week. On the second viewing, participants were asked to name each action. 
Participants next completed a 5-min filler task (solving anagrams), after which they 
completed two questionnaires that asked whether they believed and remembered that 
they performed various specific actions during Session 1. Participants completed the 
memory questionnaire first: this questionnaire listed 28 actions including 22 non-
critical fillers (of which 10 were performed in Session 1 and 12 were new) and the 6 
critical actions. For each action, participants used an 8-point scale to rate their 
memory, in response to the question “How strongly do you remember performing 
this action in Session 1?” Following the memory questionnaire, participants 
completed the belief questionnaire, which comprised the same 28 actions in a 
different order. Here, participants again used an 8-point scale to answer the question 
“How strongly do you believe you performed this action in Session 1?” In both 
questionnaires, a rating of ‘8’ signified a strong belief or memory. Our initial piloting 
showed that participants understood the distinction between belief and memory 
better when the memory questionnaire was administered first, and so we did not 
counterbalance this ordering. Doing so might have negated a possible confound 
insofar as people’s belief ratings might have been influenced by their memory 
ratings; however, for the purpose of this exploratory experiment, we decided it 
preferable that participants were fully able to understand the conceptual difference. 
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After completing these questionnaires, participants were again thanked and reminded 
to return for Session 3. 
Session 3 
Participants returned for Session 3 approximately 4 hours after Session 2. In 
this session, we explained to participants that some of the video clips they saw in 
Session 2 had been doctored, and we told them which clips were the fakes. For each 
of the six critical actions, participants were then asked to provide new belief and 
memory ratings using the same scales as in Session 2. Finally, participants completed 
a questionnaire probing the phenomenological characteristics of their memories. For 
each of the six critical actions, they were asked to rate 25 memory characteristics on 
7-point scales. 
 
Results 
 
In the following section, we present our findings in four stages. First, we 
examine the data measuring participants’ beliefs and memories for critical actions in 
Session 2, and we look for evidence of nonbelieved memories among these reports. 
Second, we conduct the same analyses on the comparable data from Session 3. Third, 
we look at the changes in participants’ ratings between Session 2 and Session 3.3 
Fourth, we analyse the phenomenology data collected in Session 3. 
                                                          
3 We also analysed the data with two repeated measures factorial ANOVAs, 
including Session (Session 2 vs. Session 3) as a within-subjects variable. The results 
were wholly consistent with those reported here, with large Critical Action Type x 
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Beliefs and memories, pre-debriefing 
As a manipulation check, we were first interested to find whether our 
doctored videos led participants to believe or remember they performed the fake 
actions. To this end, we examined participants’ action ratings from Session 2; these 
are represented in the first column of data in Table 1. A one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed significant differences in belief ratings across critical action types, 
F(2, 18) = 73.43, p < .001, η2p = .89. Follow-up paired sample t-tests showed that 
performed critical actions were rated significantly higher than both new critical 
actions, t(19) = 10.76, p < .001, dz = 2.41, and fake actions, t(19) = 2.32, p = .03, dz = 
0.52. Importantly, fake actions were rated significantly higher than new critical 
actions t(19) = 8.99, p < .001, dz = 2.01, which shows that our doctored videos had 
the intended effect on beliefs. The same pattern of results held for memory ratings: 
there were significant differences across critical action types F(2, 18) = 62.50, p < 
.001, η2p = .87. Performed critical actions were rated significantly higher than both 
new critical actions, t(19) = 11.37, p < .001, dz = 2.54, and fake actions, t(19) = 3.37, 
p < .01, dz = 0.75, but fake actions were rated significantly higher than new critical 
actions, t(19) = 7.23, p < .001, dz = 1.62. Together these findings support those of 
Nash et al. (2009a, 2009b) and showed that the doctored-video procedure was 
effective at distorting participants’ beliefs and memories for their actions.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Session interaction effects both for Belief ratings, F(2, 38) = 20.00, p < .001¸ η2p = 
.51, and Memory ratings, F (2, 38) = 8.73, p = .001, η2p = .32. For ease of 
interpretation we report the outcomes of separate analyses of Session 2 data, Session 
3 data, and change-scores. 
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We also assessed whether participants reported any nonbelieved memories in 
this session. Recall that in Scoboria et al. (2004), participants gave memory ratings 
that were higher than their belief ratings on just 4.3% of occasions. In Session 2 of  
  
Before 
debriefing 
After 
debriefing 
Change (After 
– Before) 
  M SD M SD M SD 
Belief 
Performed actions 7.15 1.34 6.48 1.40 -0.68 1.13 
Fake actions 5.93 1.83 2.63 1.90 -3.30 2.84 
New actions 2.20 1.27 2.83 2.05 +0.63 1.78 
Memory 
Performed actions 7.30 1.13 6.48 1.63 -0.83 1.26 
Fake actions 5.78 1.92 3.73 1.87 -2.05 2.43 
New actions 2.33 1.48 2.55 1.83 +0.23 1.96 
Table 1. Mean belief and memory ratings assigned to critical actions before and 
after debriefing. 
the present experiment, memory ratings were higher than belief ratings on 14.2% of 
occasions (10% of performed critical actions; 15% of fake actions; 17.5% of new 
critical actions). This frequency of nonbelieved memories is considerably higher than 
Scoboria et al.’s figure. 
Random variations in participants’ ratings might account for many of the 
nonbelieved memories when assessed in this way, particularly because unlike 
Scoboria et al. we administered the belief and memory questionnaires separately. For 
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this reason, we also examined our data with more stringent criteria. First, we 
classified responses as nonbelieved memories only if the memory rating was at least 
2 scale-points higher than belief rating. This pattern held on 10.8% of occasions  
(7.5% of performed critical actions; 12.5% of fake actions; 12.5% of new critical 
actions). When the difference was required to be 3 or more scale-points, the overall 
rate was 5.8% (5% performed, 5% fake, and 7.5% new).  
Beliefs and memories, post-debriefing 
At the start of Session 3, we asked participants to guess what the aim of the 
experiment was. Only one participant guessed a hypothesis involving false memory 
or doctored videos; this participant was removed from the analysis and replaced with 
another participant.  
We now turn to examining whether debriefing influenced people’s beliefs 
and memories and whether it created any nonbelieved memories. To this end, we 
began by examining participants’ belief and memory ratings from Session 3, after 
they had been debriefed. These results are reported in the middle column of data in 
Table 1. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA on the belief ratings again revealed 
significant differences across action types, F(2, 18) = 38.56, p < .001, η2p = .81. 
Performed critical actions were rated higher than both new critical actions, t(19) = 
7.42, p < .001, dz = 1.66, and fake actions, t(19) = 8.16, p < .001, dz = 1.83, but this 
time fake actions were no longer rated higher than new critical actions in terms of 
belief, t(19) = -0.42, p = .68, dz = 0.09. In other words, the debriefing appeared to 
undo the effect of the doctored video clips on participants’ beliefs. Results were 
partly different for memory ratings. An ANOVA revealed significant differences in 
memory ratings across critical action types, F(2, 18) = 41.29, p < .001, η2p = .82. As 
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before, performed critical actions were rated higher than new critical actions, t(19) = 
9.30, p < .001, dz = 2.08, and fake actions, t(19) = 5.09, p < .001, dz = 1.14, but 
unlike the pattern with the belief ratings, memory ratings for fake actions remained 
significantly higher than those for new critical actions, t(19) = 2.70, p = .01, dz = 
0.60. That is to say, the debriefing did not undermine participants’ memories of fake 
actions to the same extent as it undermined their beliefs. 
These analyses suggest that debriefing might have created some additional 
nonbelieved memories. To assess whether this was the case, as for Session 2 we 
examined participants’ Session 3 ratings to see how often their memory ratings 
exceeded their belief ratings by at least one scale-point: the criterion used in Mazzoni 
et al. (2010). Overall, this occurred for 26.7% of critical actions (20.0% of performed 
critical actions; 42.5% of fake actions; 17.5% of new critical actions). As compared 
with the Session 2 data, following debriefing there were significantly more 
nonbelieved memories of fake actions, z = 2.30, p = .02. The same was not true of 
performed critical actions, z = 1.16, p = .25, or new critical actions, z = 0.00, p = 
1.00. Indeed, as Table 1 illustrates, after debriefing the memory ratings were 
significantly greater than the belief ratings only for fake actions, t(19) = 3.51, p < 
.01, dz = 0.79; in all other conditions the belief and memory ratings did not 
significantly differ (for all contrasts, t < 1.1, p > .29, dz < .25). 
When the more stringent criterion to measure nonbelieved memories 
(memory minus belief ≥ 2 scale-points) was used, a lower number of nonbelieved 
memories was obtained (14.2% overall), but the decrease was mostly for performed 
(5%) and new critical actions (7.5%). For fake actions, memory ratings were at least 
two points higher than belief ratings on 30% of occasions. A similar pattern was 
found when the even more stringent criterion of ≥ 3 scale-points was used, with 
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10.8% of nonbelieved memories overall. Still, 25% of the fake actions met this 
criterion, but only 5% of the performed critical actions and 2.5% of the new critical 
actions. It is, therefore, clear that our false memory induction and debriefing 
procedure substantially increased the incidence of nonbelieved memories even when 
a highly stringent classification criterion was used. 
Change-scores 
To explore our findings in more depth, we calculated change-scores by 
subtracting participants’ belief and memory ratings given at Session 2 from their 
ratings given at Session 3. These change-scores are shown in the third column of data 
in Table 1 and provide a measure of the effect of debriefing on beliefs and memories. 
One-sample t-tests showed that with regard to performed critical actions, the change-
scores were significantly below zero for both the belief, t(19) = -2.93, p < .01, d = 
0.60, and memory measures, t(19) = -2.68, p = .02, d = 0.66. These change-scores for 
performed critical actions give us an indication of how much deflation in ratings 
between Sessions 2 and 3 might plausibly be attributed to simple weakening of 
memory strength and confidence across the time delay. Change-scores for fake 
actions were also significantly below zero, (Belief, t(19) = -5.19, p < .001, d = 1.16, 
Memory, t(19) = -3.78, p = .001, d =0.84), but were also significantly greater in 
magnitude than those for performed critical actions (both ts > 2.5, both ps < .05, both 
ds > 0.56). These change-scores, therefore, show that both beliefs and memories for 
fake actions were undermined by debriefing, although the effect on belief was 
significantly greater than the effect on memory. The change-scores for new critical 
actions did not differ significantly from zero (Belief, t(19) = 0.51, p = .61, d = 0.11; 
Memory, t(19) = 1.57, p = .13, d = 0.35).  
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Phenomenological characteristics 
The final element of our analysis was to look at the characteristics of 
participants’ beliefs and memories. Recall that at the end of Session 3, participants 
rated all six critical actions in terms of 25 memory characteristics. For each of these 
25 characteristics, we computed a one-way ANOVA, with critical action type as the 
repeated measures factor. After making a Bonferroni correction (α = .05/25 = .002), 
these analyses revealed significant differences on 9 of the 25 memory characteristics, 
including visual detail, feelings, and the experience of re-living. However, follow-up 
t-tests with Bonferroni corrections revealed that all of these effects were driven by 
memory characteristics for performed critical actions being clearer than for fake and 
new critical actions. In contrast, there were no significant differences between the 
characteristics of memories for fake actions and new critical actions. 
To assess whether nonbelieved memories differ in characteristics from other 
types of belief and memory phenomena, we collapsed the Session 3 data across 
critical action types, and categorised all 120 critical actions (6 actions x 20 
participants) as either a nonbelieved non-memory (n = 76), believed non-memory (n 
= 5), nonbelieved memory (n = 10), or believed memory (n = 29). Responses were 
classified as ‘beliefs’ whenever participants gave belief ratings of 7 or 8, and also as 
‘memories’ whenever they gave memory ratings of 7 or 8. Thus instead of defining 
nonbelieved memories as before in terms of the size of the difference between 
memory and beliefs scores, here a nonbelieved memory is defined specifically as a 
memory rated as 7 or 8, accompanied by a belief rated 6 or below. We conducted a 
series of one-way ANOVAs to compare the characteristics of different response 
types; however, we excluded believed non-memories from this analysis due to their 
low frequency. As represented in Figure 3, our ANOVAs revealed significant 
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differences (α = .05/25 = .002) on 18 of the 25 memory characteristics. We were 
particularly interested in whether nonbelieved memories differed from nonbelieved 
non-memories (i.e., comparing nonbelieved events with vs. without an  
 
Figure 3. Phenomenological characteristics that differed between nonbelieved 
memories, believed memories and nonbelieved memories. 
accompanying memory), and from believed memories (i.e., comparing memories 
with vs. without an accompanying belief). Follow-up t-tests revealed that 
nonbelieved memories were rated as significantly richer than nonbelieved non-
memories on 12 of the 18 measures that had been significant overall; three of these 
were significant at the Bonferroni-adjusted level (α = 0.05/18 = 0.0028): memory for 
location, t(17.88) = 3.76, p = .001, d = 0.98, spatial arrangement of people, t(19.82) = 
4.36, p < .001, d = 1.09, and feeling of mental time-travel, t(84) = 3.75, p < .001, d = 
1.35. In contrast, only two characteristics—clarity of thought and details of thought 
(both ts < 2.61, both ds < 0.75)—differed between nonbelieved memories and 
believed memories, and neither remained significant after a Bonferroni-adjustment. 
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These findings—along with a visual inspection of Figure 3—broadly support those 
of Mazzoni et al. (2010), insofar as they show that nonbelieved memories share 
many more similarities with believed memories than they do with non-remembered 
events. 
 
Discussion 
 
Ours is the first experiment to our knowledge to systematically examine 
whether the effects of a powerful false memory induction are ‘undone’ when 
participants are debriefed, or whether nonbelieved memories are left behind. The 
data provide new evidence—the first experimental evidence—for the proposal that 
the occurrence of beliefs and memories can be independent. Further building on the 
work of Mazzoni et al. (2010) in which participants described nonbelieved memories 
of childhood experiences, the present experiment also represents the first empirical 
demonstration of nonbelieved memories of recent experiences. 
Confirming previous results (Nash et al., 2009a), the manipulation used to 
induce false memories was highly effective. Many false memories for fake actions 
were obtained: 68% of memory ratings were above the scale-midpoint, and a high 
percentage (58%) were in the high confidence range (i.e., Memory ≥ 7). The 
debriefing manipulation we used significantly increased participants’ tendency to 
rate their memories for fake actions as stronger than their belief in those actions, a 
response pattern that previous studies have shown to occur only rarely (Scoboria et 
al., 2004). This was true even with our most stringent criterion: For 25% of fake 
actions, memory ratings were at least three points above belief ratings, whereas this 
79 
was true for just 4% of other critical actions. Indeed, after debriefing, participants’ 
mean memory ratings for fake actions were significantly higher than their mean 
belief ratings for those actions (and also higher than their mean memory ratings for 
new critical actions). These results suggest that after debriefing participants were left 
with some residual memory-like content for the fake actions that they did not believe 
to be grounded in genuine experience. 
The study of the dissociation between beliefs and memories stems from 
research on the effects of suggestion, in which often the creation of false beliefs has 
not been accompanied by false memories (Mazzoni, Loftus, Seitz & Lynn, 1999). 
This dissociation is important not only in false memories (e.g., Scoboria, Lynn, 
Hessen & Fisico, 2007) but also in episodic autobiographical memory more 
generally (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Scoboria et al., 2004), and for understanding 
some clinical conditions (Smeets et al., 2005). Previously, the distinction has been 
conceived as a partial dissociation, in which memories are nested within belief 
(Scoboria et al., 2004). Here we have shown experimentally that the two are 
theoretically independent, as the same manipulation affects differently beliefs and 
memories. This leads to having believed memories (what are usually called episodic 
memories); believed but not remembered events; nonbelieved memories, and 
nonbelieved and not remembered events. It is well established that procedures that 
create false memories often increase beliefs more easily than memories (Mazzoni et 
al., 1999; Scoboria et al., 2007). Similarly, this experiment shows that procedures 
that aim at deleting false memories have a greater effect on the belief than the 
memory. In other words, beliefs seem to be in general more malleable than 
memories. We are unaware of any theoretical reason to expect gender effects in 
terms of this relative malleability; however, the low proportion of male participants 
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in the present experiment and the exclusively student sample are limitations to the 
generalizability of these conclusions that should be addressed in further studies. 
Using the 2x2 classification system we explored the phenomenological 
characteristics of participants’ beliefs and memories, to help understand what the 
word ‘memory’ might refer to. In the current experiment believed and nonbelieved 
memories (combined across all action types) did not differ on any measure that 
reflected a recollective experience. This indicates that nonbelieved memories still 
maintain a strong sense of recollection (see also Mazzoni et al., 2010) while differing 
on non-recollective characteristics involving thoughts (details of thought and clarity 
of thought). In contrast, several recollective characteristics differed between 
nonbelieved memories and nonbelieved non-memories; thus, memory, as opposed to 
belief, could be conceived as recollection. We note, however, that one key 
experience not assessed here is familiarity, which in some previous studies has been 
shown to affect belief judgments (Bernstein, Whittlesea & Loftus, 2009; Winkielman 
& Schwarz, 2001), and in other studies has been shown also to affect memory 
judgments (Echterhoff & Hirst, 2006; Nash et al., 2009a). Future studies should 
independently manipulate in the same procedure familiarity and recollection and 
assess how they relate separately to belief.  
One important question that remains unanswered by the present experiment 
relates to the nature of the independence between belief and memory. Is belief a 
necessary precursor to memory that can nevertheless be removed afterwards, like 
scaffolding on a new building? Or, alternatively, can memories form completely in 
the absence of belief? One might reason that the former hypothesis would be true: a 
memory-like image that develops in the absence of belief would feasibly be 
attributed to a dream or to imagination. Indeed, it might be that a belief itself can 
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cause mental images to be attributed to memory; belief could thus be conceptualised 
as a form of source-monitoring cue in its own right, a conceptualisation that fits with 
existing theoretical accounts of metacognitive processes in autobiographical memory 
in which the strength of the belief affects memorial processes. The idea that belief 
can function as a monitoring cue in its own right also is in line with other 
attributional models in which non-memorial information (such as perceptual fluency) 
affects the ‘old/new’ decision in recognition tasks (Jacoby, Kelley & Dywan, 1989; 
Whittlesea, Jacoby & Girard, 1990). Nevertheless, evidence against this 
interpretation—and in favour of the latter hypothesis—is that many of the 
nonbelieved memories in our experiment were not a product of our suggestive 
doctored videos and debriefing: participants occasionally reported nonbelieved 
memories for fake actions in Session 2, as well as for performed and new actions in 
Sessions 2 and 3. Thus here nonbelieved (sometimes false) memories have occurred 
spontaneously and independently of the experimental manipulation. These 
observations raise the intriguing possibility that memories might indeed sometimes 
form in the absence of belief. This can occur only if beliefs and memories are the 
product of different mechanisms. 
Finally, our findings have broader implications for memory distortion 
research. To the extent that debriefing might not always completely ‘undo’ the 
effects of a suggestive manipulation, we might question the ethics of inducing false 
memories in experimental participants. Is it ethical for participants to leave research 
labs with remnants of nonbelieved false memory content in the forefront of their 
minds? A sensible approach to answering this question might be to consider whether 
the memories would likely be consequential. For example, it is conceivable that a 
person who ceased believing in a traumatic experience might nevertheless continue 
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to be traumatised by intrusive mental images experienced as memories. We suggest 
that for most false-memory paradigms and experiment designs, this is highly unlikely 
to pose an ethical problem. Nevertheless, how participants might feel about any 
residual memory content should be an important question for researchers to consider 
when planning studies.  
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Summary of Chapter 2 
 
The results of Clark et al. (2012) presented in this chapter demonstrate that belief in 
occurrence can be attenuated while leaving recollection relatively intact. Thus, this 
research provides a clear demonstration that belief in occurrence is dissociable from 
recollection of recent memories. While the phenomenological data in this research 
suggest that nonbelieved memories are quite similar to believed memories, should 
we expect both nonbelieved memories and believed memories to be freely reported 
in similar ways? Or, since research using a similar manipulation to that used by Clark 
et al. (2012) has found that omission errors occur (Merckelbach et al., 2007), should 
we expect nonbelieved memories to be omitted more frequently than believed 
memories? It is this question that inspired the current thesis and which is addressed 
in the research presented in the following chapters.    
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Chapter 3 – Experiments 1 and 2 
 
Omission errors are not a consequence of not believing 
 
Overview 
 
In Experiments 1 and 2, we sought to elicit omission errors using a procedure based 
on Wright et al. (2001). Participants saw a number of scenes, each showing a 
collection of household items. After a free recall test where participants had to recall 
as many items as they could from each scene, participants were either re-presented 
with the scenes (Expt. 1) or the experimenter read aloud to the participants the items 
they had recalled (Expt. 2). In these re-presented scenes, some of the items which 
were originally presented to the participants were withheld. The results showed that 
omission errors only occurred rarely and both belief and memory ratings were 
attenuated for omission errors.  
 
Experiments 1 and 2 are presented together in Chapter 3 because these experiments 
are currently being prepared for publication together.  
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Introduction 
 
Nonbelieved memories refer to autobiographical memories characterised by stronger 
recollection than belief (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010). While nonbelieved 
memories were initially assumed to be quite exceptional, more recent evidence 
revealed that one in five people report having such a memory (Mazzoni et al., 2010), 
and that nonbelieved memories can be elicited in the laboratory (Clark, Nash, 
Fincham, & Mazzoni, 2012; Mazzoni, Clark, & Nash, 2014; Otgaar, Scoboria & 
Smeets, 2013). While recent research has sought to examine the characteristics of 
nonbelieved memories, the current research sought to examine whether nonbelieved 
memories have any behavioural consequences. Specifically, in this research, we 
examined whether nonbelieved memories are responsible for instances in which 
people fail to report experienced events, also called omission errors.  
 Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) outlined a metacognitive model in which they 
proposed the idea that people can believe an event without necessarily recollecting 
the event. One of the main tenets of Mazzoni and Kirsch’s model is that even when 
people are unable to recollect a past event, they may still believe that it occurred in 
their past (for example, breaking your arm as a young child) if they have enough 
information available about the event (e.g., seeing a family photo or a scar). 
Empirical data supporting Mazzoni and Kirsch’s model was reported by Scoboria, 
Mazzoni, Kirsch and Relyea (2004) who instructed 368 participants to rate ten 
autobiographical events for how plausible the event was (general plausibility and 
personal plausibility), their belief that the event had occurred, and the strength of 
their recollection. The results showed that participants provided highest ratings for 
general plausibility (M = 4.63), followed by personal plausibility (M = 3.77). 
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Participants’ belief ratings (M = 3.19) were lower than their ratings of personal 
plausibility but higher than their ratings of recollection (M = 2.34). This finding 
suggests that for an event to be recollected, a person must believe it to have occurred, 
and for it to be believed, it must also be considered plausible. Scoboria et al. 
described this as the ‘nested model’, in which memory is nested within belief, and 
belief within plausibility. 
Despite the findings from Scoboria et al. (2004), there is anecdotal evidence 
that people can recollect events for which they have stopped believing the event 
occurred. For example, Piaget (1951) reported on a memory he had for almost being 
kidnapped when he was two years old. Piaget’s recollection was so vivid that he 
recollected details such as scratches caused to his nanny’s face as she fought off the 
attacker. However, when Piaget was 15 years old, he learned that this event had 
never happened. Taken together, the account provided by Piaget and the small 
number of recollections found by Scoboria et al. (2004) suggested that people are 
able to vividly recollect events even when their belief that the event occurred is low. 
Indeed, Scoboria et al. (2004) also found that while the nested relationship between 
belief and recollection held true for 95.7% of the events, they also found that for 
4.3% of the events rated, participants reported having a stronger recollection of the 
event than belief that the event had occurred. Thus these events were remembered 
with a stronger recollection than belief that the event had occurred.  
 To describe these recollections, Mazzoni et al. (2010) coined the term 
‘nonbelieved memories’. To understand these memories further, Mazzoni and 
colleagues asked 1593 undergraduate students to indicate whether they could 
recollect an event that they no longer believed had occurred. Strikingly, 349 
(21.91%) of these participants reported that they had a nonbelieved memory. Of 
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those participants with nonbelieved memories, 98 went on to provided further details 
of their recollection, including specific details about what had caused them to 
attenuate their belief that the event had occurred. Participants were also asked to 
recall (i) an event which they still believed had occurred, and (ii) an event which they 
believed had occurred, but for which they had no specific recollection (e.g., a family 
story) both from around the same age as the event in their nonbelieved memory. 
Also, participants were asked to rate the phenomenological characteristics of each of 
these memories (e.g., quality of visual details, emotional valence and ability to 
mentally re-live the event). The results showed that nonbelieved memories received 
similar phenomenological ratings as believed memories. For example, both believed 
memories and nonbelieved memories were characterised by the ability to form clear 
visual and other perceptual details, including the spatial arrangement of people and 
objects. In more than half of the cases (56%) participants indicated that they had 
attenuated their belief that the event had occurred following social feedback (i.e., 
someone told them that the event had not occurred). Another commonly reported 
reason for people attenuating their belief was that the event lacked plausibility 
(36%). Finally, receiving contradictory evidence (e.g., no scar where one should be) 
was the third most common reason for attenuating belief (7%). This research 
demonstrates that nonbelieved memories are more common than once thought, and 
that nonbelieved memories share many of the characteristics of memories for events 
which are still strongly believed to have occurred.  
 More recently, researchers have demonstrated that nonbelieved memories can 
be experimentally elicited in the laboratory. Clark et al. (2012) showed participants 
doctored video evidence suggesting they had performed actions which in fact they 
had not performed. Some of these participants then developed ‘false’ memories for 
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having performed those actions. The researchers then ‘debriefed’ participants by 
explaining to them how they had come to falsely remember performing these actions. 
Both before and after debriefing, participants rated the strength of their belief and 
recollection for performing the actions. The authors found that following debriefing, 
participants’ belief ratings for the false actions decreased significantly (cf. before 
debriefing), while recollection both before and after debriefing remained at similar 
strength. This experiment was the first to demonstrate that belief and recollection can 
be experimentally dissociated (see also Otgaar, Scoboria & Smeets, 2013 for an 
example using childhood memories with adult and child participants).  
 While Clark et al. (2012) and Otgaar et al. (2013) demonstrated that 
nonbelieved memories occur when false memories are challenged, similar results 
have been observed when true memories are challenged. Mazzoni et al. (2014) used a 
similar procedure to that used by Clark et al. (2012), but instead of challenging false 
memories, the memories challenged were of genuinely performed actions. Mazzoni 
et al. demonstrated that the ‘debriefing’ delivered by the experimenter resulted in 
participants attenuating their belief that they had performed these actions while their 
recollection of performing the actions remained high. Otgaar et al. (2016) also found 
that a challenge to participants’ true and false memories by an experimenter resulted 
in participants attenuating their belief, but this effect was larger when false memories 
were challenged compared with true memories.  
 While past research has assumed both belief and recollection are required for 
remembering (e.g., Brewer, 1996), the research described above demonstrates that 
recollections and beliefs about the past are dissociable components of remembering 
the past. It is possible for someone to believe an event occurred, but with little 
recollection (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Scoboria et al., 2004), and it is possible for 
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someone to recollect an event after their belief has been attenuated (Mazzoni et al., 
2010; Clark et al., 2014, Mazzoni et al., 2014; Otgaar et al., 2013). Through making 
this distinction between recollection and belief, researchers have begun to question 
whether recollection or belief has a greater influence on our behaviour (Nash & 
Takarangi, 2011, Smeets, Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 2005).  
 Our behaviours are often attributed to our memories of the past (Nelson, 
1993). However, research has shown that participants who develop a false belief 
about having a positive (Laney, Morris, Bernstein, Wakefield, & Loftus, 2008) or 
negative (Bernstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005) experience with a food in the 
past, have also shown subsequent behavioural consequences. For example, 
participants who come to believe that they had a positive experience with asparagus 
when they were children were more willing to order asparagus in a restaurant and 
pay more for asparagus when shopping (Laney et al., 2008). A recent mega-analysis 
(Bernstein, Scoboria, & Arnold, 2015) has confirmed the robustness of these 
findings. 
In the current experiments, we were interested in the consequence of having a 
recollection for which belief had been attenuated. Specifically, we examined whether 
attenuated belief would increase the frequency of omission errors. Omission errors 
occur when people fail to report items of information which they encoded, and may 
have already at some point retrieved from memory. It has been demonstrated that 
some suggestive and misleading techniques can cause participants to omit 
information more frequently than participants not exposed to the suggestive or 
misleading information (Merckelbach, Van Roermund, & Candel, 2007; Wright, 
Loftus & Hall, 2001). For example, Merckelbach et al. found that when a confederate 
challenged a participant’s recollection of items present in a scene, participants 
90 
omitted these challenged items more frequently than participants in a control 
condition who were not challenged by a confederate. Researchers have speculated 
that eliciting nonbelieved memories could also elicit omission errors (Mazzoni et al., 
2014; Otgaar, Scoboria & Mazzoni, 2014). Specifically, Mazzoni et al. (2014) use 
the term ‘negative misinformation’ to describe their ‘debriefing’ manipulation. 
Mazzoni et al. define negative misinformation as post-event information which 
suggests an event never occurred. They also argue that negative misinformation may 
have been responsible for omission errors in other research (e.g., Merckelbach et al., 
2007).  
 One experiment demonstrated that re-presenting participants with a 
previously seen set of drawings, but with some drawings ‘withheld’ resulted in 
omission errors on a recall and recognition memory test. Wright et al. (2001, Expt. 1) 
asked participants to copy a series of 12 drawings that depicted a man and a woman 
going on a date. For example, one drawing showed the couple entering a restaurant, 
while another showed them looking at the menu and so on. One week later, 
participants received what they were told was another participant’s copy of the 
drawings. For participants in the omit condition, one of the 12 drawings they had 
originally seen was left out (e.g., the drawing showing the waitress taking the 
couple’s order). For participants in the add condition, a new drawing was included 
which they had not originally seen (e.g., a man playing the guitar for the couple). 
When participants were asked to recall the drawings they had originally seen, 56% of 
participants in the omit condition failed to report the omitted drawing compared with 
33% in the control condition. More strikingly, 34% of participants in the omit 
condition failed to recognise the omitted drawing compared with 16% in the control 
condition. In the add condition, 20% of participants falsely recalled the new drawing, 
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compared with 6% in the control condition. Similarly, the new drawing was falsely 
recognised as being part of the original series by 46% of participants in the add 
condition, compared with 36% in the control condition. There are two interesting 
findings here, first that omission errors occurred at a similar rate to additions to 
memory. Second, omissions occurred not just for recall memory, but also for 
recognition memory.  
 Wright et al. (2001) explained their results in relation to retrieval-induced 
forgetting (e.g., Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994). Retrieval-induced forgetting occurs 
when participants are asked to recall only part of a to-be-remembered stimuli. For 
example, Anderson et al. (Expt. 1) demonstrated retrieval-induced forgetting by 
having participants recall some items from a category of previously studied words 
(e.g., FRUITS: orange, banana, lemon). In a subsequent category-cued recall test, 
participants recalled fewer of the items which had not been practised from the 
practised category. Retrieval-induced forgetting effects are explained in terms of 
retrieval inhibition. When some items of a category are practised, there is also 
competition from the related but non-practiced items from within the category. To 
reduce the risk of erroneously reporting the non-practiced items during the retrieval 
practice, inhibitory control processes inhibit the non-practiced items, making them 
harder to recall in a subsequent memory test. In Wright and colleagues’ experiment, 
participants in the omit condition would have to inhibit interference from the omitted 
drawing during the second phase of the experiment, making this item more difficult 
to recall and recognise in the subsequent memory tests.  
 Here, we consider the possibility that omission errors could occur as a result 
of people attenuating their belief for withheld item while maintaining a strong 
recollection. Previous research has linked confidence with people’s decisions to 
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report or withhold, or omit, recollections. Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) demonstrated 
that remembered information can be either volunteered or withheld depending upon 
the confidence with which the remembered information was held. If information is 
remembered with a high degree of confidence, it is more likely to be reported than if 
the information is remembered with low confidence. Scoboria, Talarico and Pascal 
(2015) have drawn parallels between belief and confidence in relation to Koriat and 
Goldsmith’s model. If indeed belief and confidence are similar, lower belief ratings 
should also result in people withholding memories.  
In the experiments reported here, we attempted to simultaneously elicit 
nonbelieved memories and omission errors. Whereas previous research has 
demonstrated that omission errors occur following misleading post-event information 
(Wright et al., 2001) or that nonbelieved memories occur following challenges to 
recollections (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014; Otgaar et al., 2013), we sought 
to examine whether both nonbelieved memories and omission errors co-occur. That 
is, omission errors are the result of items being recollected, but not reported due to 
attenuated belief.  
 In our first experiment, participants were presented with four scenes showing 
a collection of household items (Time 1). After recalling as many items as they could 
from each scene, participants were re-presented with the scenes again (Time 2). 
However, for two of the scenes presented at Time 2, one item had been withheld 
from the scene. Participants then recalled as many items as they could from the 
scenes presented at Time 1. In Experiment 2, participants saw only two scenes. 
Instead of re-presenting the scenes to participants, after the first recall, the 
experimenter read aloud the items the participant had recalled for each scene. For 
each scene, the experimenter withheld one of the items recalled by the participant. 
93 
For one scene, a commonly reported (high frequency) item was withheld, and for the 
other scene a less commonly reported (low frequency) item was withheld. 
Participants were then asked to recall all of the items they could from the scenes.  
 In both experiments, participants provided belief and memory ratings for a 
number of items, including withheld items and non-presented filler items. Finally, 
participants completed a recognition task whereby they were presented with 
individual items from the original scenes or non-presented filler items and asked 
whether they recognised the item as one of the items from the original scene.  
Based on previous research (Wright et al., 2001), we hypothesised that 
participants would omit the withheld items from subsequent recall and recognition 
tests. Since research has shown that disconfirmatory evidence is a commonly 
reported reason for people to attenuate their belief (Mazzoni et al., 2010; Scoboria, 
Boucher & Mazzoni, 2014) we also predicted that our manipulation would cause 
participants to provide lower belief ratings for the withheld items compared with 
control items. We, however, did not predict any difference in recollection ratings for 
the withheld and control items. Thus we predicted that omission errors would occur 
when participants’ belief for the withheld item had been attenuated.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Forty-three psychology undergraduate students (31 female) aged 18 to 23 
years (M = 19.05, SD = .97) were recruited via the departmental research 
participation pool and received course credit for their participation. All participants 
were presented with the same scenes and therefore this experiment involved a 
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within-subject design. The independent variable was the withheld items. The 
dependent variables were recall performance, belief and recollection ratings, and 
recognition performance.  
Material  
Stimuli. Four photographic scenes were used in the current experiment (see 
Figure 4), each showing a collection of household items (number of items per scene, 
M = 18.75, SD = 2.22) from four categories; kitchen items, food and drink items, 
bathroom items and office items. We created two sets of scenes. Set 1 (presented at 
Time 1) contained the four scenes depicted in colour. Set 2 (presented at Time 2) 
were black and white versions of the scenes used in Set 1 and excluded some 
withheld items (see below). We decided to present Set 2 in black and white so that 
participants were able to distinguish between Set 1 and Set 2. This distinction was 
important for the second recall test (see below).  
 
  
  
Figure 4. The four scenes used in Experiment 1. 
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Withheld and control items. At Time 2, participants saw the Set 2 scenes. 
For two scenes in Set 2, one item from the scene had been withheld. Through pilot 
testing, we identified the two most frequently reported items for each scene. 
Participants in the pilot test (N = 11) saw each of the scenes before completing a free 
recall task for each scene. We selected the two most commonly reported items from 
each scene to be used as the withheld items. These items were: for the bathroom 
scene, a can of deodorant and a can of shaving foam; for the kitchen scene, a fork 
and a chef knife; for the office scene4, a pen and a pair of glasses; for the food and 
drink scene, a banana and a bottle of juice. On average, participants in the pilot test 
reported 5.36 of these eight items (SD = 1.43). Each of these pairs of items was used 
in the current experiment as either the withheld or the control item. For example, 
when the pen was the withheld item, the pair of glasses served as a control item.  
Belief and Memory Tasks. Participants rated both belief and memory on 
separate tasks. Both tasks contained 28 items consisting of four items which had 
been present in Set 1 and Set 2 (including the control item), the withheld item and 
two filler items which had not been present in either set of scenes. For belief, 
participants were asked to rate the strength of their belief that each of them items has 
been present in the first set of scenes. Belief was rated on an 8-point scale (1 = no 
belief / 8 = strong belief). For memory, participants were asked to rate each item for 
the strength of their memory for the item being present in the first set of scenes. To 
help participants understand the distinction between belief and memory, at the 
beginning of each task there was an example. For belief, the example explained that 
                                                          
4 For the office scene, a computer was the most frequently reported item. However, 
we considered this item too central to the scene to be used as a withheld or control 
item. We therefore used the next most frequency reported item.  
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it is possible to believe an event occurred without necessarily having a memory. For 
memory, the example explained that it is possible to remember an event without 
necessarily believing the event occurred. Previous research has also provided 
participants with similar examples (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014). 
Procedure 
 Participants were informed that they would see a series of scenes (Set 1), and 
were instructed to view each scene carefully as their memory for the items within the 
scenes would be tested later. Before each scene was presented to participants, a title 
(either “Kitchen”, “Food & Drink”, “Bathroom” or “Office”) appeared on screen for 
5 seconds. The stimulus scene then appeared on screen for 15 seconds followed by a 
blank screen for 5 seconds. The order of presentation of the stimulus scenes was 
counterbalanced.  
Participants then completed a four-minute filler task before being given the 
first recall task – Recall 1. The recall task was completed using a booklet containing 
four pages. On the top of each page was the title of each of the scenes (e.g., Kitchen). 
For each scene, participants were instructed to write down all of the items they could 
remember from the scene, and that if they could not name the item, they could 
instead describe the item, i.e. the shape, colour or its use. There was no time limit to 
complete the recall test.  
Participants were then informed that we were interested in the effect of 
repeated exposure to the same stimuli and that they were going to see the same 
scenes again. Participants were presented with the Set 2 scenes. Before each scene 
was presented to participants, a title (either “Kitchen”, “Food & Drink”, “Bathroom” 
or “Office”) appeared on screen for 5 seconds. The stimulus scene then appeared on 
screen for 15 seconds followed by a blank screen for 5 seconds 
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After another four-minute filler task, participants were given the second recall 
task – Recall 2. This test was similar to that the first test but the experimenter made it 
clear that participants should only report items they remembered from the first scenes 
presented to them at Time 1 (Set 1). To ensure participants were recalling items from 
Set 1, we asked participants to report both the item and the colour of the item. There 
was no time limit for this task. 
Next, participants completed the belief and memory rating tasks. All 
participants completed the belief ratings task before completing the memory rating 
task. Previous research (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014) also used separate 
belief and memory rating tasks to avoid anchoring effects.  
Finally, participants completed a recognition and source monitoring task. For 
the same 28 items rated in the belief and memory task, participants saw an image of 
each item individually, and were instructed to indicate whether they recognised the 
item as presented in any of the scenes they had been presented with during the 
experiment by pressing either ‘Y’ (Yes) or ‘N’ (No) on the keyboard. Then they had 
to indicate if they recognised the item from only the scenes presented first, from only 
the scenes presented second, from both sets of scenes or that they did not recognise 
the item. Participants responded using the number pad, responding to a 
corresponding number which was presented next to each option on the screen. If 
participants indicated that they recognised the item as present in the first set of 
scenes only, the second set of scenes only or both sets of scenes, they were then 
asked to indicate which scene they recognised the item from. There was no time limit 
for this task.  
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Results and Discussion 
Coding 
Participants’ recall at both Recall 1 and Recall 2 was coded for correct items 
(correctly reporting an item from the scene) and intrusion errors (reporting an item 
not present in the scene). Using the recall data from Recall 1 and Recall 2, each 
recollection for the withheld and control items was coded into four categories. An 
item was coded ‘remembered’ if it was reported at both Recall 1 and Recall 2, as 
‘omitted’ if it was reported at Recall 1 but was omitted at Recall 2, as ‘new’ if it was 
not reported in Recall 1 but then was reported in Recall 2, and finally, as ‘never’ if it 
was not reported at either Recall 1 or Recall 2.  
To describe the data and make contrasts, we report 95% confidence intervals 
for means (Cumming, 2013). All confidence intervals are based on 1,000 
bootstrapped samples unless otherwise indicated. Where assumptions were violated, 
we report the alternative statistics.  
Recall Performance 
Participants recalled statistically more correct items at Recall 2 (M = 8.39, SD 
= .2.80, 95% CI [6.63, 9.27]) than at Recall 1 (M = 7.10, SD = 1.64, 95% CI [6.63, 
7.62]), t(42) = -4.00, p < .001, Mdiff = -1.28, 95% CI [-1.90, -.62]. Intrusions– items 
recalled, but which were not present in the scenes - were reported less frequently at 
Recall 2 (M = .14, SD = .23, 95% CI [.08, .22]) than at Recall 1 (M = .55, SD = .52, 
95% CI [.40, .71]), t(42) = 6.36, p < .001, Mdiff = .41, 95% CI [.28, .55]. These 
findings suggest that re-presenting participants with the stimuli provided participants 
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with an opportunity to correct erroneous items recalled, and also to learn new items 
which had not been recalled at Recall 1. 
Omission Errors  
Table 2 shows the frequency of each type of recollection by item (withheld 
and control). Omission errors for withheld (M = 0.42, SD = 0.54, 95% CI [0.26, 
0.60]) and control (M = 0.58, SD = 0.66, 95% CI [0.40, 0.79]) items was not 
significantly different, t(42) = 1.31, p = .197, 95% CI [-0.41, 0.09]. Reporting of 
withheld (M = 0.65, SD = 0.69, 95% CI [0.47, 0.86]) and control (M = 0.72, SD = 
0.70, 95% CI [0.51, 0.93]) items was not significantly different, t(42) = 0.46, p = 
.645, 95% CI [-0.37, 0.23]. This finding does not support our hypothesis that 
withheld items would be omitted more frequently than control items. Instead, this 
finding suggests that both withheld items and control items were reported in similar 
ways. Unlike in previous research (Merckelbach et al., 2007; Wright et al., 2001), 
looking at the data in Table 2 shows that the control items were omitted more 
frequently than the withheld items. 
  Item  
 Withheld Control 
Outcome Frequency % Frequency % 
Remembered 28  32.56 31 36.05 
Omitted 18 20.93 25 29.07 
New 10 11.63 6 6.98 
Never 30 34.88 24 27.91 
Table 2. The frequency of remembered, omitted, new and never reported items for 
the withheld and control items. 
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Belief and Memory Ratings 
Table 3 shows the belief and memory ratings for both the withheld and 
control items by memory type. To examine whether belief and memory ratings 
differed across memory types, we computed four one-way ANOVAs, one for each of 
the withheld and control items. Due to the low frequency of ‘new’ items, planned  
  Belief Memory 
Item Outcome M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
W
ith
he
ld
 1
 
Remembered  6.08 (2.54) [4.47, 7.70] 6.17 (2.79) [4.39, 7.94] 
Omitted  5.46 (2.67) [3.85, 7.07] 4.85 (3.13) [2.95, 6.74] 
Never 3.82 (2.84) [2.55, 5.10] 3.24 (2.39) [2.01, 4.46] 
Total 4.98 (2.68) [4.14, 5.81] 4.57 (2.95) [3.69, 5.40] 
W
ith
he
ld
 2
 
Remembered  5.63 (2.68) [4.20, 7.05] 5.38 (2.58) [4.00, 6.75] 
Omitted 6.20 (2.49) [3.11, 9.29] 5.80 (2.49) [2.71, 8.89] 
Never 5.00 (3.39) [2.95, 7.05] 5.08 (3.23) [3.13, 7.03] 
Total 5.47 (2.89) [4.53, 6.41] 5.32 (2.76) [4.38, 6.21] 
C
on
tro
l 1
 
Remembered  5.00 (3.06) [3.37, 6.63] 5.56 (2.99) [3.97, 7.15] 
Omitted  5.79 (2.49) [4.35, 7.22] 5.64 (2.71) [4.08, 7.21] 
Never  6.54 (2.33) [5.13, 7.95] 7.00 (1.47) [6.11, 7.89] 
Total 5.72 (2.68) [4.91, 6.51] 6.02 (2.55) [5.26, 6.77] 
C
on
tro
l 2
 
Remembered  7.87 (.35) [7.67, 8.06] 7.80 (.56) [7.49, 8.11] 
Omitted  7.45 (1.04) [6.76, 8.15] 7.18 1(.83) [5.95, 8.41] 
Never  3.91 (2.98) [1.91, 5.91] 3.64 2.(77) [1.78, 5.50] 
Total 6.57 (2.43) [5.78, 7.30] 6.38 (2.55) [5.62, 7.16] 
Table 3. Mean (SD), and 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) for belief and memory 
ratings for remembered, omitted and never reported memories by item. 
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contrasts did not include this outcome. The one-way ANOVA for the first withheld 
item revealed that belief ratings were not different between the memory types, F(3, 
39) = 2.52, p = .072,  = 0.16. For memory ratings there was a significant effect for 
memory type, F(3, 39) = 3.24, p = .032,  = .20. Planned contrasts revealed that 
memory ratings for remembered items were significantly higher than items which 
were never reported, t(39) = 2.83, p = .007, Mdiff = 2.93, 95% CI [.90, 4.59]. 
Remembered items were not rated significantly differently from omitted items, t(39) 
= 1.20, p = .237, Mdiff = 1.32, 95% CI [-1.00, 3.68], and omitted items were not rated 
significantly differently from never reported items, t(39) = 1.59, p = .120, Mdiff = 
1.61, 95% CI [-.45, 3.67]. For the second withheld item, the one-way ANOVA 
revealed no effect for belief, Welch’s F(3, 15.07) = 0.46, p = .711,  = .03, and no 
effect for memory, F(3, 39) = 0.11, p = .953,  = .01. 
For the first control item, for belief, F(2, 40) = 1.20, p = .313,  = .06, and 
memory, Welch’s F(2, 25.14) = 2.18, p = .134,  = .07, there was no effect for 
memory type. For the second control item, for belief, there was a significant effect 
for memory type, Welch’s F(3, 13.60) = 6.94, p = .005,  = .52. Planned contrasts 
reveal that never reported items were rated significantly lower than both remembered 
items, t(10.21) = 4.38, p = .001, Mdiff = 3.96, 95% CI [2.37, 5.55], and omitted items, 
t(12.38) = 3.73, p = .003, Mdiff = 3.55, 95% CI [1.56, 5.53]. Belief ratings between 
remembered and omitted items did not differ t(11.71) = 1.27, p = .230, Mdiff = .41, 
95% CI [-.18, 1.00]. For memory ratings, there was a significant effect for memory 
type, Welch’s F(3, 13.28) = 8.51, p = .002,  = .46. Planned contrasts reveal that 
2η
2η
2η
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never reported items were rated significantly lower than both remembered items, 
t(10.60) = 4.92, p = .001, Mdiff = 4.16, 95% CI [2.66, 5.67], and omitted items, 
t(17.37) = 3.54, p = .002, Mdiff = 3.55, 95% CI [1.46, 5.63]. Memory ratings between 
remembered and omitted items did not differ t(11.38) = 1.08, p = .302, Mdiff = .62, 
95% CI [-.41, 1.65]. 
Taken together, the results from the belief and memory ratings in this 
experiment suggest that our manipulation did not have an effect on participants’ 
belief ratings for the withheld items as predicted. Instead, omitted items received 
similar belief and recollection ratings to remembered items.  
Recognition and Source Monitoring 
For the recognition data, we examined hit rates for control and omitted items. 
The hit rate for the first withheld item was .67, and .95 for the first control item, a 
significant difference, t(42) = -3.63, p = .001, Mdiff = -.28, 95% CI [-.43, -.12]. For the 
second withheld item the hit rate was .74, and .91 for the second control item, t(42) = 
-2.00, p = .051, Mdiff = -.16, 95% CI [-.32, .00]. These results showed that our 
manipulation may have impaired participants’ ability to recognise the withheld item. 
With the source monitoring data, we examined whether participants correctly 
attributed the control items to being present in both sets of scenes and the withheld 
items to being only in the first set of scenes. Our data suggest that, on the whole, 
control items were more likely to be attributed to the correct source. For the first 
withheld and control items, approximately one third of withheld items (.33) and 
almost half of control items were attributed to the correct source (.49), t(42) = -1.64, 
p = .109, Mdiff = -.16, 95% CI [-.36, .04]. For the second withheld and control items, 
the proportion of withheld items that were attributed to the correct source (.23) was 
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significantly lower than source judgements for control items (.65), t(42) = -4.38, p < 
.001, Mdiff = .42, 95% CI [-.61, -.23]. Of the 37 incorrect source judgements of 
control items, participants most frequently attributed them to only Time 1 (45.95%) 
or only Time 2 (37.84%), with fewer attributions to neither scene (16.22%). For 
withheld items, 62 errors were made with participants reporting the items as being in 
both scenes at Time 1 and 2 (61.67%) or neither scenes (37.10%) but less frequently 
to only Time 2 (3.23%). 
To summarize, the results of our experiment do not support our hypotheses. 
Withholding a previously presented item did not result in omission errors for the 
withheld items (20.93%) above the frequency of omission errors for the control items 
(29.07%) in the free recall task. Some support for our expectation was found in that 
we did find that participants were less likely to recognise the withheld item, a finding 
which was significant for the first withheld item, but not quite significant for the 
second withheld item. Because participants saw the withheld items once, but the 
control items twice, one explanation for our finding could be that the memory trace 
was much stronger for the control item than the withheld items (e.g., Ayers & 
Reader, 1998).  
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that the manipulation was too subtle to 
create a considerable amount of omission errors for the withheld items compared 
with the control items. Looking at the free recall results, participants may have used 
the re-presentation of the scenes at Time 2 as a way to improve their correct recall 
and decrease their errors. Indeed, we observed that correct recall increased and 
intrusion errors decreased at Recall 2 (cf. Recall 1). Further support for the idea that 
our manipulation was too subtle comes from the source monitoring data which shows 
participants most frequently attributed withheld items as being present at Time 1 and 
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Time 2, or as not being present at either Time 1 or Time 2. This finding suggests that 
participants either did not notice the withheld item had been withheld, or that 
participants had not noticed the withheld item at Time 1.  
In Experiment 2 we made two changes to the methodology so that the 
withheld items were more distinctive. In Experiment 2, rather than re-presenting 
participants with the scenes again at Time 2, the experimenter read back to the 
participants the items they had recalled at Recall 1, but omitted the withheld items. 
We also manipulated which items were withheld. Some of the items in the scenes are 
recalled by participants more often than others. In Experiment 2, we consider the 
idea that items which are less frequently reported might be omitted more readily. The 
discrepancy detection principal (Tousignant, Hall & Loftus, 1986) suggests that 
misinformation is more likely to be accepted with the discrepancy between the 
original material and the misinformation. For example, research has found it is 
relatively easy to misinform participants about the type of sign they saw in a 
previously presented scene. Participants who saw a stop sign can be misled to 
thinking the sign was actually a yield sign. Also, the trace strength hypothesis 
(Pezdek & Roe, 1995) argues that strong memory traces are less vulnerable to 
misleading information than weak memory traces. We therefore predicted that 
participants would be more likely to omit an item which is more salient in these 
scenes. In Experiment 2, the withheld items were a commonly reported item (high 
frequency) and a less commonly reported (low-frequency).  
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Experiment 2 
 
Method 
 Participants and Design 
 Participants were recruited by sending an email to a database of people who 
were willing to be contacted to participate in research at the University of 
Portsmouth. We recruited 43 participants (33 female) aged 18 to 60 (M = 34.79, SD 
= 12.56). Participants received £7 for taking part. Eight participants were excluded 
from the analysis, one due to experimenter error, two because they recalled too few 
items, and five participants because they realised the manipulation. The remaining 35 
participants (28 female) were aged 18 to 60 years (M = 36.14, SD = 12.57). This 
experiment involved a within-subject design with all participants being presented 
with the same scenes. The independent variable was whether withheld items were 
withheld or not. The dependent variables were recall performance, belief and 
recollection ratings, recognition performance and confidence ratings.   
Material 
Stimulus. Two scenes were used in the current experiment, one showing a 
collection of kitchen items (e.g., a plate, a bowl, a fork and a spoon) and one showing 
a collection of office items (e.g. a computer, a pen, a notebook and a stapler). In the 
kitchen scene there was a total of 20 items, and 18 in the study scene. To control for 
scene effects, the presentation order of these scenes was counterbalanced.  
Withheld and control items. In Experiment 2, participants were exposed to 
two withheld items, one for each scene. One of these items was a high frequency 
item, and the other item was a low frequency item. In previous research, 68 
participants had seen the two scenes used in the current research. For each of the 68 
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participants, we noted which specific items each participant had reported for each 
scene. We then took the total for each item (i.e., 5 participants mentioned item ‘X’, 
10 participants mentioned items ‘Y’, 25 participants mentioned item ‘Z’), and 
calculated the mean for that scene (e.g., 13.33). Any items which received a 
frequency above this mean were considered a high frequency item and anything 
below mean was considered a low frequency item.  
 For each of the withheld items, we selected a similar item (based on the 
frequency of reporting) to be the control items. We choose the item with the closest 
frequency ratings to the withheld item.  
Belief/Memory Task. We used the same belief and memory rating task as in 
Experiment 1. However, in Experiment 2 we were not able to control which item 
would be the withheld item because it depended on which items the participants 
recalled. Therefore, we included all items from both scenes as well as six plausible 
lures for each scene. In both the belief and memory rating task, there was a total of 
50 items, comprised of the 20 items from the kitchen scene and six lure items and 18 
items from the study scene and six lure items.  
As in Experiment 1, each item on both the belief and memory rating task was 
presented in a random order, but unlike in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we 
counterbalanced the order in which participants completed the belief and memory 
ratings tasks so that half of the participants completed the belief ratings task first, 
then the memory ratings task and vice versa.  
In Experiment 2 we collected belief and memory ratings using an 11-point 
scale. We changed the scale from an 8-point scale in Experiment 1 to an 11-point 
scale in Experiment 2 because in Experiment 2 we also collected confidence ratings 
(see below). Measuring belief, memory and confidence on similar scales would allow 
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for more precise comparisons between these measures. The scale for the belief and 
memory rating tasks was 0 (no belief/memory) to 10 (strong belief/memory).  
Recognition task. The recognition task used the same 50 items used in the 
belief and memory ratings tasks. Here participants were presented with an image of 
each item. Participants were required to indicate if they recognised the item by 
responding with yes (press ’Y’) or no (press ‘N’) on the keyboard. Participants were 
then asked to rate how confident they were in their recognition response. Confidence 
was rated using an 11-point scale (0 = not confident to 100 = very confident)  
Procedure 
 Participants were informed that in this experiment they would see a series of 
scenes containing a collection of items, preceded by a title for the scene and that they 
were to remember as many items from each scene as possible. They were also 
informed that a memory test would follow. The presentation was presented via a 
computer. Participants saw the title of the scene for 5 seconds, then the scene for 15 
seconds. Between each scene, there was a 5-second pause before the next title and 
then scene.  
After a four-minute filler task, participants were given the first recall task. 
The recall task was completed using a booklet which contained on each page a title 
from each of the scenes. Participants were instructed to write down everything they 
remembered from the scene, and that if they could not name the item, they could 
instead describe the item, i.e. the shape, colour or its use. There was no time limit to 
complete the recall test.  
After completing the free recall task, participants were given another four-
minute filler task. Participants were then informed that the researcher was going to 
read each of the items they had recalled from each of the scenes back to them. The 
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researcher then read the items at an approximate rate of one word per second. The 
researcher read the items from the first scene participants had seen first, however, the 
items were not read in the same order as they had been written by the participant. All 
items were read from the lists except the withheld item. After another four-minute 
filler task participants were given the second recall task. This test was identical to 
that first test. There was no time limit for this part of the experiment.  
After completing the free recall task, participants completed the belief and 
memory ratings tasks. For each item, participants were instructed to report the 
strength of their belief/memory for seeing each of the items in the scenes. 
Participants provided responses to each item by indicating the strength of their 
belief/memory using the number-pad on the keyboard.  
Finally, participants completed the recognition task. Each item was presented 
on the computer screen as a single image. Participants were instructed to indicate if 
they recognised the item as presented in any of the by pressing either ‘y’ (Yes) or ‘n’ 
(No) on the keyboard. Participants then indicated their confidence ratings.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Coding Participants’ recall at both Recall 1 and Recall 2 was coded for 
correct items (correctly reporting an item from the scene) and intrusion errors 
(reporting an item not present in the scene). Using the recall data from Recall 1 and 
Recall 2, each recollection for the withheld and control items was coded into four 
categories. An item was coded ‘remembered’ if it was reported at both Recall 1 and 
Recall 2, as ‘omitted’ if it was reported at Recall 1 but was omitted at Recall 2, as 
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‘new’ if it was not reported in Recall 1 but then was reported in Recall 2, and finally, 
as ‘never’ if it was not reported at either Recall 1 or Recall 2.  
To describe the data and make contrasts, we report 95% confidence intervals 
for means (Cumming, 2013). All confidence intervals are based on 1,000 
bootstrapped samples unless otherwise indicated. Where assumptions were violated, 
we report the alternative statistics.  
Recall Performance 
 Participants reported a similar number of items at both Recall 1, (M = 9.71, 
SD = 1.85, 95% CI [9.03, 10.33]) as in Recall 2, (M = 9.67, SD = 1.78, 95% CI [9.02, 
10.26]), t(32) = .35, p = .731, Mdiff = .05, 95% CI [-.22, .31]. Participants also made a 
similar number of intrusion errors across both Recall 1, (M = .59, SD = .65, 95% CI 
[.38, .83]) and Recall 2, (M = .62, SD = .61, 95% CI [.42, .85]), t(32) = -.47, p = .645, 
Mdiff = -.03, 95% CI [-.16, .10]. These results show that participants’ recall 
performance remained consistent between both the recall tests with regards to correct 
recall and intrusion errors.  
Omission Errors 
 Participants reported significantly fewer of the high frequency withheld items 
(M = .85, SD = .36, 95% CI [.70, .97]) than high frequency control items (M = 1.00, 
SD = 0.00, 95% CI [1.00, 1.00]), t(32) = -2.39, p = .023, Mdiff = -.15, 95% CI [-.28, -
.02]. However, omission of the low frequency withheld items (M = .97, SD = .17, 
95% CI [.91, 1.0]) was not significantly different to omission of the low frequency 
control item, (M = .97, SD = .17, 95% CI [.91, 1.0]), t(32) = 0.00, p = 1.00, Mdiff = 
0.00, 95% CI [-.09, .09]. Contrary to our expectation, these results show that our 
manipulation had a greater effect with regards to high frequency items than low 
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frequency items. Overall, 15% of the high frequency withheld items were, compared 
with only 3% of the low frequency omitted items.  
Belief and Memory Ratings 
 Belief and memory ratings for the high and low frequency withheld and 
control items are presented in Table 4. For the high frequency withheld items, there 
was not a significant effect of whether an item was reported or omitted for either 
belief ratings F(1, 31) = 0.29, p = .596,  = .01 or memory ratings, F(1, 31) = 0.44, 
p = .514,  = .01.  
 For the high frequency control item, participants reported all of these 
recollections and so a comparison between reported and omitted items is not 
required.  
  For the low frequency withheld items, the effect of whether an item was 
reported or omitted for belief ratings, F(1, 31) = 0.16, p = .692,  = .01 and 
memory ratings, F(1, 31) = 0.14, p = .710,  = .005 was not significant. For belief 
ratings of the low frequency control items, there was a significant effect of whether 
an item was reported or omitted F(1, 31) = 4.49, p = 0.042,  = .13, with belief 
ratings for omitted items being significantly lower than reported items.  
For memory ratings, there was also a significant effect of whether an item was 
reported or omitted, F(1, 31) = 8.22, p = .007,  = .21, with omitted items being 
significantly lower than reported items. 
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      Belief Memory 
Item Frequency Reported/omitted n M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
Withheld 
High 
Reported 28 9.46 (1.37) [8.89, 9.89 9.64 (1.19) [9.10, 9.97] 
Omitted 5 9.80 (.45) [9.44, 10.00] 10.00, (0.00) [10.00, 10.00] 
Low 
Reported 32 8.69 (3.24) [7.48, 9.69] 8.92 (2.87) [7.81, 9.79] 
Omitted 1 10.00 (0.00) [10.00, 10.00] 10.00 (0.00) [10.00, 10.00] 
Control 
High 
Reported 32 9.66 (1.23) [9.19, 10.00] 9.19 (2.87) [8.16, 9.94] 
Omitted 1 7.00 (.00) [7.00, 7.00] 2.00 (.00) [2.00, 2.00] 
Low 
Reported 33 9.30 (1.61) [8.67, 9.79] 9.18 (2.10) [8.33, 9.79] 
Omitted 0 - - - - 
Table 4. Mean (SD), and 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) for belief and memory ratings for the withheld and control items by frequency and 
report outcome (reported or omitted) 
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Recognition and Confidence 
 To examine the recognition data, we examined the proportion of participants 
who correctly recognised the withheld items and compared this to the proportion of 
participants who correctly recognised the control items. The proportion of 
participants who recognised the omitted item was .94, compared with .97 of 
participants recognising the high frequency control item. There was not a significant 
difference between these proportions, t(32) = -.57, p = .572, Mdiff = -.03, 95% CI [-
.14, .07].  
 The proportion of participants who correctly recognised the low frequency 
omitted item was .97, and this was identical to the proportion of participants who 
correctly recognised the control item, .97. Therefore no statistic is reported for this 
finding. These findings suggest that our manipulation did not influence omission 
errors for the withheld items in the recognition memory test.  
 Participants were confident in their recognition responses for the high 
frequency withheld items (M = 94.55, SD = 12.52, 95% CI [89.70, 98.48]) and the 
control item (M = 93.94, SD = 16.19, 95% CI [87.27, 98.48]), and the difference in 
confidence ratings was not significant, t(32) = .17, p = .863, Mdiff = .61, 95% CI [-
6.48, 7.69]. Confidence for the low frequency omitted item (M = 95.45, SD = 13.71, 
95% CI [90.01, 99.39]) was statistically similar to the confidence rating for the 
control item (M = 94.55, SD = 17.52, 95% CI [87.58, 99.39]), t(32) = .62, p = .54. 
Mdiff = .91, 95% CI [-2.08, 3.90]. Confidence in participants’ recognition responses 
overall, was high. When considered with the recognition test results, these findings 
suggest that participants were highly confident that the high and low frequency 
withheld item was present in the original scene.  
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 To summarise, in Experiment 2 we found that participants made more 
omission errors for the high frequency withheld item (cf. a control item) than the low 
frequency withheld item (cf. a control item) in the free recall memory test. Also, 
contrary to our expectations, our manipulation did not appear to have had an effect 
on belief ratings for the withheld items. Finally, participants recognised the withheld 
items with a high degree of confidence. Taken together, these results did not support 
our expectations that withholding items would result in participants attenuating their 
belief that these items had been part of the original scenes. Furthermore, we did not 
find support for our expectation that withheld items would result in omission errors 
above the rate of omission errors for the control items.  
 
General Discussion 
 
The research reported here examined whether omission errors occurred as a 
consequence of participants attenuating their belief for a to-be-remembered item. In 
two experiments we demonstrated that re-presenting participants with either the 
original stimuli (Expt. 1) or repeating back to participants the items they had recalled 
(Expt. 2) with some items withheld, did not result in participants attenuating their 
belief that they had previously seen these items. Furthermore, we did not find 
substantial evidence that these items were even omitted (at a higher rate) compared 
with previous research (Wright et al., 2001). In Experiment 1 we also found that 
participants were less likely to recognise the withheld item compared with a control 
item, but this finding was not replicated in Experiment 2. Below, we discuss how our 
findings fit with prior findings.  
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Previous research has found that re-presenting participants with some stimuli, 
but with some items withheld, resulted in omission errors in recall and recognition 
memory tests (Wright et al., 2001). While our findings do not replicate previous 
findings, there are a number of methodological differences between the research 
reported here and the research reported by Wright and colleagues which could 
explain the different pattern of results. Firstly, in the current experiment participants 
were re-presented with the stimuli only a few minutes after they had seen the stimuli 
for the first time, whereas participants in the Wright et al. experiment were re-
presented with the stimuli one-week later when they returned for the second session. 
Research has demonstrated that participants are more susceptible to the effect of 
misleading post-event information when there is a longer delay between encoding 
and retrieval (Loftus et al., 1978; Paterson, Kemp & Forgas, 2009). In our 
experiment, the delay between seeing the original scenes and being re-presented with 
the scenes was around eight minutes. Future research might find an increased rate of 
omission errors following a longer delay. 
Research examining the factors which make people more vulnerable to the 
effect of misleading post-event information have documented a discrepancy 
detection principle (Tousignant et al., 1986). The discrepancy detection principle 
suggests that misleading post-event information is less likely to mislead participants 
if there is a greater discrepancy between what the participants originally saw and the 
misleading post-event information. This principal could explain why some 
researchers have found that changing details within a memory report is easier than 
eliciting omission errors (e.g., Pezdek & Roe, 1997). However, in Experiment 2, we 
found that participants omitted more of the high frequency withheld items (cf. a 
control item) than low frequency withheld items (cf. a control item) suggesting that 
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withholding high-frequency items had a greater effect than withholding low-
frequency items. One possible explanation for this finding could be that the low-
frequency items could be more distinctive. Research has shown that schema-
inconsistent items are more distinctive (McDaniel, 1984) and should receive a 
greater amount of attention at encoding. If indeed the low-frequency items were 
given more attention, this could explain why low-frequency items were not prone to 
becoming omission errors. Thus, these items would, according to the discrepancy 
detection principle, be more difficult to elicit omission errors for. 
In both Experiments 1 and 2, we found that our manipulation had no effect on 
belief ratings. We had predicted that belief ratings would decrease for the withheld 
items compared with remembered non-withheld items but our data did not support 
this hypothesis. On reflection, and in light of other recent work by colleagues, it may 
be the case that the manipulation applied in our experiments was simply too 
subtle/insubstantial to meaningfully affect belief ratings. For example, recent 
research has identified different subtypes of nonbelieved memories. Scoboria et al., 
(in press) identified three subtypes of nonbelieved memories and also examined 
whether these subtypes were associated with any specific reasons for the participants 
attenuating their belief. The results showed that both classic and weak nonbelieved 
memories were most commonly associated with events which had been considered 
implausible or where the rememberer had received social feedback from someone 
else telling them that the recollected event had not occurred. Classic nonbelieved 
memories also occurred when people were unable to obtain evidence to support the 
occurrence of an event. Finally, weak nonbelieved memories were often found when 
people found the memory to be inconsistent with their view of another person. These 
findings show that there are different subtypes of nonbelieved memories and that 
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continued research is needed to examine the factors which influence belief and how 
different factors could influence belief in different ways. 
The fact that our material was themed could have enhanced participants’ 
memories for the items within the scenes. Research has shown that gist memory 
enhances both false and true memory. Or put another way, gist can inoculate against 
forgetting. Our scenes were of household items, and the items within the scenes were 
all associated with things you would expect in, for example, a study (e.g., a 
computer, a pen, a highlighter). Fuzzy-trace theory (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2002) 
predicts that gist processing should increase both false and true recall. Gist 
processing relates to the semantic features of the to-be-remembered stimuli. Indeed, 
our stimuli had a gist or a theme in which all of the items were semantically related 
to the theme of the scene. One way that gist processing could be prevented in such an 
experiment would be to use unrelated items in a scene. That is, each scene should 
contain items which are not based on a theme or gist.  
 In Experiment 1 we found evidence that re-presenting some stimuli, but not 
others, resulted in omission errors in a recognition memory test for the non-re-
presented items. However, in Experiment 2 this effect was not replicated. Given the 
inconsistency of this finding in the current research, it is difficult to interpret this 
finding. Previous research also found omission errors occurred in a recognition 
memory test (Wright et al., 2001). While the results of Experiment 1 do provide 
some support for the finding by Wright et al. further research is needed to understand 
how omission errors might occur in recognition memory and the possible 
consequences that might occur in real world settings such as eyewitness 
identifications.  
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  In sum, contrary to the speculation of previous research indicating a 
relationship between nonbelieved memories and omission errors (Mazzoni et al., 
2014; Otgaar et al. 2014), we did not find that nonbelieved memories led to increased 
omission errors in the present experiments. These results suggest that to cause an 
attention of belief, a more direct and less subtle manipulation may be required. The 
research presented here demonstrates that further research is needed to understand 
the effect of re-presenting people with previously encountered stimuli can have on 
subsequent memory reports. 
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Chapter 4 – Experiments 3 and 4 
 
Social challenges to memories results in omission errors and the attenuation of belief 
and recollection 
 
Overview 
 
Researchers have speculated that inducing a nonbelieved memory – an event which 
is recollected, but for which belief that the event occurred has been attenuated – 
could be the precursor to making an omission error. Research has also shown that 
social feedback is the most commonly reported reason for people withdrawing belief 
in a recollected event. In two experiments, participants’ recollections of items (Expt. 
3) or actions (Expt. 4) were challenged by either a confederate (Expts. 3 & 4) or by 
the experimenter (Expt. 4). In Experiment 3, following the challenge made by the 
confederate, participants were more likely to omit the challenged item, while in 
Experiment 4, omission errors only occurred when participants were challenged by 
the experimenter. In both experiments we found nonbelieved memories occurred 
following social feedback, but these were for both reported and omitted recollections. 
The current experiments found only weak evidence that nonbelieved memories are 
precursors to omission errors. 
The experiments presented in Chapter 4 are currently under review as part of a 
special issue on the theoretical and legal implications of belief and recollection at 
the journal Memory  
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Introduction 
 
Receiving social feedback from other people about our memories of the past 
can reshape how we remember the past (Blank, Walther & Isemann, in press). For 
example, research has shown that when other people challenge our memories, we 
oftentimes omit the challenged events from subsequent memory reports 
(Merckelbach et al., 2007). Recent research on memories where the rememberer has 
attenuated their belief that the recollected event actually occurred, also called 
nonbelieved memories (Mazzoni et al., 2010), has also focused on the effects of 
social feedback (e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2014). Interestingly, a commonly reported 
reason for people attenuating their belief for a recollected event is social feedback 
(Scoboria et al., 2015) and social challenges have been found to result in, omission 
errors (Merckelbach et al., 2007) and the attenuation of belief in a recollected event 
(e.g., Clark et al., 2012). The current research focuses on the potential relationship 
between attenuated belief and omission errors following social feedback. 
Specifically, in two experiments, we examined whether the effects of social feedback 
on omission errors were associated with the attenuation of belief.  
Omission errors have been found to occur following social feedback that 
challenges someone’s memory. Merckelbach et al. (2007) showed participants, who 
were paired with a confederate, six household scenes (e.g., a kitchen, a bedroom, and 
a garage). Both the participant and confederate then engaged in collaborative recall, 
each taking turns to recall items from the scenes. In the ‘add condition’, the 
confederate claimed to have seen two false items, while in the ‘omit condition’, the 
confederate challenged participants’ recollections by denying that they had seen two 
of the items reported by the participant (referred to as ‘negative misinformation; 
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Mazzoni et al., 2014). In the ‘control condition’, the confederate did not report or 
deny any items incorrectly. In a subsequent individual recall phase, participants were 
asked to recall as many items as they could from each of the scenes they had 
previously seen. Merckelbach et al. (2007) found that 72% (n = 21) of participants in 
the omit condition omitted at least one of the items challenged by the confederate, 
compared with 33% (n = 10) of participants in the control condition. In the add 
condition, 52 % (n = 16) of participants reported at least one of the false items 
reported by the confederate, compared with 0% in the control condition. The results 
of this experiment suggest that when recollections are challenged socially5, 
omissions from memory reports are more likely than additions to memory reports. 
What is not yet clear is the mechanism(s) that underlies omission errors. 
 Interestingly, Merckelbach et al.’s (2007) speculation about their findings 
describe a mechanism similar to that proposed to be involved in what have been 
called nonbelieved memories (Mazzoni et al., 2010; Otgaar et al.,  2014). 
Specifically, they argued that participants might have omitted the items challenged 
by the confederate because they were ‘unsure’ about these items. This suggests the 
possibility that participants did not omit these items because they experienced 
difficulty retrieving them from memory, but because they were strategically 
regulating their memory reports, based on their belief in the accuracy of these items. 
According to metacognitive theories of memory reporting (e.g., Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996) people strategically regulate their memory reports such that if confidence for a 
memory is low, and the potential consequences of reporting an incorrect answer are 
                                                          
5 The challenges can even be quite subtle and still lead participants to alter their 
memory reports (see Granhag, Strömwall, & Billings, 2003 and Ost, Hogbin & 
Granhag, 2006 for a replication). 
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high, a participant would be more likely to withhold their response than when 
confidence is high. This suggests that omission errors might be characterised more 
by an attenuation of the belief that the event occurred, than by a lack of recollection. 
This raises the possibility that the mechanisms driving some omission errors are alike 
those of driving nonbelieved memories; specifically, a clearly recollected event 
might not be reported because belief in the occurrence of that event has been 
undermined through, for example, social feedback. 
 Researchers have used social feedback, similar to that used by Merckelbach 
et al. (2007) to elicit nonbelieved memories. For example, Clark et al. (2012) induced 
false memories for performing simple actions using doctored videos (see also Nash, 
et al., 2009b). After taking measures of ‘recollection’ and ‘belief’ in those false 
memories, the researchers ‘debriefed’ participants by telling them that they had 
watched a doctored video that suggested they had performed two actions, that, in 
fact, they had not. The results showed that following the ‘debriefing,’ belief ratings 
for the false events decreased significantly, while memory ratings did not. In other 
words, this social feedback significantly decreased participants’ belief that the event 
occurred, without altering their recollection of the event (see Otgaar et al., 2013 for 
another example using childhood memories in adult and children participants). 
Social feedback has also been used to elicit nonbelieved memories for true 
memories. Using a similar procedure to Clark et al. (2012), Mazzoni et al. (2014) 
attempted to induce nonbelieved memories for simple actions that had been 
performed in a laboratory (Mazzoni et al., 2010). During a mock ‘debriefing’, 
participants were told that they had not performed two of the actions they had in fact 
performed and that the researchers had, in fact, used doctored video evidence to 
induce a ‘false memory’ for those actions. Mirroring the findings of Clark et al. 
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(2012) with false events, Mazzoni et al. (2014) found that belief ratings for 
‘debriefed’ actions decreased significantly, while memory ratings did not. This 
experiment extended previous research showing that nonbelieved memories could 
also be created when it was suggested to participants that an experienced event had 
not occurred (see also Otgaar et al., 2016). 
Researchers have also found that naturally occurring nonbelieved memories 
are often reported to have occurred following social feedback. For example, Mazzoni 
et al. (2010) found that in a sample of 98 participants reporting to have a nonbelieved 
memory, 56% of them said that they had attenuated their belief following social 
feedback. Scoboria et al. (2015) examined 374 cases of nonbelieved memories and 
also found that belief has been attenuated following social feedback in 52.8% of the 
cases. Thus there are clear indications that the attenuation of belief can occur 
following social feedback which challenges peoples’ memories of the past.  
In sum, the limited research to date has shown that social challenges can 
result in both omission errors as well as nonbelieved memories, and a common factor 
is social feedback. Despite the similarities, research concerning omission errors has 
not obtained memory and belief ratings for the challenged events, so to date, the 
research is silent on the relationship between omission errors and the attenuation of 
belief. The research presented here is the first to specifically examine whether 
presenting participants with social feedback in the form of negative misinformation 
results in the elicitation of omission errors which are characterised by the attenuation 
of belief. 
 Here, we examined whether socially challenging recollections resulted in 
omission errors and whether these errors were the result of attenuated belief. 
Specifically, in Experiment 3, participants, together with a confederate, saw a series 
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of scenes. In a collaborative recall task, participants received negative 
misinformation from the confederate suggesting that certain items were not present, 
while in the control condition no negative misinformation was provided. In 
Experiment 4, participants performed actions together with a confederate. During a 
collaborative recall task, participants either received negative misinformation from 
the confederate, from the experimenter or were not exposed to negative 
misinformation.  
  Based on the findings from Merckelbach et al. (2007), we predicted that 
socially administered negative misinformation provided by a confederate 
(Experiment 3) would result in participants omitting the challenged items in a 
subsequent free recall task. In Experiment 4 we introduced a third condition in which 
the experimenter provided negative misinformation. We expected the experimenter 
to be perceived as more credible, and therefore omission errors to occur more 
frequently when the experimenter was the source of negative misinformation as 
opposed to the confederate. We further predicted that, if social feedback is indeed a 
key factor associated with the attenuation of belief (e.g., Scoboria et al., 2015), this 
socially administered negative misinformation would cause participants to attenuate 
their belief for the recollected information. Thus we expected omitted items to 
receive lower belief ratings compared with the memory ratings. 
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Experiment 3 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design.  
Seventy-two participants (54 female) were recruited via advertisements to 
staff and students at the University of Portsmouth. Ages ranged from 16 to 63 years 
(Mage = 29.85, SD = 10.98). Data for 11 participants were excluded because they 
were unable to recall six items in the collaborative recall task (see below). Data for 
an additional participant was excluded because they failed to understand the 
instructions. The final analysis is based on 60 participants, (48 female, 12 male) aged 
19 to 63 years (Mage = 30.23, SD = 11.43). Participants received £5 for taking part in 
the experiment.  
The current experiment used a between-subjects design and participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two conditions, confederate-challenged (n = 30) and 
control (n = 30). Two female confederates were employed in this experiment.  
Material and Procedure. 
On arrival for the experimental session, the confederate and participant were 
introduced to each other as co-participants (i.e., the participant was led to believe that 
the confederate was another participant who had signed up for the same experimental 
session). The participant and confederate were seated in front of a computer screen 
and were informed that they were going to view some scenes. They were instructed 
to view each scene carefully as their memory for the scenes would be tested later. 
Two photographic scenes (used in Expts. 1 & 2) were presented to participants, each 
showing a collection of items from a kitchen (20 items including, e.g., fork, plate, 
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and whisk) and an office (18 items including, e.g., computer, pen, and stapler). The 
items in these scenes were arranged on a white background. Before the stimulus 
scene appeared, a title (either “Kitchen” or “Office”) appeared on screen for 5 
seconds. The stimulus scene (either kitchen or office scene) appeared on screen for 
15 seconds followed by a blank screen for 5 seconds. The order of presentation of the 
stimulus scenes was counterbalanced across participants.  
After participants had viewed both scenes they completed a four-minute 
nonverbal number search filler task after which they engaged in collaborative recall. 
For each scene that had been presented, the confederate and participant were asked to 
take turns to verbally recall one item from the scene, continuing to alternate until 
each had recalled six items from this scene. In the confederate-challenged condition 
negative misinformation was provided by the confederate for the sixth item in one 
scene saying “The [name of item] that you mentioned was certainly not present in 
this picture; otherwise I would have noticed that”. In the control condition, the 
confederate did not deny seeing any items. For one scene, the participant was first to 
recall an item, and for the other scene, the confederate went first. Order of 
responding was counterbalanced across the two scenes.  
The participant then worked on a 10-min filler task in a separate room to the 
confederate, before completing an individual free recall task. In the free recall task, 
participants were presented with a blank page containing just the title of the first 
scene they had seen and asked to write down everything they could remember from 
that scene. Participants then did the same for the other scene. There was no time limit 
for this task.  
Participants then provided belief and memory ratings for all 24 items 
generated by themselves and the confederate in the collaborative recall task. These 
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ratings were provided on an 11-point scale (0 = no belief/memory, 10 = strong 
belief/memory). Belief and memory were rated separately; half of the participants 
rated belief first, and the other half rated memory first. To help participants 
understand the distinction between belief and memory, at the beginning of each task 
there was an example. For belief, the example explained that it is possible to believe 
an event occurred without necessarily having a memory. For memory, the example 
explained that it is possible to remember an event without necessarily believing the 
event occurred. Previous research has also provided participants with similar 
examples (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Coding 
Accuracy in the free recall task was coded by counting the number of 
correctly recalled items for each scene. We also coded intrusion errors, where 
participants had recalled items that were not present in either of the scenes. The items 
challenged by the confederate were coded as ‘reported’ if they were recalled, or 
‘omitted’ if they were not reported in the free recall task. As a comparable control 
item, participants from the confederate-challenged condition were paired with a 
participant from the control condition and the sixth item from the same scene was 
used as a control item.  
To describe the data and make contrasts, we report 95% confidence intervals 
for means (Cumming, 2013). All confidence intervals are based on 1,000 
bootstrapped samples unless otherwise indicated.  
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Recall Performance 
Recall of correct items in the free recall task was almost identical between the 
confederate-challenged (M = 10.42, SD = 2.06, 95% CI [9.72, 11.18]) and control 
conditions (M = 10.42, SD = 1.92, 95% CI [9.67, 11.07]), t(58) < 1, p = 1.00, Mdiff = 
0.00, 95% CI [-1.03, 1.03]. For intrusion errors, there was no difference between 
participants in the confederate-challenged condition (M = 0.48, SD = 0.64, 95% CI 
[.28, 0.70]) and participants in the control condition, (M = .57, SD = 0.50, 95% CI 
[0.40, 0.77]); t(58) = .56, p = .576, Mdiff = 0.08, 95% CI [-0.21, 0.38]. 
Omission Errors 
In the individual recall task, 11 (36.67%) participants in the confederate-
challenged condition omitted the item challenged by the confederate, compared with 
only four participants (13.30%) in the control condition. A 2 (condition: confederate-
challenged vs. control) x 2 (report option: reported vs. omitted) Chi-square test 
showed a significant association between condition and report option, X2(1, N = 60) 
= 4.36, p = .037, ɸ = .27, odds ratio = 3.76, 95% CI [1.04, 13.65]. This result 
supported our prediction that participants who had their memories challenged by the 
confederate would be more likely to omit these items.  
Belief and Memory Ratings 
Overall, participants in the confederate-challenged condition rated the 
challenged items lower for belief (M = 7.27, SD = 3.74, 95% CI [5.86, 8.51]) than 
the control items reported in the control condition (M = 8.90, SD = 1.86, 95% CI 
[8.23, 9.52]), t(42.56) = 2.14, p = .038, Mdiff = 1.63, 95% CI [0.09, 3.17]. Participants 
in the confederate-challenge condition also rated challenged items lower for memory 
(M = 7.53, SD = 3.44, 95% CI [6.23, 8.73]) than the control items in the control 
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condition (M = 8.13, SD = 3.15, 95% CI [6.92, 9.17]), however, this was not a 
statistically significant difference, t(58) = .71, p = .484, Mdiff = 0.60, 95% CI [-1.10, 
2.30]. Items challenged by the confederate received lower belief and memory ratings 
overall.  
We were interested in belief and memory ratings for reported and omitted 
items. Table 5 shows the mean belief and memory ratings for reported and omitted 
items by condition. A 2 (condition: confederate-challenged vs. control) x 2 (report 
option: reported vs. omitted) mixed ANOVA for belief ratings revealed a statistically 
significant effect of condition, F(1,56) = 4.43, p = .04,  = .07, report option 
F(1,56) = 20.94, p < .001,  = .27, and a significant interaction F(1,56) = 4.45, p = 
.039,  = .07. These findings show that participants in the confederate-challenged 
condition (cf. control) reported lower belief ratings for the challenged items, 
especially when these items were omitted. This finding aligns well with Scoboria et 
al.’s (2015) finding that social feedback about the occurrence of our recollections is a 
common reason reported for withdrawing belief in occurrence of an event. 
For memory ratings, a 2 (condition: confederate-challenged vs. control) x 2 
(report option: reported vs. omitted) mixed ANOVA revealed no significant 
interaction, F(1, 56) = 1.31, p = .257,  = .02. There was not a significant main 
effect of condition, F(1, 56) = 0.07, p = .796,  = .001, but there was a statistically 
significant main effect for report option, F(1, 56) = 17.06, p < .001,  = .23. 
Omitted items received lower memory ratings in the confederate-challenged 
condition compared with the control condition. Taken together, the belief and 
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Table 5. Mean (SD), and 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) for Belief and Memory Ratings According to Condition and Report Outcome for 
challenged and control items 
 
 
 Belief Memory 
 Reported Omitted Reported Omitted 
Condition M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
Control 9.15 (1.78) [8.43, 9.87] 7.25 (1.71) [4.53, 9.97] 8.50 (3.08) [7.26, 9.74] 5.75 (2.87) [1.18, 10.32] 
Confederate-challenged 9.16 (2.06) [8.16, 10.15] 4.00 (3.79) [1.45, 6.55] 9.32 (1.60) [8.54, 10.09] 4.45 (3.64) [2.01, 6.90] 
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memory data suggest that our manipulation caused participants to rate challenged 
items lower on belief than memory compared with control items.  
In sum, participants who received negative misinformation from a 
confederate were less likely to report these items. Also, participants who had their 
recollections challenged also provided lower belief ratings for the challenged items. 
We did, however, also find that omitted items were rated lower for memory strength, 
but this was for omitted items across all conditions. The results of Experiments 3 
therefore show that social challenges result in both omission errors and the 
attenuation of belief ratings.  
In Experiment 4, we attempted to replicate the findings from Experiment 3 
with more personally relevant stimuli and also by changing the source of the social 
feedback to a potentially more credible source. In Experiment 4, the stimuli used 
were self-performed actions. Much of the nonbelieved memory literature has 
explored autobiographical (Mazzoni et al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 2013) or episodic 
memories (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014). The memories that were 
challenged in Experiment 3 lacked many of the characteristics of episodic and 
autobiographical memory in that the items in the scenes were not personal memories 
and hence, not self-relevant (but see Otgaar et al., 2016). Nonbelieved memories 
might be more prevalent for episodic and autobiographical memories because these 
types of memories are personally relevant. It is one thing to challenge another 
person's memory for an item in a scene, but what about when the memory is 
personally relevant? Nonbelieved memories may be more likely to occur when 
memories about ourselves are challenged. In other words, nonbelieved memories 
may occur because people are less willing to surrender their personal memories.  
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Research has also shown that performing to-be-remembered actions results in 
enhanced memory for these actions compared with learning verbal stimuli (known as 
the ‘enactment effect’; Zimmer & Cohen, 2001). Self-performed actions make the 
stimuli self-relevant in that they are actions performed by the participants instead of 
items seen in a scene. Therefore, using self-performed actions we should expect to 
see stronger recollections for the stimuli which should result in a clearer distinction 
between belief and recollection than was found in Experiment 3. We expected that 
using self-performed actions would increase the personal relevance of the 
recollections and increase initial memory and belief strength for the action prior to 
any social challenge. We also predicted that following the social feedback, belief 
ratings should be attenuated below recollection strength ratings.  
In Experiment 4, we also introduced an additional condition in which the 
experimenter provided negative misinformation. In much of the existing literature 
(Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014; Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, & Wang, 2016; 
Otgaar et al., 2013), nonbelieved memories were elicited when the experimenter 
(rather than a peer confederate) provided information that challenged participants’ 
memories. It is therefore worth examining whether more credible sources of social 
feedback would have a larger effect on belief ratings. For example, recent research 
has shown that people often consider other people, such as family and friends, to be a 
reliable source of information when attempting to verify their memories (Wade, 
Nash, & Garry, 2014). Research on social influence has manipulated the credibility 
of the person providing misleading post-event information. For example, Hoffman, 
Granhag, See, and Loftus (2001) undermined the credibility of a confederate who 
provided misleading post-event information and found that when the credibility of 
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the confederate was undermined, social influence decreased (see also Gabbert, 
Memon, & Wright, 2007).  
In Experiment 4, we predicted that a challenge made by the experimenter 
would be perceived by the participant as being more credible, and therefore should 
have a larger effect on decreasing belief ratings and a subsequent increase in 
omission errors compared with a challenge made by a peer confederate.  
 
Experiment 4 
 
Method 
Participants and Design. 
Ninety-seven undergraduate students (77 female) from the University of 
Portsmouth participated in return for course credit. Ages ranged from 18 to 40 years 
(Mage = 19.42, SD = 3.81). Data for eight participants were removed prior to analysis; 
six of these guessed the aim of the experiment or reported that they were suspicious 
that the other participant was a confederate. Data for two participants were removed 
due to the experimenter or confederate making an error during testing. The final 
analysis is based on 89 participants (71 female), aged 18 to 40 years (Mage = 19.45, 
SD = 3.97). Participants received one course credit for taking part in the experiment.  
The current experiment used a between-subjects design and participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions; confederate-challenged (n = 31), 
experimenter-challenged (n = 27), and control (n = 31). We counterbalanced the use 
of two confederates (one female) in the current experiment.  
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Materials and Procedure. 
On arrival for the experimental session, the confederate and participant were 
introduced to each other as co-participants (i.e., the participant was led to believe that 
the confederate was another participant who had signed up for the same session). 
Both the participant and confederate stood side by side, facing the experimenter and 
were informed that they would perform a series of actions. The experimenter read 
aloud the name of each action, and the participant and confederate performed the 
action simultaneously. Sixty actions (e.g., take three steps forward, touch the floor, 
wave) were used in the current experiment. These actions were selected from action 
stimuli reported by Goff and Roediger (1998). Actions not requiring the use of 
objects were selected for the current experiment. Some of these actions were 
performed only once (e.g., put your hands on your hips) whereas other actions 
included a number of repetitive elements (e.g., clap your hands five times). During 
pilot testing, we asked participants to perform each action for 15 seconds following 
the instructions used by Goff and Roediger (1998) but found that participants 
stopped shortly after performing the action. We, therefore, reduced the performance 
time for each action to 5 seconds. On average, all 60 actions were performed in 5.5 
min.  
After a four-minute nonverbal number search filler task, the participant and 
confederate engaged in collaborative recall where the confederate and participants 
took turns to recall an action they had performed. The participant and confederate 
took turns to verbally recall actions until 24 actions had been recalled, in total, 12 by 
the participant and 12 by the confederate. In the confederate-challenged condition, 
the fourth and ninth actions recollected by the participant were challenged by the 
confederate saying “I don’t remember that action”. In the experimenter-challenged 
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condition, the fourth and ninth actions recollected by the participant were challenged 
by the experimenter saying “That is an incorrect action”. Participants in the control 
condition were not challenged, and actions reported in position four and nine served 
as control actions. Since in Experiment 4 the confederate made two challenges 
compared with one challenge in Experiment 3, we made the phrase more natural so 
that participants did not become suspicious of the confederate.  
After a 10-min filler task, completed in a separate room to the confederate, 
participants then completed an individual free recall task. Participants were presented 
with a blank page and were instructed to write down all of the actions that had been 
performed. There was no time limit for this task. 
Participants then provided belief and memory ratings for all 24 actions 
generated in the collaborative recall task on an 11-point scale (0 = no belief/memory, 
10 = strong belief/memory). Belief and memory ratings were given independently, 
and half of the participants provided belief ratings first, while the other half provided 
memory ratings first.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Coding  
Accuracy in the free recall task was coded by counting the number of 
correctly recalled actions. We also coded intrusion errors, where participants had 
recalled actions that were not performed. Actions challenged by the confederate or 
experimenter and control actions, were coded as reported if they were recalled, or 
omitted if they were not reported in the free recall task.  
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To describe the data and make contrasts, we report 95% confidence intervals 
for means (Cumming, 2013). All confidence intervals are based on 1,000 
bootstrapped samples unless otherwise indicated. Where assumptions were violated, 
we report the alternative statistics.  
Recall Performance 
Participants in the control condition (M = 34.35, SD = 7.53, 95% CI [31.68, 
37.06]) reported the most correct items, followed by the confederate-challenged 
condition (M = 32.74, SD = 5.70, 95% CI [30.71, 34.74]). Participants in the 
experimenter-challenged condition (M = 27.33, SD = 6.10, 95% CI [25.08, 29.56]) 
reported the fewest correct actions. A one-way ANOVA revealed an effect of 
condition, F(2, 86) = 9.04, p < .001,  = .17. Planned contrasts confirmed that 
participants in the experimenter-challenged condition reported significantly fewer 
actions than participants in both the confederate-challenged, t(86) = 3.16, p = .002, 
Mdiff = 5.41, 95% CI [2.30, 8.52] and the control conditions, t(86) = -4.16, p < .001, 
Mdiff = -7.02, 95% CI [-10.66, -3.38]. The difference between the number of actions 
recalled by participants in the confederate-challenged and control conditions was not 
statistically significant, t(86) = -.98, p =.332, Mdiff = -1.61, 95% CI [-5.01, 1.78].  
Intrusion errors were low across all conditions; confederate-challenged (M = 
0.06, SD = .25, 95% CI [.00, .16]), experimenter-challenged (M = .11, SD = .32, 95% 
CI [.00, .26]) and control (M = .13, SD = .34, 95% CI [.03, .26]). A one-way 
ANOVA revealed no statistical effect for condition, F(2, 86) = 0.37, p = .694,  
=.001. 
Omission Errors 
Following Merckelbach and colleagues (2007), we classified participants as 
making an omission error if they omitted one or two of the challenged or control 
2η
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actions. Table 6 shows the frequency of actions reported and omitted across 
conditions. A 3 (condition: confederate-challenged, experimenter-challenged and 
control) x 2 (report option: reported vs. omitted) Chi-square test revealed a 
statistically significant association between report option and condition, X2(2, N = 
89) = 21.18, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .49. We conducted follow-up tests using three 2 
(condition) x 2 (report option: reported vs. omitted) Chi-square tests, correcting for 
multiple comparisons. There was a statistically significant association between 
condition (confederate-challenged vs. experimenter-challenged) and report option, 
X2(1, n = 58) = 17.61, p <.001, ɸ = -.55, odds ratio = 12.07, 95% CI [3.48, 41.37]. 
There was also a significant association between condition (control vs. experimenter-
challenged), and report option, X2(1, n = 58) = 13.73, p <.001, ɸ = .49, odds ratio = 
8.54, 95% CI [2.59, 28.22]. However, the association between condition 
(confederate-challenged vs. control condition) and report option was not significant, 
X2(1, n = 62) = .34, p = .562, ɸ = -.07, odds ratio = 0.71, 95% CI [0.23, 2.24]. 
Omission errors were most frequent in the experimenter-challenged condition 
compared with the confederate-challenged and control condition.  
However, because the analysis above does not take into account how many 
items each participant omitted, we also examined the mean number of challenged 
and control actions reported by participants across conditions. A one-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of condition, F(2, 51.13) = 21.17, p < .001,  = .44. 
Planned contrasts showed that participants in the confederate-challenged condition 
(M = 1.77, SD = .43, 95% CI [1.16, 1.90]) reported a similar number of challenged 
actions as control actions reported by participants in the control condition (M = 1.71, 
SD = .46, 95% CI [1.55, 1.87]), t(59.60) =.57, p = 669, Mdiff = .06, 95% CI [-.16, 
.30]. However, in the experimenter-challenged condition, participants reported 
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statistically significantly fewer challenged actions (M = .63, SD = .84, 95% CI [.33, 
.96]) than both the confederate-challenged condition, t(37.31) = 6.41, p < .001, Mdiff 
= 1.15, 95% CI [.78, 1.51] and control actions reported by participants in the control 
condition t(39.15) = -5.95, p < .001, Mdiff = -1.08, 95% CI [-1.45, -.71]. Taken 
together, these results show that participants in the experimenter-challenged 
condition were more likely to omit the challenged actions in the free recall test than 
participants in both the confederate-challenged condition and control condition.  
 
Condition Omitted Reported 
Confederate-challenged 7 (22.5 %) 24 (77.5 %) 
Experimenter-challenged 21 (77.5 %) 6 (22.5 %) 
Control 9 (29 %) 22 (71 %) 
Table 6. Frequency of Reported and Omitted Actions According to Condition. 
Belief and Memory Ratings  
A one-way ANOVA, revealed a significant effect of condition on overall 
belief ratings, F(2, 49.28) = 4.23, p < .020, = .14. Planned contrasts revealed that 
participants in the experimenter-challenged condition (M = 8.72, SD = 1.95, 95% CI 
[7.95, 9.49]) rated the challenged actions statistically significantly lower than 
participants in the confederate-challenged condition (M = 9.81, SD = .49, 95% CI 
[9.63, 9.99]), t(28.92) = 2.81, p = .009, Mdiff =1.08, 95% CI [.36, 1.81]. Participants 
in the experimenter-challenged condition rated challenged actions statistically 
significantly lower than control actions rated by the control condition (M = 9.85, SD 
= .57, 96% CI [9.65, 10.06]), t(29.82) = -2.92, p = .007, Mdiff = -1.13, 95% CI [-1.87, 
-.40]. Participants in the confederate-challenged condition however did not rate 
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challenged actions significantly different to control actions rated by participants in 
the control condition, t(58.95) = -0.36, p = .721, Mdiff = -.05, 95% CI [-.32, .22]. 
These results suggest that the challenge made by the experimenter had a greater 
effect on belief than the confederate’s challenge.  
Table 7 presents the belief and memory ratings for challenged and control 
items by report option (reported or omitted). To examine belief ratings for reported 
and omitted actions, we conducted two 3 (condition: confederate-challenged, 
experimenter-challenged and control) x 2 (report option: reported vs. omitted) mixed 
ANOVAs, one for each of the challenged or control actions. For the first action, we 
found no effect for condition, F(2, 83) = 2.75, p = .07,  = .06, and no effect for 
report option, F(1, 83) = 1.43, p = .235,  = .02. The interaction was not significant, 
F(2, 83) = 2.47. p = .091,  = .06. For the second action, there was also no effect for 
condition, F(2, 83) = 2.40, p = .097,  = .06, and no effect for report option, F(1, 
83) = 2.36, p = .129,  = .03. The interaction was not significant, F(2, 83) = 2.46, p 
= .092,  = .06. This finding shows that when looking specifically at reported and 
omitted items there were no effects on belief ratings.  
For memory ratings, a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect for 
condition, F(2, 51.45) = 4.86, p = .012,  = .09. Planned contrasts indicated that 
participants in the confederate-challenged condition (M = 9.19, SD = 1.07, 95% CI 
[8.80, 9.59]) rated challenged actions lower than the control actions rated by 
participants in the control condition (M = 9.69, SD = .85, 95% CI [9.38, 10.00]), 
t(57.17) = -2.03, p = .047, Mdiff = -.50, 95% CI [-.99, -.01]. Participants in the 
experimenter-challenged condition (M = 8.72, SD = 1.57, 95% CI [8.10, 9.34]) also 
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Table 7. Mean (SD), and 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) for Belief and Memory Ratings According to Condition and Report Outcome 
 
 
 
 
  Belief Memory 
  Reported Omitted Reported Omitted 
Condition Action M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
Confederate-
challenged 
Action 1 9.70 (.82) [9.37, 9.93] 9.75 (.50) [9.25, 10.00] 9.59 (.80) [9.26, 9.85] 6.75 (2.22) [5.25, 9.00] 
Action 2 9.89 (.42) [9.71, 10.00] 10.00 (.00) [10.00, 10.00] 9.32 (1.28) [8.82, 9.75] 7.67 (2.08) [6.00, 10.00] 
Experimenter-
challenged 
Action 1 9.71 (.49) [9.43, 10.00] 7.95 (2.82) [6.65, 9.10] 9.57 (.79) [9.00, 10.00] 8.10 (1.89) [7.2, 8.90] 
Action 2 9.90 (.32) [9.70, 10.00] 8.53 (2.18) [7.53, 9.47] 9.90 (.32) [9.70, 10.00] 8.41 (2.09) [7.41, 9.29] 
Control 
Action 1 9.80 (1.00) [9.40, 10.00] 10.00 (.00) [10.00, 10.00] 9.92 (.40) [9.76, 10.00] 8.5 (2.81) [6.17, 10.00] 
Action 2 9.89 (.42) [9.71, 10.00] 9.67 (.58) [9.00, 10.00] 9.86 (.59) [9.61, 10.00] 8.67 (2.31) [6.00, 10.00] 
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rated challenged actions lower than the control actions rated by the control condition 
t(38.85) = -2.87, p = .007, Mdiff = -.97, 95% CI [-1.62, -.32]. Memory ratings for the 
challenged actions rated by both the confederate and experimenter-challenged 
conditions were not significantly different, t(44.90) = 1.32, p = .195, Mdiff = .47, 95% 
CI [-.23, 1.17]. These results suggest that both the confederate and experimenter´s 
challenge had an effect on memory strength, with the experimenter’s challenge 
having a greater effect than the confederate’s challenge.  
Table 7 shows the belief and memory ratings for challenged and control 
actions by report option (reported or omitted). As with belief ratings, we conducted 
two 3 (condition: confederate-challenged, experimenter-challenged and control) x 2 
(report option: reported vs. omitted) mixed ANOVAs for memory ratings. There was 
no effect for condition, F(2, 83) = 2.50, p = .089,  = .06, but there was a 
significant effect for report option F(1, 83) = 27.20, p < .001,  = .25. The 
interaction was not significant F(2, 83) = 1.43, p = .244,  = .03. For the second 
action, there was no significant effect for condition, F(2, 83) = 1.18, p = .312,  = 
.03, but a significant effect for report option, F(1, 83) = 12.08, p = .001,  = .13. 
The interaction was not significant, F(2, 83) = 0.09, p = .916,  <.01. These 
findings are consistent with the pattern of results presented in Table 7. Memory 
ratings were lower for omitted actions than for reported actions across all conditions.  
In sum, as in Experiment 3, we found that a social challenge to participants’ 
memories resulted in omission errors. However, in Experiment 4 only participants 
challenged by the experimenter made omission errors above the rate of omission 
errors occurring in the control condition. In Experiment 4 we also found that 
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participants who were challenged by the experimenter reported significantly lower 
belief ratings than participants in the confederate-challenged condition and control 
condition. However, for memory, we found that omitted items received significantly 
lower ratings for memory than items that were reported. Thus, our social challenge 
delivered by the experimenter appears to have resulted in omission errors and the 
attenuation of belief, but also the attenuation of recollection.  
 
General Discussion 
 
 The current research examined whether providing participants with negative 
misinformation in the form of a challenge from either a confederate or an 
experimenter resulted omission errors and whether these omission errors were 
characterised by attenuated belief ratings. Over two experiments, we demonstrated 
that a challenge from a confederate (Expt. 3) or an experimenter (Expt. 4) resulted in 
omission errors. In Experiment 3 we found that participants who had their memory 
challenged by a confederate were not only more likely to omit the challenged item, 
but also provided lower belief ratings for the challenged items. In Experiment 4, we 
also found that participants who were challenged by the experimenter were less 
likely to report the challenged item and also reported lower belief ratings for the 
challenged items. However, in both experiments we found that where omission errors 
occurred, there was a significant decrease in participants’ memory ratings for 
challenged items, suggesting that omission errors were not only characterised by a 
decrease in belief strength, but also a decrease in recollection strength.  
 In both experiments, challenging participants’ recollections resulted in 
omission errors during a subsequent recall task. In Experiment 3, consistent with 
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Merckelbach et al. (2007), participants who had their recollections challenged by a 
confederate were less likely to report the challenged item on the recall test. However, 
the percentage of participants in the confederate-challenged condition who made an 
omission error was much lower (37%) compared with the experiment by 
Merckelbach et al. (2007) where 72% of participants made at least one omission 
error. That is, the frequency of omission errors in our experiment was almost 50% 
lower than in Merckelbach et al. (2007). One possible explanation for this could be 
because the confederate only challenged one item in our experiment, whereas the 
confederate in Merckelbach et al. challenged two items. Merckelbach et al. classified 
participants as ‘omitters’ in their analysis irrespective of whether they made one or 
two omission errors. Thus, participants in Merckelbach et al. had two opportunities 
to be classified as omitters, whereas in our experiment there was only one 
opportunity to omit a target item. Therefore, our lower rate of omission errors could 
be explained by the reduced opportunity to make an omission error.  
In Experiment 4, the omission error results from Experiment 3 were not 
replicated, in relation to the confederate-challenged condition. Instead, in Experiment 
4, it was the challenge made by the experimenter which resulted in omission errors. 
Taken together, the results from Experiment 3 and 4 suggest that the relationship 
between belief, recollection, and omission errors are affected by how the negative 
misinformation is delivered. In Experiment 3, the confederate used a direct statement 
to challenge the participant’s recollection by specifically questioning whether the 
item was present in the original scene (“The [name of item] that you mentioned was 
certainly not present in this picture; otherwise I would have noticed that”). However, 
in Experiment 4, the confederate used a statement, (“I don’t remember that action”), 
which was less direct, and could have been interpreted by the participant as the 
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confederate not recollecting the action, as opposed to them not actually performing 
the action. The experimenter’s challenge in Experiment 4 (“That is an incorrect 
action”), resembled the stronger challenge made by the confederate in Experiment 3 
in that it specifically called into question that the action had been performed. 
Therefore, it seems that the strength of the phrase and/or the participants’ perception 
of the strength of the challenge is an important factor in the formation of omission 
errors. Research on the effect of misleading questions has shown that the specific 
wording of a misleading question can influence the reports people make about past 
experiences (e.g., Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Future research should examine how 
differing degrees of social influence can affect people’s belief. For example, how 
direct the social challenge is could be one variable which might be manipulated. 
Based on the findings from this research, it might be predicted that more direct 
feedback which makes a specific challenge would result in a higher frequency of 
omission errors compared with an indirect challenge.  
In both experiments, we found that omission errors were rated lower for both 
belief and memory strength. While the finding that omission errors received lower 
belief ratings is in line with our expectations, we had not predicted memory ratings to 
also be low. Previous research (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014) has also 
found that negative misinformation which resulted in nonbelieved memories also had 
an effect on memory ratings. However, in Clark et al. (2012) and Mazzoni et al. 
(2014), their manipulation had a greater effect on belief ratings and the change in 
memory ratings was only small (and not significant). With respect to the current 
findings, one possible explanation could be that our manipulation challenged not 
only participants’ belief, but also their recollection. Scoboria et al. (in press) argue 
that what they called ‘weak’ nonbelieved – characterised by low belief and 
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recollection ratings - are more likely to occur following manipulations which 
question the recollective qualities of the memory. 
In Experiment 4 we found that participants in the experimenter-challenged 
condition reported lower belief ratings than participants in both the confederate-
challenged and control conditions. Participants in the experimenter-challenged 
condition also reported fewer correct actions in the free recall task, suggesting that 
the challenge made by the experimenter could have caused participants to raise their 
criterion for reporting recollections. Challenges from both the confederate in 
Experiment 3 and the experimenter in Experiment 4 resulted in participants being 
less likely to report recollections that had been challenged. These findings suggest 
that it is not the production of nonbelieved memories that results in omission errors. 
Instead, our results fit best within the model proposed by Koriat and Goldsmith 
(1996). That is, people decide to withhold memories about which they are unsure: the 
attenuation of belief is not a necessary pre-condition for omission errors. Koriat and 
Goldsmith’s model suggests that a recollection will be withheld if the cost of 
reporting the recollection outweighs the probability of the recollection being correct. 
Although we cannot rule out that participants felt that they had to be as accurate as 
possible, our data suggest that participants’ decision to report or omit their 
recollections was based on new information obtained from the confederate or 
experimenter, and not the situational demands.  
Looking at the data in Table 7 it is clear that belief and memory ratings were, 
overall, very high in Experiment 4. Participants were asked to provide belief and 
memory ratings only a short time after performing the actions. Previous research 
aimed at eliciting nonbelieved memories has employed a longer delay between 
encoding and delay (e.g., Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014). Future research 
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should increase the delay between encoding and challenging the recollection. It could 
be hypothesised that as the delay increases, participants could become more 
susceptible to the challenge by the confederate or the experimenter.  
One of the novel aspects of Experiment 4 is the use of self-performed actions. 
We predicted that by performing the actions, recollections would be more self-
relevant than the recollections of items in Experiment 3. Self-relevance is an 
important aspect of episodic and autobiographical memories, and past research on 
nonbelieved memories has focused predominantly on episodic and autobiographical 
memories. In Experiment 4, it is not clear whether personal relevance was important, 
since participants in the confederate-challenged condition did not omit challenged 
actions compared with either the control condition or the confederate-challenged 
condition in Experiment 3. Future research should examine whether self-relevance is 
an important factor in the retention of recollection for events that individuals have 
since ceased to believe to have occurred.  
There are practical implications to the current research. Previous research has 
shown that omission errors occur following negative misinformation from a 
confederate acting as a co-witness (Merckelbach et al., 2007). While we replicated 
these findings in Experiment 3, in Experiment 4 we were not able to replicate this 
finding. This could be, as predicted, that the self-relevant actions performed in 
Experiment 4 are more difficult to challenge than the items in Experiment 3. That is, 
when the memory to be challenged is of personal relevance, negative misinformation 
from a peer appears to be ineffective. However, when negative misinformation from 
a more reliable source, the experimenter, was introduced then our results suggest that 
this is effective (Otgaar et al., 2016).  
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In sum, in contrast to research suggesting a relationship between nonbelieved 
memories and omission errors, we did not find that nonbelieved memories led to 
increased omission errors in the present experiments. These results suggest that the 
link between belief, recollection, and the reporting of memories is rather more 
complex than is often assumed. A key recommendation emerging from our findings 
is that future research place greater emphasis on the interplay between the role of 
various forms of social feedback and its impact on belief, recollection, and the 
retrieval of autobiographical memories. There are many situations where people 
share and discuss their memories, and the current findings raise important questions 
about how other people can both support and undermine our recollection of the past.  
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Chapter 5 - Thesis General Discussion 
 
The core aim of the experiments presented in this thesis was to examine whether 
there was an association between nonbelieved memories and omission errors. 
Specifically, the main hypothesis was that omission errors would occur when 
individuals attenuated their belief about past experiences. The current research 
represents the first attempt to test this hypothesis experimentally. In this discussion, 
an overview of the results from the four experiments is presented first, before the 
theoretical and practical implications are considered. In the final sections, some of 
the limitations of the current research and suggestions for future research are 
explored. 
Summary of Findings 
One of the most interesting and consistent findings from the four experiments 
presented in this thesis was that belief was only attenuated when participants’ 
memories were challenged. In both Experiments 1 and 2, negative misinformation 
was introduced to participants in the form of withheld items. In both experiments, 
there was no effect of withholding items on the belief ratings for those items. 
However, in Experiments 3 and 4, a ‘social’ challenge was introduced whereby 
participants received negative misinformation from a confederate. In both 
Experiments 3 and 4, this social feedback resulted in the attenuation of belief ratings 
for the omitted items. This finding is of particular interest because previous research 
(e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2010; Scoboria et al. 2014) has found that people who have a 
naturally occurring nonbelieved memory most commonly report social feedback 
(e.g., being told by someone else that the event did not occur) as the main reason that 
led them to attenuate belief in that particular memory. In addition, research that has 
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elicited nonbelieved memories in the laboratory has also tended to use social 
manipulations (such as the experimenter telling participants that they have falsely 
remembered performing an action; Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014). 
  Another interesting finding from these experiments relates to the frequency of 
omission errors. In previous research, omission errors were elicited by re-presenting 
participants with a previously seen stimulus (e.g., a series of drawings depicting a 
couple going on a date ), with some items (in this case one of the drawings) withheld 
(Wright et al., 2001), or by having a confederate challenge a participant’s memory 
(Merckelbach et al., 2007). In Experiments 1 and 2, similar to the procedure used by 
Wright et al. (2001), omission errors were elicited by initially presenting participants 
with scenes showing a collection of household items (e.g., a kitchen scene showing a 
fork, a knife, a plate). Participants were then shown those scenes again but with some 
items from the scenes (e.g., the fork) omitted. Although this procedure did result in 
some omission errors for the omitted items such errors were scarce. Using a 
procedure similar to Merckelbach et al. (2007), in Experiments 3 and 4 participants 
had their memories challenged by either a confederate (Expts. 3 & 4) or the 
experimenter (Expt. 4). In Experiments 3 and 4 we found a higher rate of omission 
errors than in Experiments 1 and 2. In fact, the frequency of omission errors in 
Experiments 3 and 4 was comparable to other omission error studies (e.g. 
Merckelbach et al., 2007). Again, the main difference between Experiments 1 and 2 
and Experiments 3 and 4 is the use of a confederate to challenge participant’s 
recollection in the latter experiment. This finding suggests that omission errors occur 
more readily following a social challenge.  
 In both Experiments 3 and 4 we found that social feedback which challenged 
participants’ memories resulted in both omission errors and the attenuation of belief. 
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While this was in line with our expectations, we did, however, also find that the 
social feedback had a decreasing effect on participants’ recollection ratings for 
challenged items. While this finding is interesting, it is also interesting that 
recollection ratings decreased along with belief ratings.  
In summary, our results suggest that there is an important link between 
omission error and the attenuation of belief, but only in situations where participants 
received challenging social information. Below, we discuss the findings from the 
current research and the theoretical implications of our findings.  
Theoretical Implications 
The research presented in this thesis is grounded in the idea that recollecting 
an event and believing that an event occurred are dissociable components of 
remembering the past (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Scoboria et al., 2014; Scoboria et 
al., 2004). The results of the experiments reported here do not demonstrate 
conclusively that belief and recollection can be dissociated when focussing on 
omission errors. In Experiments 3 and 4, challenged items and actions received lower 
belief ratings. Previous research has found that people with naturally occurring 
nonbelieved memories most commonly report that they attenuated their belief when 
they received social feedback (Mazzoni et al., 2010; Scoboria at al., 2015). Also, 
researchers have used social feedback from an experimenter to elicit nonbelieved 
memories in laboratory settings (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014; Otgaar et 
al., 2013). Social feedback therefore seems to be a critical factor associated with the 
attenuation of belief.  
We also found, however, that challenged items and actions also received 
recollection ratings which were lower than for items that were not challenged. This 
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finding that both belief and recollection for challenged items were rated lower for 
both belief and recollection than non-challenged items suggests that the social 
feedback had an effect on participants’ ratings of both belief and recollection. While 
this finding was surprising since we had expected challenged memories to be 
characterised by high recollection ratings accompanied by low belief ratings, 
previous research has also found that social challenges result in the attenuation of 
both belief and recollection (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014). However, 
participants in the research conducted by Clark et al., (2012) and Mazzoni et al., 
(2014) were presented with video evidence which could have enhanced their memory 
for them performing the actions. Thus, previous research may have used a procedure 
which resulted in more robust memories than in our research.  
It is perhaps not surprising that social feedback is most commonly associated 
with attenuating belief in recollections, given that autobiographical memory provides 
the material required for conversations with others (Bluck, Alea, Habernas, & Rubin 
2005). How we discuss our memories with other people can reshape our memories of 
the past. For example Marsh (2007) makes a distinction between recalling and 
retelling previously experienced events. The distinction Marsh (2007) emphasises is 
that recalling is an accurate and detailed account of the past, while retelling is 
dependent on the goals of the person telling the memory. Often when we share our 
memories with other people, we reshape the story to fit with the audience, as 
observed by Bartlett (1932) with participants’ retellings of the story ‘The War of the 
Ghosts’. Sharing our memories with other people also provides an opportunity for 
other people to challenge our memories (Gabbert et al., 2006; Merckelbach et al., 
2007). Therefore our recollections and beliefs are subject to constant revision and 
change in light of conversations with other people. It is also not surprising that 
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memories are subject to revision following social feedback given that research has 
found that people often rely on other people to verify their memories. For example, 
recent research has shown that people often consider other people, such as family 
and friends, to be a reliable source of information when attempting to verify their 
memories (Wade et al., 2014). Thus, social feedback might be the most commonly 
reported reason for people to attenuate their belief because memories are often 
discussed with other people. 
We also found that omission errors were more likely to occur following a 
social challenge (Expts. 3 & 4) compared with a non-social challenge (Expts. 1 & 2). 
While previous research had found that social challenges resulted in a high frequency 
of omission errors, 72% in Merckelbach et al. (2007), previous research had also 
found that 56% of participants made an omission errors using a non-social paradigm 
(Wright et al., 2001). However, the procedure used by Wright et al. (2001) was not 
entirely non-social. Recall that Wright et al. asked participants to copy a series of 
drawings depicting a couple going on a date. When participants returned a week 
later, they were shown a copy of the drawings to use to tell a story. However, 
participants were told that this copy of the drawings was done by another participant. 
Thus, while there was not a direct social feedback from another participant, there was 
an implicit social element in this experimental design. It is not possible to know 
whether this social element had an effect on the frequency of omission errors. 
However, in Experiment 1 and 2 reported in this thesis, participants were not given 
any information suggesting a social element. In Experiments 1 and 2 we found 
omission errors only occurred rarely. There is, therefore, scope for further research 
examining the impact of social influence on the occurrence of omission errors given 
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that previous research using explicit (Merckelbach et al., 2007) and implicit (Wright 
et al., 2001) social feedback has found omission errors. 
Practical Implications 
 The results of the experiments reported here support previous research (e.g. 
Merckelbach et al., 2007), showing that socially challenging peoples’ memories 
result in omission errors. Given that research has shown that it is not uncommon for 
eyewitnesses to discuss a witnessed event with other witnesses (Skagerberg & 
Wright, 2008) there is an obvious concern that social feedback could result in 
witnesses omitting important information when interviewed by police. If a witness 
discusses a co-witnessed event with another witness at the scene and mentions a 
detail that was not seen by the other witness, a challenge from the other witness 
could result in an omission error. The consequence of the witness making an 
omission error could be that investigators are unable to follow up a lead which is 
relevant to their investigation. The question then is whether there is a way to 
encourage people to report memories that have been challenged by other people. For 
example, the Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) instructs witnesses to 
only report what they saw. Therefore, one question for future research is whether 
adopting good interviewing techniques such as the Cognitive Interview will reduce 
the frequency of omission errors. Further research might also explore whether 
warnings or specific instructions might also be beneficial with respect to eliciting 
information which has been ‘weakened’ by a challenge. 
 The current research may also be relevant to cases where people claim to 
have been the victim of sexual abuse but later retract their claim (see for example 
Ost, in press). In such cases, these ‘retractors’ initially report that they were abused, 
but then, for some reason, withdraw their claim. There are of course a number of 
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reasons that someone alleging sexual abuse would come to retract their claim. For 
example, the alleged victim might have been told by the alleged abuser that they did 
not abuse them or perhaps the claim was without merit, based on suggestive memory 
recovery techniques used by some therapists (Ost, Costall & Bull, 2001). Our results 
show that challenging people’s recollections of past events can make them less likely 
to be reported in subsequent memory tests. What is not clear is whether our findings 
would replicate in a situation where a highly personal memory is the focus of the 
challenge. Of course, there are significant ethical issues in designing experimental 
research to address research questions surrounding highly personal and traumatic 
memories. Nonetheless, future work might consider how best to design 
methodologies to capture omission errors in real-world situations. 
Limitations 
 One of the limitations of these experiments is that, like most other lab 
investigations of nonbelieved memories and omission errors, ecological validity was 
low. In reality, challenges to a person’s memory are more likely to occur in a 
conversational setting as opposed to a simple statement or withholding an item from 
a previously seen scene in a highly controlled environment. This raises the possibility 
that social feedback could operate via a number of factors which were not present in 
our experiments. For example, when people discuss their memories in real world 
settings, a challenge by another person is likely to be followed by a discussion. 
Indeed, if someone challenged my memory of writing this thesis I would not simply 
accept the challenge and stop believing that I had in fact written it. Instead, I would 
want to question the challenge and understand why the challenger disputes my 
recollection. In our experiments we prevented participants asking questions about 
why it appeared their recollection was inaccurate. Previous research (Clark et al., 
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2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014) challenged participants’ memories using a debriefing 
which provided participants with an explanation for why they had falsely 
remembered the challenged memories. Future research should allow participants the 
opportunity to discuss their challenged recollections with their challenger to 
determine whether, with more information and rationalisation, belief is attenuated 
and the frequency of omission errors increases. 
 The personal relevance of a memory might influence how willing we are to 
re-appraise our memory. In Experiment 4 we asked participants to perform simple 
actions. The purpose of using self-performed actions was to increase the personal 
relevance of the stimuli. Naturally occurring nonbelieved memories, such as the one 
reported by Piaget (1951) tend to be for highly personal and self-relevant events 
(e.g., almost being kidnapped). It is questionable how personally relevant memories 
of performing a simple action in a laboratory setting really are. While it would be 
interesting for future research to challenge participants’ recollections of true, 
personally relevant events from their past, there are ethical issues to consider. After 
all, it is one thing to implant a false memory for having being in a hot-air balloon and 
then to remove the false memory (Wade et al., 2002), but it is an entirely different 
issue to challenge people’s personal memories of the past. Perhaps the use of a more 
interactive activity in which people must complete certain actions to achieve a goal 
might offer one opportunity to study more self-relevant recollections. It might be 
predicted that using such a procedure, the more self-relevant the recollections are 
(e.g., memory for an achievement), the more likely people will be to retain the 
recollection while attenuating their belief that the event occurred.  
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Future Research Directions 
The results of the present research reiterate the importance of social processes 
in the attenuation of belief. There is clear evidence converging on the idea that social 
influence is important in the attenuation of belief (e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2010; 
Scoboria et al., 2014), and further research is needed to understand the social 
processes involved in the elicitation of nonbelieved memories. Previous research has 
shown that the credibility of the person providing social feedback can influence how 
willing people are to accept the social feedback. For example, Hoffman et al. (2001) 
undermined the credibility of a confederate who provided participants with 
misleading post-event information and found that participants were less susceptible 
to the misleading post-event information (see also Gabbert et al., 2007). 
Interestingly, children appear to be more susceptible to misleading post-event 
information when it is provided by their parents, who, presumably, they consider 
credible (Poole & Lindsay, 2001). While Experiments 3 and 4 of the current research 
examined social feedback from a peer-confederate or an experimenter, future 
research should examine influence other people could have. For example, if a parent 
was to challenge one of their children’s memories of the past, would this cause the 
attenuation of belief more than when a stranger challenges their memory? Since 
research has shown that asking other people is a common method of verifying 
memories (Wade et al., 2014), it might be predicted that a relative would be 
considered more reliable and credible than someone unknown to the rememberer.  
Another important question which also needs to be addressed in future work 
relates to the potential of important individual differences between participants who 
have a nonbelieved memory and those who do not. While research has found that one 
in five people report having a nonbelieved memory (Mazzoni et al., 2010), it seems 
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plausible to argue that more people have had their memories of the past challenged. 
Thus, there are interesting questions to be asked about why some people develop 
nonbelieved memories while others do not. Indeed, research has shown that some 
people continue to have a strong recollection of an event even when their recollection 
is challenged. For example, Sheen, Kemp and Rubin (2001) found that twins and 
even same-sex friends can often dispute the ownership of a memory. One such 
example of a disputed memory is from a twin sample where each had a recollection 
of being sent home from school for a uniform violation. However, while both of 
them remembered it being them who was sent home, this event actually only 
occurred to one member of the pair. Such recollections show that in the presence of 
social feedback, some people defend their memories. Similar findings have been 
found in the nonbelieved memories literature (Otgaar et al., 2013). Future research 
should examine the individual differences of those participants who relinquish belief 
compared with those who defend their original memory even in the face of social 
feedback challenging their recollection. It might be predicted that factors such as 
suggestibility and compliance could explain why some people are more willing to 
attenuate their belief following a social challenge. Research has found that 
suggestibility and compliance are factors associated with false confessions 
(Gudjonsson, 1989) which have also been associated with changes in beliefs about 
the past (Scoboria et al., 2014).  
 Finally, future research should examine the effect of delay on the elicitation 
of nonbelieved memories and omission errors. Previous research which attempted to 
elicit nonbelieved memories (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014) and omission 
errors (Wright et al., 2001) used a procedure which allowed a greater amount of time 
to pass between encoding the original stimuli and being exposed to the misleading 
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information (but see Merckelbach et al., 2007). In naturally occurring nonbelieved 
memories, there are often many years between the original event and the time at 
which the person attenuated their belief that the event occurred. For example, 
Mazzoni et al. (2010) found that nonbelieved memories were, on average for events 
at age seven years old, and belief was attenuated at around age 15 years old. Thus, 
around eight years had passed between the original event occurring and the time at 
which the event was re-appraised. In experimental settings, the delay between the 
original event occurring and the challenge has been as long as a few days (Clark et 
al. 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014) but more typically in experimental research, the delay 
is not manipulated and the retrieval interval is only several minutes. The experiments 
presented in this thesis did not allow for an extended time delay. This comparison 
raises an interesting question: does a decrease in activation of memories over time 
result in greater susceptibility to misinformation? Research has shown that 
participants are more susceptible to the effects of socially administered misleading 
post-event information when a greater amount of time has passed (Paterson, Kemp & 
Forgas, 2009). It, therefore, could be predicted that as the amount of time between 
the original event and the social feedback increases, so too could the participant’s 
susceptibility to the social feedback. 
Concluding Remarks  
While the results of the current research only show a weak link between the 
elicitation of nonbelieved memories and the occurrence of omission errors, there is 
evidence to suggest that when recollections are socially challenged, people do 
attenuate their belief for the challenged recollection. We did, however, observe a 
decrease in recollection ratings which was not observed for non-challenged items. 
Thus, while our results do support the previous speculation about the association 
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between nonbelieved memories and omission errors, our results do not show belief to 
have been dissociated from recollection substantially. The research presented in this 
thesis makes a useful contribution to the literature examining the social effects on 
memory. Participants in our research did become less likely to report memories when 
they had been challenged socially. These findings are largely consistent with 
previous research and demonstrate that other people can have a significant impact on 
what we remember about the past. The results of this research raise some interesting 
questions about the influence of other people on our recollections and beliefs about 
the past. Our findings show that social challenges influence both belief and 
recollection, and under some circumstances also result in omission errors.  
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